Effects of taxes and transfer payments on married women's labour supply and welfare by Kawaguchi, Akira
EFFECTS OF TAXES AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS ON 
MARRIED WOMEN'S LABOUR SUPPLY AND WELFARE 
By 
Akira Kawaguchi 
Australia-Japan Research Centre 
Research Schcx)! of Pacific Studies 
Australian National University 
A thesis submined for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the Australian National University. 
February 1991 
Declaration 
Except where otherwise indicated 
This work is my own work 
Akira Kawaguchi 
February 1991 
m 
Acknowledgements 
I am indebted to Bob Gregory, Peter Drysdale, Bruce Chapman, and John 
Beggs who as supervisors provided assistance, guidance and encouragement. I am 
also indebted to my advisor, Paul S heard, for his constructive comments and 
suggestions. 
I would like to thank Richard Comes, George Fane, Keizo Mizuno, Adrian 
Pagan, Keiko Shimono and Peter Smith for helpful comments on the work. I have to 
express my special thanks to James Jordan who read the final draft and provided 
valuable comments. Any deficiencies or errors in the work are, however, the sole 
responsibility of the author. 
I am deeply grateful to the Australia-Japan Foundation for granting me a 
Postgraduate Scholarship for four years. 
Finally, I would like to thank John McCallum for his invaluable assistance and 
encouragement in many aspects of my hfe. I owe much to Yukie, my wife, for her 
continuing encouragement and support. 
IV 
Abstract 
It has been observed that the labour supply of married women is sensitive to 
wage rate and nonwage income as well as to other socio-economic variables. It is of 
interest, for economists and policy makers, to measure the effects of taxes and transfer 
payments on the labour supply and welfare of married women. In the last two 
decades, much effort has been devoted to the development of the theory of labour 
supply and to the application of this theory to policy analysis. 
This thesis intends to contribute to the study of labour supply on three counts. A 
usual way of estimating a system of labour supply and a demand functions is to 
estimate the labour supply function only, and parameters in the demand function are 
identified by the budget constraint and the labour supply function. We will discuss that 
a labour supply function estimated in this way is valid even if there exists a certain 
form of an unobservable transaction cost We also show that, under certain types of 
nonlinear budget constraints, the utility consistency of the labour supply function can 
be examined in a similar way to that of the labour supply function with linear budget 
constraints, and dual functions and identities still hold. Moreover, we develop a 
method of estimating utility consistent labour supply under an endogenous market 
wage rate. 
Individuals generally pay labour market entry costs such as the expenses of 
transportation, uniforms, child care, and self education. A part of these entry costs is 
paid for indirectly by the government through the deduction of these expenses from 
taxable income and through subsidies for child care. Our second contribution is to 
derive a numerical expression for the effects, on labour supply and earnings, of two 
types of subsidies for market entry, and to measure these effects using Australian data. 
The estimation result shows that if the government gave a lump sum subsidy to all 
working wives, a one dollar subsidy will increase an average wife's wage income by 
$1.10, and if the government gave a subsidy that was proportional to the number of 
hours worked, to all woridng wives, a one dollar subsidy would increase an average 
wife's wage income by $2.36. 
Our third contribution is to estimate a labour supply function with piecewise-
linear budget constraints, and to assess several tax reforms. We shall focus especially 
on the difference between a tax system under which tax rates are based on individual 
income (individual-income-based tax system) and a tax system under which tax rates 
are based on a couple's joint income (joint-income-based tax system). We find that if 
both the pre-reform tax system and the post-reform tax system are based on individual 
income, introducing a single rate tax system will reduce the work effort of married 
women, and increase the excess burden of taxes. On the other hand, if both the pre-
reform tax system and the post-reform tax system are joint-income-based, introducing 
a single rate tax system would encourage the work effort of married women, and 
reduce the excess burden of taxes. A lesson from this result is that similar tax reforms 
may have quite different effects on the labour supply and the welfare of married 
women according to whether the tax rate is based on individual income or on a 
couple's joint income. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1. Motivation 
In the last two decades, much effort has been devoted to developing the theory 
of labour supply and to the application of this theory to policy analysis. The major 
developments have occurred in five areas. 
First, when a labour supply function is specified, its consistency with the utility 
maximization of the household has been more rigorously considered. Most early 
studies estimated linear reduced form equations in which the hours of work variable is 
regressed against explanatory variables such as the wage rate, nonwage income, 
spouse's labour market status and other socio-economic variables. Recently, however, 
many authors have derived the labour supply function from an explicit utility function 
(see Leuthold (1968), Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1975), Wales and Woodland 
(1976,1977), and Rosen (1978)). Alternatively, several authors have integrated the 
labour supply function to recover the utility function (see Hausman (1981a), and an 
excellent survey by Stem (1986)). 
An advantage of specifying the labour supply function so that it is consistent 
with utility maximizing behaviour is that the estimation results can be used for further 
analyses. For instance, utility consistent labour supply functions are widely adopted 
for the assessment of tax systems (see, for instance, Rosen (1978), Hausman (1981a, 
1981b, 1981c), Glaister, McGlone, and Ulph (1981), Apps (1987, 1988), Apps, 
Jones and Savage (1988), Apps and Savage (1987), and Blundell Meghir, Symons, 
and Walker (1988)). Utility consistent labour supply functions have been also used to 
measure a fixed market entry cost (see Cogan (1981), and Hausman (1980)). 
Second, a method of estimation in the presence of a piecewise-linear 
budgetconstraint has been developed. Most empirical studies, even now, ignore the 
existence of taxes and regress the hours of work variable on the market wage and on 
gross nonwage income. Several authors linearized the piecewise-linear budget 
constraint by extending the line segment along which an individual's labour supply is 
observed (see Hall (1973), and Wales and Woodland (1976, 1977)). This method, 
however, suffers from endogeneity bias since the observed virtual wage rate and 
virtual income (as defined in Chapter 2) are correlated with an optimization error. 
A more sophisticated method has been developed by Burtless and Hausman 
(1978) and Wales and Woodland (1979). They use information not only from the line 
segment along which the labour supply is observed, but also from the whole budget 
constraint Hence, this method is called the "full information method." This method is 
free from endogeneity bias, and moreover, the estimated parameters of the labour 
supply function, and hence of the utility function, are valid under any alternative 
budget constraint. The latter property is useful when we simulate behaviour under an 
alternative tax system (see also Hausman (1979, 1981b, 1981c), Ashworth and Ulph 
(1981), Ruffel (1981), and Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) for discussion and empirical 
application of the full information method). 
Third, methods of estimating censored and truncated regression models have 
been developed. The first theoretical work was done by Tobin (1958). More recently, 
Gronau (1973, 1974) pointed out the importance of selectivity bias for estimation of 
the wage rate, and Heckman (1974a) developed a simultaneous model of an offered 
wage equation and a shadow wage equation. A major breakthrough was the two step 
estimation method presented by Heckman (1976a, 1979). He suggested estimating the 
participation decision by probit as the first step, and then in the second step, adding 
consistent estimates of the inverse of Mill's ratio to the wage and the hours of work 
equations. This method is so easy that it is now often used for censored regression 
models. Asymptotic covariance matrices for the two step method were offered by 
several authors (e.g., Heckman (1979), Lee, Maddala, and Trost (1980), and see 
Maddala (1983) for a survey of censored and truncated regression models). 
Fourth, intra-household bargaining has been modelled explicitly. The 
conventional model of labour supply derives household behaviour from the 
maximization of a unique household utility function. This formalization, however, can 
be criticized on two counts. First, there are many other methods of household 
decision-making. There is no clear reason, except practical convenience, to specify 
family decision-making in that way. Second, the traditional approach does not provide 
helpful tools for analyzing separately the welfare of each family member. For instance, 
if a family has Samuelson's (1956) ordinal social welfare function, a person's own 
nonwage income and the nonwage income of that person's spouse have the same 
effect on that person's welfare, because the family pools all of its income and divides 
it so that family welfare is maximized. 
Recendy, alternative models of household decision making processes have been 
provided. Manser and Brown (1979, 1980) considered the implications of Nash and 
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining for the marriage decision and for household labour 
supply. McElroy and Homey (1981) generalized conventional demand functions in the 
context of Nash bargaining. Apps and Jones (1986) applied an intra-family trade 
model to analyze the effects of taxes on the labour supply and welfare of married 
women. Chiappori (1988) derived feasible conditions on household behaviour from a 
Pareto efficient agreement hypothesis. Applications of intra-family bargaining models 
for empirical studies are, however, rare (see Apps (1988) for an exception). 
Finally, a life-cycle labour supply model has been developed A life-cycle model 
assumes that individuals try to maximize a life-time utility function subject to a life-
time budget constraint. Modem developments in life-cycle labour supply began with 
Heckman (1974b, 1976b), Ghez and Becker (1975), and Smith (1977). Heckman 
(1974b) explained the relation between wage income and consumption over the life-
cycle using a life-cycle utility maximizing model. Ghez and Becker (1975) made a 
distinction between anticipated wage changes along the life-cycle profile and 
unanticipated wage changes caused by shifts of the profile. Heckman (1976b) 
presented a life-cycle model in which learning activity is modelled expliciUy. 
An important development is due to Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and to 
MaCurdy (1981). Under a certain assumption, labour supply can be expressed as a 
function of the current wage rate and of the marginal utility of income (A), which is 
constant over the life-cycle after suitable discounting. Although A is unobservable, it 
can be eliminated from the labour supply function by taking a differential form (see 
Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985), Blundell (1986), Blundell and Walker (1986), 
and Altonji (1986) for recent developments of the life-cycle model). 
This thesis intends to contribute to these studies in three ways. First, a usual 
way of estimating a system of a labour supply function and a demand function is to 
estimate the labour supply function only, and parameters in the demand function are 
identified by the budget constraint and the labour supply function. We will discuss that 
a labour supply function estimated in this way is valid even if there exists a certain 
form of an unobservable transaction cost. We also show that, under certain types of 
nonlinear budget constraints, the utility consistency of a labour supply function can be 
examined in a similar way to the utility consistency of a labour supply function with 
linear budget constraints, and the associated functions and identities such as the 
indirect utility function, the expenditure function, the Slutsky decomposition, Roy's 
identity, and Hotelling's lemma are still valid. We offer several examples of such 
nonlinear budget constraints such as the budget constraints that follows from a 
progressive tax system, from money market entry costs which may vary as labour 
supply varies, and from intra-household bargaining. 
Furthermore, we develop an estimation method for utility consistent labour 
supply under an endogenous market wage rate. Rosen (1976) estimated a labour 
supply function assuming that the market wage rate depends on hours of work. His 
method is free from endogeneity bias, but his labour supply function is not consistent 
with individual utility maximization. We shall show how the labour supply function 
should be specified, in the presence of an endogenous market wage, to make the 
labour supply function consistent with utility maximization. 
Second, individuals generally pay market entry costs such as the expenses of 
transportation, uniforms, child care, and self education. Some of these entry costs are 
indirectly paid for by the government, through the deduction of such expenses from 
taxable income and through subsidies for child care. Policy makers are, therefore, 
interested in the effects of market entry subsidies on labour supply and income. We 
derive numerical expressions of the effects, of two types of subsidies for market 
entry, on labour supply and earnings, and then measure these effects using Australian 
data. The model consists of a probit-type participation criterion equation, a log linear 
wage equation, a log linear reservation wage equation and a utility consistent labour 
supply function, of which the disturbance terms are jointly normally distributed. The 
estimation results show that if the government were to give a lump sum subsidy to all 
working wives, a subsidy of one dollar would increase an average wife's wage 
income by $1.10, and if the government were to give, to all working wives, a subsidy 
that is proportional to the number of hours worked, a subsidy of one dollar would 
increase an average wife's wage income by $2.36. 
Third, we estimate a labour supply function with piecewise-linear budget 
constraints and assess several tax reforms. We shall focus especially on the difference 
between a tax system under which tax rates are based on individual income 
(individual-income-based tax system) and a tax system under which tax rates are based 
on a couple's joint income (joint-income-based tax system). Hausman (1981b, 1981c) 
found that introducing a single rate tax system with a relatively low threshold would 
increase labour supply and decrease excess burden for both male and female. 
In Hausman's simulation, both the pre-reform tax system and the post-reform 
tax system are based on a couple's joint income. We examine whether or not 
Hausman's findings are observed when both the pre-reform tax system and the post-
reform tax system are based on individual income. We adopt a labour supply function 
and an estimation technique that are similar to those of Hausman, and simulate the 
wives' behaviour under several hypothetical tax systems. We find that if both the pre-
reform tax system and the post-reform tax system were based on individual income, 
introducing a single rate tax system would depress wives' work effort, and increase 
their excess burden. On the other hand, if both the pre-reform tax system and the post-
reform tax system were based on a couple's joint income, our findings are similar to 
those of Hausman. A lesson from this result is that similar tax reforms may have quite 
different effects on wives' labour supply and welfare according to whether the tax rate 
is based on individual income or on a couple's joint income. 
2. Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapters 2 to 6 are devoted to theoretical 
discussions. In Chapter 2, we review the theory of welfare analysis when the analysis 
is based on a utility function. We define several important terms such as equivalent 
income, equivalent gain, compensated gain, and deadweight loss. The discussion in 
Chapter 2 is based on King (1983) which discusses welfare analysis in the context of 
commodity demands under consumption taxes. We translate his discussion so that it 
fits the context of labour supply with income taxes. Chapter 2 offers a theoretical 
background for the empirical work in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 3 reviews a method for estimating labour supply with piecewise-linear 
budget constraints. This method is called the "full information method." There are 
several versions of the full information method according to whether or not the non-
convexity of the budget set is taken into account, whether or not the participation 
decision is taken into account, and whether or not a stochastic term representing 
random preferences is included. We will present the model that we adopt for the 
empirical work in Chapter 8, and compare it to other types of models. 
Chapter 4 presents the main theoretical contribution of the thesis. A main 
purpose of this chapter is not to present a new econometric method of estimation, but 
to present a new interpretation of a utility consistent labour supply function. A usual 
way of estimating a system of a labour supply function and a demand function is to 
estimate the labour supply function only, and parameters in the demand function are 
identified by the budget constraint and the labour supply function. We will discuss that 
a labour supply function estimated in this way is valid even if there exists a certain 
form of an unobservable transaction cost. For instance, labour supply function hiyv, 
m) estimated without taking into account nonlinearity of budget constraints is generally 
interpreted as the outcome of the maximization of U{c, h) subject lo c = wh + m, 
where h is labour supply, w is wage, m is nonwage income, t/ is a utility function, c 
is consumption. But we will show that the labour supply function h{w, m) can be 
interpreted as the outcome of the maximization of U{c, h) subject to c = w/n- m - /a 
where is a transaction cost. The transaction cost may be a function of total income 
and labour supply, and more precise conditions of the transaction function will be 
discussed. The discussion in Chapter 4 makes it clear that the empirical work in this 
thesis is valid under certain types of nonlinear budget constraints, although these 
constraints are not explicitiy modelled. 
In Chapter 5, we discuss participations and hours-of-work decisions, under 
money entry costs and time entry costs which may vary as work hours vary. It 
becomes clear that an increase of any kind of entry cost, whether it is a money cost or 
a time cost, will reduce the participation probability. The effect, of such increase, on 
hours supplied depends, however, on the labour supply function and on the type of 
entry cost. We also present a numerical explanation of the effects, of changes in two 
types of market entry costs, on participation probability and hours of work. Chapter 5 
offers a theoretical background for the empirical work in Chapter 7. 
Issues concerning the specification of labour supply functions are discussed in 
Chapter 6. The selection of a labour supply function is an important part of every 
empirical study, because restrictions are implicitiy imposed on the model through the 
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specification of the labour supply function. Several authors (e.g., Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1976, 1980), Atkinson, Stem, and Gomulka (1980), and Deaton (1981)) 
point out that the conclusions of a study may be sensitive to the selection of the labour 
supply function. In Chapter 6, we follow Stem's (1986) criteria to assess the labour 
supply functions which are employed in the empirical part of the thesis, namely the 
linear labour supply function and the quadratic labour supply function. We discuss 
these two labour supply functions in a little more depth than does Stem (1986). 
With the exception of Chapter 4, our theoretical discussion is limited to that 
which is necessary in order to understand our empirical work. A comprehensive 
survey of all labour supply studies is beyond the purpose of this thesis (see Heckman, 
Killingsworth, MaCurdy (1981), Killingsworth (1983), Killingsworth and Heckman 
(1986) for a comprehensive survey). 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 are devoted to empirical studies. In Chapter 7, we 
measure the marginal gain and marginal cost of two types of subsidies for market 
entry. In Chapter 8, we simulate wives' behaviour under alternative tax systems, and 
examine whether or not Hausman's (1981b, 1981c) findings are observed under an 
individual-income-based tax system. Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes and concludes 
this thesis. 
Chapter 2 
The Neoclassical Theory of Labour Supply and 
Its Application to Welfare Analysis 
1. Introduction 
Neoclassical theory regards labour supply as the outcome of an individual's 
utility maximization. One advantage of this approach is that we can utilize the 
functions dual to the labour supply function, such as the expenditure function and the 
direct and indirect utility functions for analysis. 
This chapter is devoted to a review of theoretical discussions of welfare analysis 
that is based on the neoclassical theory of labour supply. We present several concepts 
which are important for the empirical part of the thesis, and especially important for 
the analysis of tax systems in Chapter 8. The discussion is based on King (1983), 
which discussed welfare analysis in the context of commodity demands under 
consumption taxes. We transform his discussion into a labour supply framework. 
The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, a labour supply 
function is derived from a utility maximization problem with a linear budget constraint, 
and the virtual wage rate and virtual nonwage income are defined under a nonlinear 
budget constraint. After equivalent income is defined in Section 3, two types of 
deadweight loss are defined and their properties are discussed in Section 4. Then, a 
method of ranking people according to their welfare level is discussed in Section 5. 
The discussion is summarized in Section 6. 
2. Utility Maximization and the Labour Supply Function 
An individual is assumed to follow a utility maximization problem. 
Max C/(c, h) 
s.t. c < w/i + m, (2.1) 
10 
where c is the composite commodity, h is hours of work, w is the wage rate, and m is 
nonwage income. It is assumed that the utility function is strictly quasi-concave and 
continuously twice differentiable, and preferences are locally nonsatiated.^ These three 
assumptions are called the classical assumptions in the remainder of the thesis. 
Furthermore, we assume that there exists positive optimal labour supply such that h* 
= h{w, m) > 0. This assumption will be relaxed later. 
If we regard labour supply as a negative demand for leisure, such that I = -h, 
then the utility maximization problem collapses to the conventional maximization 
problem of consumer theory, that is,2 
Max U{c, h) = U*(c, I) 
s.t. c + w/ < m. (2.2) 
Hence, any functions and identities which hold in consumer theory still hold if we 
replace / by -h. 
This maximization problem is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The vertical axis 
1 Local nonsatiation is weaker assumption than strong monotonicity. Lx)cal nonsatiation says 
that one could always do a bit better if one could change marginally the consumption 
bundle, and the direction of the change is not specified. Monotonicity says that one could 
always do a bit better if one could change marginally the bundle towards a certain 
direction (increase or decrease). See Varian (1984, pl l3) for the definition of local 
nonsatiation. 
2 Another way of looking at the maximization problem is to impose a total time asset T, so that 
an individual must solve: 
Max U*(,c, t) 
s.L c + w/ < m + wT = M, 
where M is called "full income" by Becker (1965). The labour supply function is now a 
function of w, m and T. In practice, Tmay be estimated (e.g., the linear expenditure 
system (LES)), Tmay be included in the constant temi (e.g., the linear labour supply 
function, the quadratic labour supply function), or Tmay be imposed by an a r b i u ^ 
assumption (e.g., the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function and the 
almost ideal demand system (AIDS)). 
11 
A 
0 
h* = - 1 * 
Figure 2.1. Labour Supply with a Linear Budget Constraint 
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measures the consumption level of the composite commodity, and the horizontal axis 
measures the labour supply which is regarded as the negative demand for leisure. The 
budget line is given by AB, and the nonwage income is given by A. The indifference 
curve i represents the maximum attainable utility level. The equilibrium point is given 
by E, and the corresponding labour supply is given by h*. 
Now, consider the case where the budget constraint is not linear but there still 
exists a unique solution. Figure 2.2 illustrates this case. The budget line is given by 
AB, and the equilibrium point is given by E. It is convenient for the following 
discussion to define the virtual wage rate (w*) and the virtual nonwage income (m*) 
as follows. The virtual wage rate is the slope of the indifference curve at the 
equilibrium point. The virtual nonwage income is the level of nonwage income that 
would afford the current utility level if the wage rate were set at the virtual wage rate, 
i.e., 
m* = E(w*, U) (2.3) 
where E is the expenditure function.^ 
In Figure 2.2, the virtual wage rate is the slope of A'B', and the virtual nonwage 
income is given by A'. The individual's utility maximization problem is regarded as 
the problem of utility maximization subject to the hypothetical budget line A'B'. 
Therefore, her utility maximization problem can be written: 
Max U{c, h) 
sx.c<w*h-\-m*. (2.4) 
Hence, the optimal labour supply is expressed as a function of tiie virtual wage rate 
3 In this chapter, the expenditure function is defined as the nonwage income which affords a 
certain utility level at a given wage rate. This definition corresponds to the budget 
constraint in the maximization problem (2.1) or (2.2). An altemative definition of the 
expenditure function, which corresponds to the maximization problem in footnote 2, is 
the full income which affords a certain utility level at a given wage rate. 
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and of the virtual nonwage income such that ^ 
h*=hiw*,m*). (2.5) 
Furthermore, the optimal utility level is expressed, by the indirect utility function, in 
terms of the virtual wage rate and virtual nonwage income such that 
U = Viw*,m*), (2.6) 
where V is the indirect utility function. 
3. Equivalent Income 
When we assess two or more competing tax systems, we examine them to see 
which tax system gives the higher utility level to an individual. If the post-tax budget 
constraints that correspond to each tax system do not cross each other, the individual 
always prefers the tax system which gives the upper budget line. The problem is not 
so easy, however, if these post-tax budget lines cross. 
One way of comparing post-tax utility levels is to compare the values of the 
utility function. If we estimate a utility consistent labour supply function, we can 
calculate an individual's utility level using the direct or indirect utility function. If the 
individual selects bundle (ci, hi) under tax system 1, and bundle (C2, /i2) under tax 
system 2, she prefers system 1 if and only if 
U { c u h i ) > U ( c 2 , h 2 ) . (2.7) 
The same relation can be expressed by using the indirect utility function. If the 
individual's virtual wage rates and virtual nonwage incomes under tax systems 1 and 2 
are given respectively by (w*i, m*i) and (w*2, m*2), she prefers system 1 if and 
only if 
V(w*um*i)>Viw*2,m*2). (2.8) 
Another way of measuring utility is to use equivalent income. If we select a 
reference wage rate, there exists a one-to-one relationship between any given utility 
A difficulty in estimating this labour supply function is discussed in the next chapter. 
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level and the nonwage income which affords that level of utility. Formally, the 
equivalent income is given by 
EI{U) = U), (2.9) 
where u^ is the reference wage. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the equivalent income. The budget line under tax system 1 
is given by A\B\Di, and the budget line under tax system 2 is given by A2D2. Since 
the budget lines cross each other, one cannot know which budget line gives the higher 
utility level unless the utility function is known. If all parameters of the utility function 
are known, we can predict the optimal bundles under both tax systems. The figure 
shows that the optimal bundles under tax systems 1 and 2 are respectively B\ and E2, 
and the associated indifference curves are /'i and 12. It is clear that ii represents the 
higher utility level. Let us select the slope of A2D2 as the reference wage. The 
nonwage incomes that afford the utiUty levels represented by /j and /2 are given 
respectively by F and A2, which are the equivalent incomes. 
As a welfare index, the equivalent income has two advantages over the direct or 
indirect utility function. First, while the utility function gives an ordinal number, the 
equivalent income has a meaning: the nonwage income which is necessary to attain a 
certain level of utiUty at the reference wage. Second, as we will discuss later, 
equivalent income can be used for inter-personal comparisons of welfare levels if a 
further assumption is made. 
Substituting the direct and indirect utility functions into (2.9) gives alternative 
expressions of the equivalent income such as, 
EI = Uic, h)) c, h), (2.10) 
and 
EI = £;(w*, V(w*, m*)) = w*, m*). (2.11) 
/ i s called the (direct) compensated function,^ and g is called the indirect compensated 
5 The direct compensated function is also known as the "minimum income function," or the 
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function. 
4. Deadweight Loss 
We now discuss the definition and the properties of the deadweight loss. The 
concept of the deadweight loss based on the Hicksian demand function was developed 
by Mohring (1971), Diamond and McFadden (1974), Rosen (1978), Kay (1980), 
Hausman (1981a), and King (1983). The following discussion mainly follows King 
(1983).6 
Let us define the compensated gain (CG) and the equivalent gain (EG) as 
follows. The compensated gain (CG) is equal to the post-reform equivalent income 
minus the pre-reform equivalent income, when both are evaluated at the post-reform 
virtual wage rate, i.e., 
CGio = £(w*i, Ui) - £(w*i, Uo) = m*i - E(w*i, Uo)\ (2.12) 
The equivalent gain (EG) is equal to the post-reform equivalent income minus the pre-
reform equivalent income, when both are evaluated at the pre-reform virtual wage rate, 
i.e., 
EGio = E{w*o, Ui) - E(w*o, Uo) = E(w*o, Ui) - m*o. (2.13) 
The subscripts 0 and 1 that follow w*, U and m* correspond to the tax system 0 (the 
pre-reform tax system) and the tax system 1 (the post-reform tax system). The 
subscript 10 that follows EG and CG denotes the gain that follows in moving from tax 
system 0 to tax system 1. The virtual nonwage income m*j is expressed as, 
"money metric utility function." The concept was first offered by McKenzie (1956), and 
was developed by Samuelson (1974). 
6 King (1983) set his discussion in the context of a consumption tax, under which the post-
tax budget line was still linear, but we are interested in the income tax, under which the 
post-tax budget line is nonlinear. Kings's discussion remains valid for the income tax if 
we replace the post-reforan virtual price by the post-reform virtual wage rate, and replace 
the income by the post-refonm virtual nonwage income. 
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m*j = EIW*j, Uj) = m + Tj'wh^(w*j, Uj) - Tj, (2.14) 
where T/ and Xj are respectively the marginal tax rate she faces and the tax she pays, 
under tax system;; hP is the Hicksian compensated labour supply function; and x/whF 
is the tax which would have to be paid if the current marginal tax rate were applied to 
her total wage income. The term x/whP is called the hypothetical wage fox in the 
remainder of the thesis. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the compensated gain and the equivalent gain. The budget 
line under the pre-reform tax system (tax system 0) is given by AD, and the budget 
line under the post-reform tax system (tax system 1) is given by ABD'. The pre-
reform equilibrium point and the post-reform equilibrium point are given respectively 
by EQ and E\. The compensated gain from the tax reform is given by -GG', and the 
equivalent gain is given by -AG". Both the compensated gain and the equivalent gain 
are negative in this case. 
We consider now the Hicksian measures of compensating and equivalent 
variation (CV and EV)J The compensating variation is equal to the pre-reform 
equivalent income evaluated at the post-reform virtual wage rate minus the pre-reform 
equivalent income evaluated at the pre-reform virtual wage rate, i.e., 
CKio = £(w*i, UQ) - £(w*o, UQ) = £(w*i, UO) - m*o. (2.15) 
The equivalent variation is equal to the post-reform equivalent income evaluated at 
post-reform virtual wage rate minus the post-reform equivalent income evaluated at the 
pre-reform virtual wage rate, i.e., 
EVIQ = £(w*i, UX) - £(w*o, UI) = - £(w*o, f/i). (2.16) 
In Figure 2.4, the compensated variation is given by GA, and the equivalent variation 
is given by G'G". 
From (2.12) and (2.15), the compensated gain and the compensating variation 
have the following relationship. 
1 Hicks (1946). 
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CGiQ = m * i - m * o - C V i o . (2.17) 
From (2.13) and (2.16), the equivalent gain and the equivalent variation have the 
following relationship. 
EGiQ = m*i -m*o-EVio . (2.18) 
Two types of deadweight loss are often used to measure the excess burden of a 
tax system. The first type, which is based on the compensating variation, is defined by 
Diamond and McFadden (1974) and by Hausman (1981a). Suppose that there is no 
tax under tax system 0, so that to = to' = 0, w*o = w, and m*o = The deadweight 
loss caused by the introduction of tax system 1 is defined as, 
DL(\) = CVio - Ti W(w*i, Uo), (2.19) 
where the second term on the right hand side is called the compensated tax function, 
which is given by GK in Figure 2.4. The difference between the hypothetical wage tax 
defined by (2.14) and the compensated tax function is that the latter is evaluated at the 
pre-tax utility level. In Figure 2.4, DL(1) is given by KA. 
Another definition of the deadweight loss is given by Rosen (1978), and Kay 
(1980). This definition is based on the equivalent variation, and is defined as, 
DL(2) = EVXQ - Ui). (2.20) 
In other words, DL(2) is the equivalent variation net of the hypothetical wage tax at the 
post-reform equilibrium point. In Figure 2.4, DL{2) is given by K'G". The difference 
between £)L(1) and DL(2) is that the former measures the welfare loss based on the 
pre-tax utility level, while the latter measures the utility loss based on the post-tax 
utility level. 
The difference between the two defmitions becomes clear when we express the 
two deadweight losses in terms of Hicksian compensated labour supply function. 
Substituting (2.15) into (2.19) gives 
DL(1) = E{w*x, Uo) - E{w, Uo) - Uo) 
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UO) DT - T i W ( w * i , UO). (2.21) 
W 
Substituting (2.16) into (2.20) gives 
DL(2) = £(W*I, UI) - E{W, UI) - TIW(W*I, UI) 
W*, 
= - F/i) DT - Ti'w/i'^(w*i, f / i ) . (2.22) 
< 
W 
Figure 2.5 compares these two measurement of the deadweight loss. There are 
three labour supply curves corresponding to two Hicksian compensated labour supply 
functions and the ordinary (or Marshallian) labour supply function. In order to keep 
utility at tiie pre-tax level (UQ), a decline in the virtual wage rate form w to W*I should 
be compensated by the increase in nonwage income that is measured by (A + B + D). 
The compensated tax that is defined by the second term in (2.19) is given by A, so 
DL(1) is measured by (B + D). Similarly, DL(2) is measured by (D + £ + F), and the 
Marshallian measurement of the deadweight loss is given by (D + £). 
Kay (1980) pointed out several advantages of the measurement that is based 
upon the equivalent gain, DL(2). First, the larger is the equivalent gain, the higher is 
the post-tax utility level, but a larger compensated gain does not necessarily imply a 
higher post-tax utility level. Figure 2.6 illustrates the case where a larger compensated 
gain is consistent with a lower utility level. The indifference curve k represents the 
utility level without tax. The budget lines under tax systems 1 and 2 are given 
respectively by AiBi and A2B2, and the corresponding indifference curves are given 
by /'i and ij. The utility level is higher under tax system 1. The compensated gains are, 
however, given by -D\A\ for tax system 1, and -D2A2 for tax system 2. Thus, the 
compensated gain is larger (the absolute value is smaller) for the second tax system in 
spite of the lower utility level. 
Second, if tax revenue is held constant, the smaller is DL(2), the higher is the 
post-tax utility level, but this is not true forDL(l) . Figure 2.7 gives an example where 
a larger DIXX) is consistent with a higher utility level. Aofio is the budget line without 
w 
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a tax system. AiBiand A2B2 are the budget lines under tax systems 1 and 2 
respectively. The tax paid by the individual is given by the vertical distance between 
the initial budget line and the post-tax equilibrium point. Line GH is parallel to the pre-
tax budget line and passes through two post-tax equilibrium points Ei and Ej. This 
means that the tax paid by the individual is the same under the two tax systems. The 
figure shows that the optimal utility level is higher under tax system 1 than it is under 
tax system 2. 
Now, let us check that DL(1) is larger for tax system 1 than it is for tax system 
2. First, draw two lines, one of which is parallel to A\Bi and and one of which is 
parallel to A2B2, such that both are tangent to the indifference curve /Q. These lines 
touch i'o at the compensated points Ci and C2 that correspond to the two tax systems. 
Since the vertical distances from these points to the pre-tax budget line give the two 
values for DL(\), DL{1) is larger for tax system 1. 
Third, in order to define DL(\), it is necessary to use the compensated tax 
function, which is not consistent with the tax acuially paid, but it is possible to define 
DL(2) without reference to the hypothetical wage tax. This can be done as follows. 
From (2.18) and (2.20), we get 
DL(2) = - £Gio +m*i - m - ri'w¥{w*i, Ui), (2.23) 
From (2.14) and (2.23), we get 
DL(2) = - £Gio - Ti = EGoi - t i . (2.24) 
Thus, DL(2) is the equivalent gain that could be obtained by removing the current tax 
system minus the tax that is currently paid. Furthermore, the difference of DL(2) 
under two competing tax systems 1 and 2, can be decomposed into the equivalent gain 
from the first to the second tax system and the difference of the taxes under the two tax 
systems as follows. 
AixDUl) = - EG20 + EGxo - T2 -H Ti = - EG2\ - A2\T, (2.25) 
where A> denotes the difference between tax system i and tax system j. 
In the reminder of the thesis, we employ only the second definition of 
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deadweight loss, so we omit the number in the parentheses after DL. 
Finally, let us discuss the relation between the marginal tax rate and the 
deadweight loss. From (2.22), we can define the following deadweight loss function. 
DL(TI', w, UX) = £(w( l - Ti ') , Ux)- Eiw, Ui) 
+ T i W ( w ( l - T i ' ) , f / i ) , (2.26) 
since w*i = w(l - r f ) , Expanding this function around Ti' = 0 up to the second 
order gives ^ 
= (2.27) 
Thus, the second order approximation of the deadweight loss is proportional to the 
square of the marginal tax rate, to the square of the market wage rate, and to the 
compensated response to the wage. Most empirical studies show that an average wife 
has a larger compensated response to the wage than an average husband, but she has 
the lower market wage and, when tax rates are based on individual income, has the 
lower marginal tax rate. Hence, we cannot predict whether a husband or a wife has the 
larger deadweight loss.^ 
5. Welfare Ranking 
For labour supply analysis and commodity demand analysis, we do not need to 
assume a cardinal utility function. Any utility function which is obtained by a positive 
monotonic transformation of a certain utility function results in the same labour supply 
^ This approximation is known as the Harberger second order approximation (Harberger 
(1964)). In empirical study, we need not use this approximation to calculate the 
deadweight loss of each individual, because the parameters necessary to calculate the 
exact deadweight loss are obtained by estimating the labour supply functioa 
9 Furthermore, if a couple has a unique family utility function, it is not possible to distinguish 
the wife's deadweight loss from the husband's deadweight loss. 
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function and the same commodity demand function. 
However, when we assess a tax reform, we are especially interested in whether 
the tax reform favours richer or poorer people. Hence, it is necessary somehow to 
define who is rich and who is poor. In this section, we discuss a welfare index that 
satisfies two conditions. First, the index should be consistent with an ordinal utility 
function. In other words, for a given individual, the larger is the value of the utility 
function, the larger is the index. Second, it should allow inter-personal comparisons 
without restrictive assumptions. In other words, the index should be close to our 
common sense notions of rich and poor. 
In daily life the most often used index is money income. The progressive income 
tax system is also based on this index. However, this index is consistent with utility 
theory only under a limited condition. If there is no tax, an individual's utility level is 
expressed as V(w, m), which is nondecreasing in w and m. If the wage elasticity of 
labour supply is greater than -1, money income increases when the wage rate 
increases. Furthermore, if the composite commodity is a normal good, money income 
increases as nonwage income increases. Hence, if the wage rate is fixed or if nonwage 
income is fixed, the utility level can be measured by money income. But money 
income is not a suitable welfare index for people with various wage rates and nonwage 
incomes. 
Equivalent income is consistent with ordinal utility, as we saw in the previous 
section. If we evaluate all individuals' equivalent income at the same reference wage 
rate,^o ^ a y be used for inter-personal comparisons of welfare. Now let us discuss 
the properties of this index. Suppose that two indifference curves, which represent 
respectively two persons' optimal utility levels, do not cross each other. Then, (i) the 
To evaluate equivalent income at each person's own wage rate would not be consistent 
with utility analysis since one's equivalent income changes as one's wage rate changes 
even if the utility level is fixed. 
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equivalent income is larger for the upper indifference curve; (ii) the ranking does not 
depend on the selection of the reference wage; and (iii) the ranking does not depend on 
the point on the hours axis at which we evaluate the equivalent income. The first 
property is convenient for inter-personal comparisons since both people prefer any 
point along the upper indifference curve to any point along the lower indifference 
curve. In this sense, the person who can attain the upper indifference curve is better 
off. The second and the third points are convenient since the selection of the reference 
wage and of the evaluating point are more or less arbitrary. 
Figure 2.8 illustrates these properties. There are two indifference curves, and 
jfl, which represent respectively the maximum attainable utility levels of individuals A 
and B. Although we do not know the shape of the other indifference curves, we know 
that both A and B prefer points along Ia to points along is- If we evaluate the 
equivalent income at the reference wage and at zero hours of labour supply, the 
equivalent incomes are given by Ao and BQ, so AO > BQ. And if we evaluate the 
equivalent income at the higher reference wage w^', the equivalent incomes are given 
by Ao' and Bo', so AQ' > BQ'. Thus the selection of the reference wage does not affect 
the ranking. On the other hand, if the equivalent income is evaluated at time T and at 
H^, then the equivalent incomes are given by AT and BJ, so AJ > BJ. Thus the point, 
on the hours axis, at which the evaluation is done does not affect the ranking either. 
The first and second properties do not hold if the indifference curves cross each 
other. The first property cannot hold simply because we cannot determine which is the 
upper indifference curve. An example of the violation of the second property is given 
by Figure 2.9. There are two indifference curves ^ and is, which represent the 
maximum attainable utility levels of individuals A and B. These indifference curves 
cross each other. If we evaluate the equivalent income at the equivalent incomes 
are given by AQ and Bo respectively, soAo> BQ. But, if we evaluate the equivalent 
income at the higher reference wage H^', the equivalent incomes are given by AQ' and 
Bo', so Ao' < Bo'- Thus, if the indifference curves cross each other, the ranking 
29 
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depends on the selection of the reference wage. The third property, however, still 
holds. As the figure shows. AT > BJ if and only if AQ > BQ. 
If we use equivalent income as a welfare index, therefore, we should be careful 
when we interpret the ranking that results. The ranking depends on the reference wage 
if the indifference curves cross each other. Consequentiy, it is desirable to compare the 
rankings that emerge from two or three different reference wages to test the sensitivity 
of the results. Altematively, one could compare the results that emerge firom the use of 
other indices, such as net money income or spouse's income. 
6. Summary 
In this chapter, we reviewed methods of welfare analysis that are based on the 
neoclassical theory of labour supply. Most technical terms which are utilized for 
welfare analysis have been developed in the context of commodity demand under 
consumption taxes. We discussed these terms in the context of labour supply under 
income taxes. It will be seen that these terms are useful tools for the analysis of tax 
reforms in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 3 
Nonlinearity (I) 
1. Introduction 
This chapter and the next chapter discuss the methods of estimation that are used 
when budget constraints are nonlinear. The nonlinearity of budget constraints stems 
from various factors such as the progressive tax system, income tests for government 
benefits, overtime premiums, fixed and variable market entry costs, endogenous 
market wage rates (e.g., a wage rate difference between full-time work and part-time 
work) and intra-family bargaining over the division of household income among 
family members. 
The nonlinearity of budget constraints does not prohibit us from the expressing 
the labour supply as a function of the market wage and of nonwage income. For 
instance, suppose that an individual has a utility function U{c, h), and the budget set is 
given by c< B{h; w, m), where B is increasing in w and m. Then, the labour supply 
can be expressed, as a function of exogenous variables, by h{w, m) in the same way 
as we express labour supply under linear budget constraints. 
However, this labour supply function has two disadvantages when we use 
estimates of the function for further analyses. First, dual functions such as the indirect 
utility function and the expenditure function, and identities such as Roy's identity and 
the Slutsky equation are not generally valid, because these functions and identities are 
derived from linear budget constraints. Hence, we cannot utilize this labour supply 
function for the type of welfare analysis that was discussed in the previous chapter if 
this labour supply function is defined in terms of the market wage and nonwage 
income. 
Second, it is only valid to express this labour supply function in terms of the 
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market wage and nonwage income, under the budget constraint function B. For 
instance, if the budget constraint embodies the current tax system, the gross wage 
effect and gross income effect under an alternative tax system will be different from 
those effects under the current tax system. Therefore, the labour supply function /i(w, 
m) cannot predict labour supply under an alternative tax system. 
One solution to this difficulty is to linearize the budget constraint by drawing a 
line tangent to the budget constraint at the observed commodity bundle, and to estimate 
the labour supply function based on the linearized budget constraint. This method is 
used by Hall (1973) to estimate labour supply under a progressive tax system. The 
slop)e and the intercept of the linearized budget constraint that is obtained by this 
method depend, however, on the actual labour supply which is an endogenous 
variable. This method suffers, therefore, from endogeneity bias. 
Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Wales and Woodland (1979) independently 
developed the "full information method" which is free from endogeneity bias. This 
method utilizes all slopes and intercepts of the piecewise-linear budget constraint, 
rather than just the slope and intercept of the point actually selected. This method has 
been employed often for labour supply estimation with a kinked budget line. See, for 
instance, Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), Ashworth and Ulph (1981), Hausman (1980, 
1981b, 1981c), and Ruffel (1981). We employ this method for our applied work in 
Chapter 8. 
In this chapter, we discuss methods of estimating labour supply function with 
piecewise-linear budget constraints. The organization of this chapter is as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the nonrandom-preference model, in which preferences are 
assumed to be captured by nonrandom parameters and any deviation from the expected 
labour supply is assumed to stem from selection error. Section 3 discusses the 
random-preference model, in which some parameters are assumed to be random 
variables, and any deviation from the expected labour supply is assumed to stem from 
the random preferences as well as from selection error. Section 4 summarizes the 
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discussion. 
2. Nonrandom-Preference Model 
2.1. Endogeneity Bias 
Hall (1973) linearized the budget constraint by extending the line segment that 
contained the labour-commodity bundle that was actually selected by the individual. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates this method. The pre-tax budget line is given by AG, and the 
post-tax budget line is given by ABDH. If an individual's optimal point is E, her 
virtual wage rate is given by the slope of BD and her virtual nonwage income is given 
by /i'. One may use the virtual wage and the virtual nonwage income as explanatory 
variables.! But, a drawback of this method is that the observed labour supply is not 
generally an optimal point, because of measurement error, under employment, 
unexpected overtime work, illness and so on. If the observed labour supply is given 
by £", the observed virtual wage and virtual nonwage income are the same as those at 
the optimal point. Thus, so long as the observed labour supply belongs to the same tax 
bracket as the optimal labour supply, this method does not suffer from endogeneity 
bias. But if the observed labour supply belongs to another tax bracket, like E", the 
observed virtual wage rate and virtual nonwage income are not consistent with the true 
virtual wage and virtual income. 
If a tax system is progressive, the observed virtual wage rate is negatively 
correlated with labour supply, and the observed virtual income is positively correlated 
with labour supply. Thus, the observed virtual wage rate and virtual nonwage income 
are endogenous variables, and estimation methods such as ordinary least squares 
! Instead of the vimial nonwage income. Hall (1973) used the virtual income evaluated at 
2000 hours of work, which he called the "whole income after tax." Whether we evaluate 
the virtual income at zero hours or at any positive numbers of hours is an arbitrary 
choice. 
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suffers from endogeneity bias. 
2.2. Basic Model 
The full information method utilizes the information about all tax brackets. There 
are variations in this estimation method according to whetiier or not: (i) participation is 
taken into account; (ii) nonconvexity of the budget set is taken into account; and (iii) 
random-preferences are taken into account Table 3.1 summarizes the specifications of 
past empirical studies. 
Hausman (1979) offered a relatively simple estimation method without taking 
into account participation, nonconvexity or random preferences. The method that we 
employ in Chapter 8 is similar to his method, but we take into account the participation 
decision. Figure 3.2 illustrates Hausman's estimation method. For the moment, we 
Table 3.1. Past Studies of Labour Supply with Piecewise-Linear Budget constraints 
Model Sample 
Participation 
Decision 
Nonconvex 
Budget Set 
Random 
Prefoence 
Burtless and Hausman (1978) log linear husband no yes yes 
Wales and Woodland (1979) CES husband no no no 
Hausman (1980)' linear female head yes yes yes 
Hausman (1981a, 1981b) linear husband 
wife 
female head 
yes yes yes 
Ashworthand Ulph (1981) generalized 
CES 
husband 
wife 
no yes no 
Ruffel (1981) quadratic husband 
wife 
no yes no 
Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) CES wife yes no yes 
Chapter 8 in this thesis linear wife yes no no 
The dependent variable is participation dummy. 
A' 
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assume that optimal labour supply is always positive. This assumption will be relaxed 
later. 
The three diagrams in Figure 3.2 have the same budget line, but their 
indifference curves differ from each other. Each individual's budget line is calculated 
from her wage rate and nonwage income and from the income tax schedule. It is 
assumed that the marginal tax rate changes at B, so that the budget line ABD'is kinked 
at B. We extend the two line segments, and estimate the labour supply for each 
linearized budget line. For given parameters, we may observe three types of equilibria. 
Panel (a) shows that the equilibrium point along line A'D'is feasible, but the 
equilibrium point along line AD is not In this case, the optimal point is given by £2-
Panel (b) shows the case where neither equilibrium point is feasible, and the two 
equilibrium points, £1 and E2 bracket the kink point B. In this case the optimal point is 
given by the kink point. Panel (c) shows that the equilibrium point along line segment 
AS is feasible, but the equilibrium point along line segment A'D'is not In this case, 
the optimal point is E\. 
We can generalize the model such that there exist n tax brackets. Since the 
budget set is convex, a feasible equilibrium point is at most one. If there is no feasible 
equilibrium point, the individual desires to select a kink point which is bracketed by 
two unfeasible equilibrium points, as can be seen in panel (b) of Figure 3.2. Once we 
determine the optimal labour supply for a given set of parameters, a likelihood 
function is calculated assuming that the selection error follows a certain density 
function. This procedure is iterated until the likelihood function is maximized. 
Algebraically this procedure is expressed as follows. Let the labour supply 
function be /i(w*, m*), where w* is the virtual wage rate, and m* is the virtual 
nonwage income. Suppose that the budget constraint consists of n line segments, 
which are numbered from the origin. Each kink point is also numbered from 1 to n -
1, and the labour supply at they-th kink point is denoted by k j J = 1,..., n - \ , and for 
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convenience we assume kQ = 0 and kn = The slope of the /-th line segment is 
denoted as w„ and the intercept of the j-th line is denoted as m,. Then, since the 
budget set is convex, the slopes and the intercepts have relationships, wi > W2 > •• 
> w„, and mi < m 2 < ••• < rrin. The optimal labour supply is given by 
h* = hiwj, mj) if kj.\ < h(wj, mj) < kj, 7 = 1 , 2,..., n, 
h* = kj if hiwj, rrij) > kj > h(wj+i, mj+i), 
; = 1,2, ..., n - 1 . (3.1) 
Hence, the labour supply function can be expressed as 
h* = H(h(wj, mj), kj), j = 1, 2,..., n. (3.2) 
An observed labour supply is generally different from h* because of selection 
error. The observed labour supply is given by 
h = h* + u, (3.3) 
where M is a random selection error. 
2.3. Participation 
As was pointed out by Tobin (1958) and more recently by Heckman (1976), 
ignoring non-participation may cause selectivity bias.^ We now extend the model of 
the previous section such that people can select zero labour supply. 
First, let us relax the assumption in the previous section such that the 
equilibrium labour supply may be negative. Figure 3.3 illustrates this case. The 
equilibrium point along line AB is negative. Since negative hours cannot be selected, 
this individual will desire to select zero hours. Hence, the optimal labour supply 
should be modified as follows. 
h * = 0 if/z(wi,mi) < 0 
h* = h(wj, mj) if kj.\ < h{wj, mj) < kj, 7 = 1 , 2,..., n, 
h* = kj if h{wj, mj) > kj > h{wj^\, wy+i), 
2 We will discuss selectivity bias more in Chapter 7. 
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y = l , 2 , n - 1 . (3 .4) 
Adding the selection error gives the observed labour supply, 
h = h* + u, if the right hand side is positive, 
h = 0 otherwise. (3 .5) 
where u is independendy, idenrically and normally distributed.^ If we assume that the 
first Ni of N individuals do not participate in the labour market and the other A^  - A i^ 
participate, then the likelihood function is given by 
N, N 
L = n Pr(hi = 0) n Pr(/ii > OyfiUi I hi > 0) 
i = 1 / = Ni+ 1 
N: N f . 
= n ( i - F i ) n F i f . 
3 When the labour supply is given by /i = /i* + w, the demand for c is given by the function, 
c(wj, rrij, kj) = w*h + m* = w*h* + m* + £, ; = 1, 2,..., n, 
where w* and m* are virtual wage and virtual nonwage income at the desired labour 
supply. If actual labour supply is on the same line segment as the desired labour supply, 
the error term is given by £ = w*!^ if not, the error term depends on the tax schedule and 
it has a very complicated form. 
Wales and Woodland (1979) discussed that if the labour supply function has a share form, 
such as 
w**h w**h* 
m** ~ m** 
where w** and m** are respectively the virtual wage rate and virtual nonwage income 
actually selected. Then, the demand for c is given by 
c _ w * * h + m** w**h w**h* 
+ 1 + U, 
Thus, the error terms of the labour supply function and of the demand function are the 
same. There is no theoretical problem in the former specification since the demand 
function is identified by a budget constraint and the labour supply function, although the 
error term of the demand function cannot be expressed by a simple form. 
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N, N 
= U i l - F , ) n f i , (3-6) 
/ = 1 j = Nl+l 
where F, = F(/i,*, c^), F is the cumulative normal density f u n c t i o n , = f { h i * , ( f ) , 
a n d / i s the normal density function with variance c^. 
The assumption that the selection error is identically distributed is unrealistic, 
because it implies that all people who desire not to work have the same probability of 
working, regardless of their socio-economic characteristics. Furthermore, since the 
error is normally distributed, the probability that people who do not desire to 
participate actually participate, because of selection error, is fifty per cent. This 
assumption is too strong. 
Instead of this implausible assumption, Hausman (1980, 1981b, 1981c) and 
Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) assumed that those who desire not to work are not subject 
to selection error. In other words, they assumed that all working people desired to 
select positive hours. This assumption can be imposed, however, only in random-
preference models. If preferences are nonrandom, the likelihood function cannot be 
well defined, because those who desire not to work do not have a stochastic term. 
Alternatively, we can impose an assumption that people may desire negative 
labour supply, and the selection error of those who desire not to work depends on this 
hypothetical desired labour supply, such that the hypothetical selection error measured 
from the hypothetical desired labour supply is independently, identically and normally 
distributed.'^ This assures that the more strongly people desire not to work, the larger 
(in absolute terms) is their negative labour supply, and hence they are less likely to 
participate. In the case of Figure 3.3, if the individual selects positive labour supply, 
the hypothetical selection error is measured by the distance between the actual labour 
supply and hypothetical desired hours H, rather than O. Hence, the hypothetical 
desired labour supply is given by 
The stochastic structure under this assumption is exactly the same as that of tobit. 
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h* = h(wj, mj) if kj.\ < h{wj, mj) < kj, ; = 1, 2,..., n, 
h* = kj if h(wj, mj) > kj > /i(w;+i, my+i), 
7 = 1,2, 1. (3.7) 
where k^ is redefined such that ko = -oo. Adding a st(x:hastic term gives the labour 
supply function (3.5) and the likelihood function (3.6) as before. 
Under this assumption, the probability of participation for those who desire not 
to work is at most 50 per cent. Hence, for instance, the probability that those who 
want to work 500 hours per year do not work, because of the selection error, is 
generally larger than the probability that those who do not want to work actually work 
500 hours or more. The former probability is given by 1 - F(500) = F(-5(X)), and the 
latter probability is given by F(-500 + h*\ where h* is zero or negative. In Chapter 8, 
we employ this model. 
If the budget set is not convex, the problem becomes more complicated since 
there may be two or more feasible equilibrium points. Figure 3.4 illustrates this case. 
The budget set is nonconvex, and there are two feasible equilibrium points, E\ and E2. 
In such a case, we have to calculate the utility level at each equilibrium point and select 
the equilibrium point which attains the higher utility level. When the desired labour 
supply is obtained by this method, the estimation procedure is the same as the case of 
convex budget set. 
As Wales and Woodland (1979) pointed out, the likelihood function for this type 
of labour supply does not behave well. First, in the case of the convex budget set, a 
difficulty occurs when the indifference curve which represents the maximum utility is 
tangent to the budget line at a kink point. At this point, while the likelihood function is 
continuous, it is not differentiable. Figure 3.5 illustrates this point. The indifference 
curve i is tangent to budget line A'D'dX kink point B. If a marginal change of the 
parameter vector shifts the indifference curve towards the left, the optimal labour 
supply does not change. On the other hand, if the marginal change of the parameter 
vector shifts the indifference curve towards the right, the optimal labour supply 
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increases. This implies that the likelihood function is not differentiable at this 
parameter vector since the marginal change of the likelihood function depends on the 
direction of the parameter change. 
Second, if the budget set is nonconvex, the likelihood function is not continuous 
any more. Suppose that indifference curves j'l and /2 in Figure 3.4 attain the same 
utiUty level, then the optimal labour supply never exists between h*i and h*2. This 
implies that the optimal labour supply jumps from h*\ to h*2 or from h*2 to h*i as the 
parameter vector marginally changes, so the likelihood function is not continuous at 
this parameter vector. 
The latter problem does not occur in our empirical work in Chapter 8 since the 
budget set of the selected sample is well approximated by a convex set, but the former 
problem may occur. However, this does not present a problem if the likelihood 
function is differentiable at the true parameter vector. We assume, following Wales 
and Woodland, that at the true parameter vector the likelihood function is differentiable 
up to the third order. 
Up to now, we have assumed that preferences are captured totally by observed 
variables such as age, education and the number of children. Hence the difference 
between the expected labour supply and the actual labour supply is caused solely by 
the selection error. This assumption is strong since no two individuals actually have 
exacdy the same preferences. If there are omitted variables, or if the preferences have 
random components, the procedure generates inconsistent estimates.^ This drawback 
is overcome by the random-preference model. 
3. Random-Preference Model 
Although we do not employ a random-preference model for our empirical study 
in Chapter 8, because of the conplication of the computation procedure, it is instructive 
5 This was pointed out by Heckman, Killingsworth, and MaCurdy (1981). 
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to compare our model to a random-preference model. A random-preference model 
distinguishes between the deviation caused by a selection error and the deviation 
caused by unobserved preferences. Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1980, 
1981b, 1981c), and Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) employed random-preference models. 
In this section we review their models assuming that the labour supply function is 
linear, the income effect differs among individuals, and the tax system consists of two 
tax brackets. Desired labour supply under the random-preference model can be 
expressed as 
h* = H(wj + Prrij + y, k), if the right hand side is positive, 
h* = 0, otherwise, (3.8) 
where j = 1, 2; ^ is the labour supply at the kink point; and {5 = fj.p+ u\. We assume, 
following Hausman (1981b), and Arrufat and Zabalza (1986), that: (i) the distribution 
of «i is independent of the selection error U2 such that COV(MI, ui) = 0; and (ii) the 
individual who desires not to work does not have a selection error. The model can 
then be expressed as follows. 
h = h* + U2, if h* is positive and if the right hand side is 
positive, 
/i = 0, otherwise. (3.9) 
Now let us derive the likelihood function of this model. Because of the 
assumption of no selection error for the individual who desires not to work, a working 
individual desires to work either along segment AS, at the kink point B, or along 
segment BD' in Figure 3.2. The desired labour supply in these three areas is denoted 
respectively by h*i,k and h*2. When the market wage and nonwage income are 
given, the desired hours depend on the random preferences. An individual will desire 
to work along the segment AB, at the kink point B, and along the segment BD' 
respectively if and only if < ^ < j^ z < < and < ^ < where 
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Pi = - awi- Y mi (3.10) 
P2 = k - gvvi - y mi (3.11) 
m2 
Hence, the probability that we observe positive labour supply h is given by 
(3.12) 
Ph = r i . / h - h -
Pi 
02 0 
/33 
r 1 
CJ2 0 
(72 
-
. 0-2 
8(P)dp 
g(P)dp + r 1 
fh 
02 0 02 g i P ) d p (3.13) 
where 0 is a standard normal density function; c^ is the standard error of U2> ,? is 
the density function of (3. These three terms in (3.13) capture the probability that the 
individual desires to work h*i, k and /i*2> but actually works h. In the second term, k 
does not depend on so it can be expressed without integration as follows. 
1 .//i - k (G(p3)-G{f52)y (3.14) 
02 y <72 J 
where G is the cumulative density function of (5. 
In this model, it is implicitly assumed that p3> otherwise the probability that 
she selects the kink point B in Figure 3.2 is negative. It is notable that if W2 
approaches to wi, and hence m2 approaches to mi, the assumption P i > Pi becomes 
equivalent to the Slutsky restriction, a - ^ k > 0. This can be shown as follows. Let us 
marginally pivot the line AD around B towards A'D', then wi will decrease and mi 
will increase. The change in wi and the change in mi has the relationship. 
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d/Mj^  _ 
dwi 
where k is the labour supply at B. The change in ^ and that in w\ has the 
relationship. 
(3.15) 
^ - - r d/ni 
dvvi ' m\ ' dwi 
m\ ^ (3.16) 
But if the Slutsky restriction is satisfied, the right hand side of (3.16) is negative. In 
other words, ^ increases when wi decreases. 
Now, if the slope of the second line segment BD' in Figure 3.2 is only 
marginally smaller than that of the first segment AB, the equation (3.16) implies that 
pi is larger than if the Slutsky restriction is satisfied MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch 
(1990) proved the above relationship between the theoretical consistency and the 
econometric coherency when the random term has a more general form. 
On the other hand, a nonparticipant desires to work zero hours, along segment 
AB, at the kink point B, or along segment BD'. The probability that the individual 
does not participate is given by 
Pi 
Po= \giP)d(5 + 
Qi 
giP)gi(yi)dl5dvi 
Pi 
+ <p(-]iG(p2)-G(p2)) + 
Ql 
- Ih 
giP) glM dpdv2 
V 
-oo 
p2 
(3.17) 
where vj = pmj + U2, Qj = - ccwj - y, and gj is the density function of vy. The first term 
in (3.17) is the probability that the individual desires not to work. The rest of the terms 
are the probabilities that the individual has not worked but desired to work respectively 
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along segment AB, at kink point B, and along segment BD'. Hence, the likelihood 
function is given by 
U P o i U P h i (3.18) i =1 i = Ni+l 
When the budget set is nonconvex, the above procedure should be modified. 
The derivation of the likelihood function under the nonconvex budget set is beyond the 
purpose of this thesis. We only mention the points which should be considered when 
we derive the likelihood function. First, the participation decision is not the same as 
before. Even if A in Figure 3.4 attains the maximum utility level along segment AS, 
some point along segment BD' may attain a higher utility level. Hence, the 
participation decision should be modified such that people desire not to work if zero 
labour supply attains a higher utility level than any other points along the budget line. 
Secondly, no one desires to work at B, so the second term in (3.13) and the third term 
in (3.17) disappear. Thirdly, the first and the third terms in (3.13), and the second and 
the fourth terms in (3.17) should be modified such that an individual desires to work 
along a line segment if the maximum utility level along that line segment is higher than 
the utility level at any other point along the budget line. 
4. Summary 
This chapter reviewed methods of estimating labour supply functions in the 
presence of piecewise-linear budget constraints. It has been shown that the 
linearization method adopted by Hall suffers from endogeneity bias, and so called the 
"full information method" assures a consistent estimator. 
The model that we use for the empirical study in Chapter 8 was explained in 
Section 2. A crucial assumption of the model is that the stochastic term stems from 
selection error only, and preferences are totally captured by observed variables. 
In Section 3, we reviewed the random-preference model. The random-
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preference model assumes that there are two sources of deviations in labour supply: 
random preferences and selection error. The random-preference model is more realistic 
since no two individuals have identical preferences. 
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Chapter 4 
Nonlinearity (II) 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed methods of estimating a labour supply function 
in the presence of piecewise-linear budget constraints. The labour supply function was 
defined in terms of the virtual wage rate and virtual nonwage income. This assures that 
we can employ dual functions and identities such as the direct and indirect utility 
functions, the expenditure function, the Slutsky decomposition, Roy's identity and 
Hotelling's lemma. 
A main purpose of this chapter is to give a new interpretation of the labour 
supply function. Except for Sections 3.4 and 4.1, we will not present a new 
estimation method of labour supply. A usual way of estimating a system of labour 
supply and demand functions is to estimate the labour supply function only, and 
parameters in the demand function are identified by the budget constraint and the 
labour supply function. A labour supply function estimated in this way is valid even if 
there exists a certain form of an unobservable transaction cost For instance, a labour 
supply function h(w, m) estimated without taking into account the nonlinearity of 
budget constraints is generally interpreted as the outcome of the maximization of U{c, 
h) subject toe = wh + m, where h is labour supply, w is wage, m is nonwage income, 
U isdL utility function, c is consumption. But it will be shown that the labour supply 
function h{w, m) can be interpreted as the outcome of the maximization of U{c, h) 
subject to c = w/i + w - fiiyvh + m,h) = ri(wh + m, h), where ^ is a transaction cost 
function and r\ is continuous in wh + m, and monotonically increasing in w/i + m. 
This budget constraint is more general than the linear budget constraint. 
Thus, we can assume a more general form of budget constraints than linear 
budget constraints in order to employ dual functions and identities that hold under 
53 
linear budget constraints. We demonstrate also that the utility consistency of a labour 
supply function in the presence of this type of nonlinear budget constraints can be 
checked in a similar way as one checks the utility consistency of a labour supply 
function in the presence of linear budget constraints. 
Another notable outcome of this chapter is our presentation of a method of 
estimating a utility consistent labour supply function when the wage rate depends on 
hours of work. A labour supply function with endogenous wage rates was estimated 
by Rosen (1976), but his labour supply function is not consistent with utility 
maximization. We amend his model to make the labour supply function consistent 
with utility maximization. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we review briefly 
the conventional method of linearizing a nonlinear budget constraint, and then present 
an alternative method. Two special cases of our method are discussed in Sections 3 
and 4. Section 5 concludes the discussion. 
2. Linearizing Nonlinear Budget Constraints 
2.1. A Conventional Method 
Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) showed that, under certain regularity properties,^ 
the Slutsky restriction is the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the 
utility function that generates the given demand functions.^ This theorem is, however, 
^ The regularity properties required for the necessary condition are: (i) The demand function 
is single valued and differentiable; (ii) the demand functions x(p, m) satisfy the adding up 
condition, px = m\ and (iii) the demand functions uniquely maximize the utility. The 
regularity properties required for the sufficient condition are (i) and (ii) together with: (iv) 
the derivatives of the demand functions with respect to income satisfy a boundedness 
condition. In this chapter, these properties are assumed to hold if budget conso-aints are 
linear. 
2 Sufficient conditions are also provided by Samuelson (1947,1950). 
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limited to the case where budget constraints are linear. If a budget constraint is 
nonlinear, it should be linearized in order to treat labour supply in the classical 
framework. 
Now suppose that a budget constraint is nonlinear such that 
c=Bih-w,m), (4.1) 
where c is consumption; h is labour supply; and w and m are the market wage rate and 
nonwage income, both of which are exogenous. This budget constraint implies that if 
an individual selects labour supply h based on exogenous market wage rate w and 
nonwage income m, then the individual's consumption c is uniquely determined. The 
linear budget constraint is a special case of (4.1). 
A conventional way of transforming the utility maximization problem subject to 
nonlinear budget constraints into the classical framework is to define the labour supply 
function and the commodity demand function in terms of the virtual wage rate and the 
virtual nonwage income, where the virtual wage rate is the slope of the line which is 
tangent to the indifference curve at the optimal point, and the virtual nonwage income 
is the intercept of that tangent line on the c-axis. The associated budget constraint is 
given by 
c = w*h + m*, (4.2) 
where w* is the virtual wage rate and m* is the virtual nonwage income. If the 
function B is differentiable at the optimal bundle, the virtual wage rate and the virtual 
nonwage income are respectively denoted as 
^ . ^ m h h ^ ^ (4.3) 
m* =B{h*-,w,m)-w*h*, (4.4) 
where h* is the optimal labour supply. These equations show that the virtual wage rate 
and the virtual nonwage income depend on the optimal labour supply, so they are not 
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exogenous.^ 
The labour supply function h{w*, m*) is consistent with an individual's utility 
maximizing behaviour if and only if the system consisting of the labour supply 
function hiw*, m*) and the demand function c{w*, m*) satisfies the Slutsky 
restriction. The full information method discussed in the previous chapter used such a 
labour supply function. 
2.2. An Altemative Method 
We now discuss an altemative method of linearizing the budget constraint (4.1). 
The discussion is based on the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. If there exists a one-to-one map (x, y) =f{c, h), by which the budget 
constraint (4.1) is transformed to x = wy + m, then the labour supply function hiw, 
m) and the commodity demand function c(w, m) are consistent with utility maximizing 
behaviour if and only if a demand-supply system defined by (xiw, m), y{w, m)) = 
f(c(w, m), h{w, m)) satisfies the Slutsky restriction. 
Proof Consider a utility maximization problem 
Max U{c, h) 
s.t. c = B{h\ w, m). (4.5) 
The one-to-one map /transforms this maximization problem into the (x, y) space so 
that we get, 
Max U*{x,y) 
s.t. x = wy+m, (4.6) 
where U*(x, y) = U(fic, h)). A system consisting of the demand function x(w, m) 
3 Edlefsen (1981) and Blomquist (1989) offered comparative statics for utility maximization 
models in the presence of nonlinear budget constraints. 
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and the supply function m) is regarded as the outcome of maximization (4.6) if 
and only if this demand-supply system satisfies the Slutsky restriction. However, the 
demand-supply system (c(w, m), hiw, m)) is regarded as the outcome of 
maximization (4.5) if and only if the demand-supply system {x{w, m), y(w, m)) is the 
outcome of maximization (4.6), because the (c, h) space and the (x, y) space have a 
one-to-one relationship. Q.ED. 
We will explain later, with more precision, that some types of nonlinear budget 
constraints can be made linear by this one-to-one-map. The classical integrability 
problem can be employed, therefore, under these types of nonlinear budget 
constraints, and the neoclassical theory of labour supply can be applied to the analysis 
of labour supply with these types of nonlinear budget constraints."* 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the above discussion. The budget line in the regular 
commodity space c = B{h\ w, m) is given by AS, which is nonlinear. The optimal 
labour supply is given by h*. If the budget line AB becomes linear by the one-to-one 
map/, the budget line in the hypothetical commodity space x = wy + m\s> given by 
A'B'. Since the budget constraint in the {x, y) space is linear, we can integrate the 
labour supply function to obtain a utility function. Hence, the utility consistency of 
labour supply function h(w, m) is checked by the Slutsky restriction in the {x, y) 
space. 
In the next two sections, we shall discuss two special forms of map/. The first 
type of map preserves labour supply and transforms only consumption, and is defined 
by 
The theoretical framework of our method is similar to that of household production theory, 
which was developed by Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966). Both our method and the 
household production theory transform the utility function from the conventional 
commodity space to an altemative space. The one-to-one m a p / i n Proposition 1 
corresponds to a production function in the household production theory. 
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{X, h) = g{c, h) = (^(c, h), h), (4.7) 
where ^ is continuous in c, and monotonically increasing in c. This map is called the 
type 1 map in the remainder of the thesis. The second type of map preserves 
consumption and transforms only labour supply, and is defined by 
(c, y) = k{c, h) = (c, v^c, h)), (4.8) 
where v -^is continuous in h and monotonically increasing in h. This map is called the 
type 2 map in the remainder of the thesis. Several examples of budget constraints 
which are linearized by the type 1 map and the type 2 map are given in Sections 3 and 
4 respectively. 
3. Type 1 Map 
In this section, we discuss the case where the budget constraint is linearized by 
the type 1 map. That is, we consider the budget constraint defined by 
;c = h) = wh + m, (4.9) 
where the hypothetical commodity x is equivalent to gross total income. Without loss 
of generality, this budget constraint can be expressed as 
c = ri(wh + m, h), (4.10) 
where T] is the inverse function of ^ with respect to the first argument The budget 
constraint (4.10) implies that consumption is a function of gross total income and of 
labour supply. This is more general than the linear budget constraint which is a special 
case of (4.10). Under this budget constraint. Proposition 1 can be modified as 
follows: 
Proposition 2. If a budget constraint is such that consumption c is a continuous and 
monotonically increasing function of gross total income (w/i + m) for a given labour 
supply h, then the labour supply function h(w, m) and commodity demand function 
c(w, m) are consistent with utility maximizing behaviour if and only if the Slutsky 
restriction is satisfied by a system consisting of the labour supply function and the 
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gross total income function that is defined by x(w, m) = wh{w, m) + m. 
The proof is omitted since Proposition 2 is encompassed by Proposition 1. We should 
note that the labour supply function h{w, m) can be interpreted as an outcome of the 
maximization of U{c, h) subject to the nonlinear budget constraint (4.10), and the 
linear budget constraint c = wh + m is a special case of (4.10). We will offer four 
examples in which the budget constraints satisfy (4.10) or a slighdy modified version 
of (4.10), i.e., budget constraints under progressive tax systems, variable money 
entry costs, intra-family bargaining and endogenous maricet wage rates. 
3.1. Progressive Tax System 
If tax rates are determined on the basis of total income, the budget constraint is 
given by 
c = wh + m + r{wh + m) = ri(wh + m), (4.11) 
where r i s the tax function. It is assumed that l i s a non-decreasing function, but 77 is 
an increasing function. It is clear that (4.11) is a special case of (4.10). Hence, the 
budget constraint is defined by 
x=^{c)=wh + m. (4.12) 
Therefore, if the system consisting of the labour supply function h{w, m) and the 
gross total income function y) satisfies the Slutsky restriction, this labour supply 
function is consistent with maximization of the utility function, U{c, h) = Uirjix), h) = 
U*{x,h) subject to (4.11).5 
It should be noted that (4.12) is simply the budget constraint in the absence of 
the tax system, so we can recover the utility function U* without information on the 
functional form of r\, and hence on T. Therefore, if we are interested only in the labour 
5 Defining a utility function which behaves well in the (x, h) space does not imply that the 
preferences depend on the tax system. The independence of the preferences still holds. 
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supply under the current tax system, we can simply ignore the existence of the tax 
when we estimate labour supply. Thus, defining a utility maximization problem in 
terms of pre-tax income and labour, which is done in many applied studies, does not 
contradict the assumption that an individual accepts taxes perfecdy, so long as the 
post-tax income is a monotonically increasing function of the pre-tax income. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the relation between utility maximization in tiie (c, h) space 
and utility maximization in the {x, h) space, assuming that the tax function is 
differentiable. gives the pre-tax budget constraint, and AB gives the post-tax 
budget constraint. The indifference curve which is tangent to the budget constraint is 
given by /. The labour supply is given by h*. 
Let us transform the maximization problem into the (x, h) space. The 
indifference curve is now given by /', so utility maximization with respect to c and h 
and utility maximization with respect too: and h both yield the same labour supply. 
Three points should be noted. First, although it is assumed that the utility 
function in the {x, h) space satisfies the classical assumptions, and so it is assumed 
that the labour supply function is continuously differentiable with respect to w and m, 
this may be restrictive. In contrast to those depicted in Figure 4.2, the budget 
constraints under a progressive tax system are generally kinked. If the indifference 
curve in the (x, h) space is smooth, and if the budget constraint in die (c, h) space is 
kinked, the indifference curve in the (c, h) space should also be kinked at the same 
income level that at which the budget constraint is kinked. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates this case. Panel (a) shows the budget constraint and an 
indifference curve in the (c, h) space, and panel (b) shows the corresponding budget 
constraint and indifference curve in the (jc, h) space. It is assumed that there is no 
nonwage income, there is no tax for annual income up to $20,000, and there are two 
tax rates beyond $20,000 such that the individual has to pay 50 cents for each $1 
between $20,000 and $40,000, and 75 cents for each $1 over $40,000. Map ^{c, h) is 
defined such that the budget constraint in the (x, h) space is overlapped by the pre-tax 
c , x 
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Figure 4.2. Type 1 Map 
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budget constraint in the (c, h) space. The vertical distance between any two points that 
lie between the dashed lines fi and C in panel (a) is a half of the vertical distance 
between the corresponding points in panel (b), but horizontal distance is preserved by 
the mapping from one diagram to the other. As we assumed above, if the indifference 
curve in the (x, h) space is continuously differentiable, the indifference curve in the 
actual commodity space is still continuous, but is not differentiable, at the income level 
at which the tax rate changes. 
This assumption is restrictive. If an individual's preferences are independent of 
the tax system, the probability that her indifference curve is kinked at the same income 
level as that at which the tax rate changes under the current tax system will be almost 
zero. 
There is an alternative and perhaps more plausible interpretation of the 
assumption that the utility function in the hypothetical space is well behaved. If people 
treat the budget constraint as a smooth curve rather than as a kinked line, indifference 
curves in the (c, h) space can be also smooth lines.^ This is a kind of tax illusion, but 
it should be distinguished from the illusion under which people totally ignore the tax. 
The latter is less likely to exist in the actual economy. The plausibility of the former tax 
illusion depends on the angles of the kink points. If the tax schedule consists of many 
tax brackets and the marginal tax rate is gradually rising as income increases, it is 
plausible to assume that people do not care about the exact hours at which the kink 
points are located, and to assume that people behave as if the budget constraint is a 
6 We cannot say how smooth the budget line in the (c, h) space must be in order to make 
plausible the assumption that a labour supply function in terms of w and m is 
continuously differentiable. Even if the budget line in the (c, h) space is continuously 
differentiable, it may still be restrictive to assume that the labour supply function is 
continuously differentiable if the budget line has a complicated shape. For instance, if a 
budget line is waved, indifference curves in the (c, h) space should also be waved in 
order to generate a continuously differentiable labour supply function. 
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smcxDth curve. On the other hand, if the kink point has a sharp angle, or if the budget 
constraint is discontinuous because of, say, income tests for government benefits, the 
above assumptions are not plausible. The sharper the angle of the kink point is, the 
less acceptable is the assumption that people treat the budget constraint as smooth. 
Secondly, the utility function in terms of x and h behaves well only under the 
current tax system. Hence, the utility function and the labour supply function are 
generally not valid under an alternative tax system. This feature is inconvenient when 
we wish to assess two or more competing tax systems, because we cannot compare 
the welfare levels of the different tax systems. Therefore, if the purpose of estimating 
the labour supply function is to assess several competing tax systems, the above 
approach is not suitable. 
Thirdly, if the nonwage income in the budget constraint contains the spouse's 
total income as well as own nonwage income, as is often assumed when estimating a 
wife's labour supply, the budget constraint (4.11) is valid only under a tax system that 
is based on the joint income of the husband and the wife. If the tax rate is determined 
on the basis of an individual's income, the budget constraint should be 
c = wh+m - r{wh+mf) - T(Mm), (4.13) 
where m/is a wife's nonwage income and Mm is a husband's total income so that m = 
mf+ Mm- Equation (4.13) cannot be expressed in the same form as (4.11). 
3.2. The Money Cost of Market Entry 
Most studies of female labour supply after Heckman (1979, 1980), Cogan 
(1980,1981), Hannock (1980) and Hausman (1980) distinguish the participation 
decision from the hours worked decision. This implies that they implicitiy assume the 
existence of fixed entry costs,^ because if there were no fixed entry cost, we would 
An altemaUve interpretation of two step decision making is that the utility function is not 
continuous at zero hours of labour supply. In this chapter, however, we assume that the 
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not need to consider any participation criterion other than the latent labour supply.^ 
On the other hand, studies of labour supply usually ignore the nonlinearity of 
budget constraints that is caused by market entry costs, in terms of time and money, 
which vary according to hours of work. But most money entry costs such as the 
expenses of commuting and of child care depend on hours of work. It would be 
restrictive, therefore, to assume that all money entry costs are captured by a fixed cost. 
We shall show, however, that if the money entry cost has a cenain functional 
form, the budget constraint can be linearized by the type 1 map. For instance, suppose 
that the market entry cost is a function of hours worked and of characteristics, so that 
= (4.14) 
where /i(0; z) = 0, since there is no cost for non-workers. Equation (4.14) is more 
realistic than the fixed money cost model in which the entry cost is a function of the 
characteristics only. The budget constraint is given by 
c = wh+m- n{h\ z) = T]{wh + m, k, z), (4.15) 
where we allow r] to be discontinuous with respect to /i at /z = 0, because of the 
existence of fixed entry costs. Although J] contains the characteristics variables z, 
these are fixed for a given individual. Hence, z can be embodied in the utility function. 
The utility maximization problem can be expressed by 
M a x U{c, h) = T / ( 7 7 ( X , / J ; Z ) , h) = U*{x, h) 
s.t. ^{c, h\z)=x = wh + m. (4.16) 
Thus, if U* satisfies the classical assumptions, there exists a single valued labour 
supply function, and the dual functions and the identities of neoclassical theory still 
hold. 
The model can be extended so that the market entry cost depends on family 
utility function is everywhere continuous. 
8 If there is no fixed entry cost, the labour supply model becomes the standard tobit model. 
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income as well. This case occurs if there exists, say, an income test for child care 
subsidies. Then, the market entry cost is given by 
fl = ^(wh + m,h), (4.17) 
where the characteristics variables are omitted for the sake of simplicity. The budget 
constraint is given by 
c = wh + m- niwh + m,h) = rjiwh + m, h). (4.18) 
This is the same as (4.10) if T\ is monotonically increasing in the pre-tax income. 
It is noteworthy that if there is a fixed entry cost, the utility function in the {x, h) 
space is discontinuous at zero hours of labour supply. Hence, the participation 
decision should be distinguished from the hours of work decision. For estimating the 
labour supply function, the two step decision making model should be employed. 
3.3. Intra-Family Bargaining 
A conventional two-person household model assumes that a household has a 
unique utility function. In the last decade, alternative models of the household decision 
making process have been provided. Manser and Brown (1979, 1980) considered the 
implications of Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining for the marriage decision and 
for household consumption. McElroy and Homey (1981) generalized the demand 
functions in the context of Nash bargaining. Apps and Jones (1986) applied an intra-
family trade model to analyze the effect of tax on a wife's labour supply and welfare. 
Chiappori (1988) derived feasible conditions on household behaviour from a Pareto 
efficient agreement hypothesis. Lundberg (1988) tested empirically whether or not 
labour supply functions that are conditional upon the spouse's labour supply satisfy 
the equal income effects restriction which is required by the family utility maximizing 
model. 
We shall show that the type 1 map can linearize a certain type of nonlinear 
budget constraint that is caused by intra-family bargaining. Suppose that a wife has 
her own utility function t/(c/, /i/), where c/is her consumption of private goods which 
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does not affect her husband's utility, and /lyis the wife's labour supply which affects 
her husband's utility. The wife and the husband are assumed to bargain over the 
division of household income between them. Assume further that, as a result of this 
bargaining, the wife's expenditure on private goods is restricted such that, 
c /= ri(w^f+mf, hf\ mm), (4.19) 
where w, is / 's wage rate, mi is /'s nonwage income, i = / , m. The budget constraint 
(4.19) is a version of (4.10) in which and nim are regarded as characteristics 
variables. Hence, if the system consisting of the wife's labour supply function /i/w/, 
my; Wfn, mm) and the wife's gross total income function defined by x{\vf, m/; 
f^m) = Wfhjiwf, mf, Wm, mm) + m/satisfies the Slutsky restriction, the labour supply 
function is consistent with the wife behaving so as to maximize her utility under the 
budget constraint (4.19). 
The budget constraint (4.19) is not a strong assumption. It is plausible to 
assume that the wife's private consumption is given by a continuous and increasing 
function of her total income when her labour supply is given. Moreover, if rj is 
differentiate, the wife's net hourly income is given by T}\Wf+ rjj, which changes 
when her income, her labour supply, the husband's wage rate or his nonwage income 
changes. This property is desirable, because the wife's labour supply is assumed to 
affect the husband's utility. 
A limitation of this model is that the effect, of the husband's wage and of 
nonwage income, on the wife's utility cannot be known, and hence the compensated 
cross-wage effect cannot be known. The model treats the husband's wage rate and his 
nonwage income as characteristics variables which shift the wife's indifference 
curves. Therefore, if we want to know the effect of the husband's wage and of his 
nonwage income on the wife's welfare, the bargaining process should be specified 
more precisely. 
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3.4. Endogenous Market Wage (Linear Wage Function) 
Up to now, we have assumed that the market wage rate is exogenous. Here, we 
discuss the case where this is not true.^ There are several reasons why the market 
wage rate may depend on labour supply. If part-time labour and full-time labour are 
different inputs for production, the demand for part-time labour and the demand for 
full-time labour may be distinguished. If the demand for part-time labour exceeds its 
supply at the same wage rate as is paid for the full-time labour, the part-time wage rate 
will be higher than the full-time wage rate, and vice versa. 
Suppose that the wage rate is given by 
w = Q)(K,h), (4.20) 
where Kis called ability, and wis assumed to be monotonically increasing in K. 
Without loss of generality, we can define K'as the market wage rate at zero hours of 
work, i.e., K=CO(K, 0). The budget constraint is given by 
c = co(K, h)h + m. (4.21) 
Maximizing the utility function U(c, h) subject to (4.21) gives a labour supply 
function in terms of the exogenous variables K and m. 
Now let us discuss how (4.21) can be expressed in the same form as (4.10), 
replacing w with k. In order to express (4.21) in the same form as (4.10), the wage 
function should have a special form. That is, K and h must be separable in the wage 
function, such that 
w = co(K, h) = K + d{h). (4.22) 
Substituting (4.22) into (4.21) gives 
c = (K+ d{h))h + m=Kh + m + e(h)h = T](Kh + m, h). (4.23) 
^ For females in the United States, Rosen (1976) found that the market wage rate is a positive 
fiinction of the hours of work, but Hausman (1981a) showed that there is no significant 
effect of hours on the market wage rate. In the case of Australian females, Vella (1989) 
found that the wage rate of part-time workers is higher than the wage rate of full-time 
workers. 
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This would be the same as (4.10) if we replaced x-in (4.21) with w. Thus, if the wage 
function is given by (4.22) and the system consisting of the labour supply function 
h(K, m) and the hypothetical gross total income function defined by X{K, m) = Kh{K, 
m) + m satisfies the Slutsky restriction, the labour supply function is consistent with 
utility maximizing behaviour. 
If X" is a linear function of exogenous variables, and if 9{h) = h, (4.22) is simply 
a linear wage function with the labour supply as an additive term. Another possible 
specification for 6 is that it could be a dummy variable equal to one for a full-time 
worker and equal to zero for a part-time worker. This specification assumes that the 
indifference curve in the (c, h) space is kinked at the minimum number of hours of 
full-time work,io for the same reason that lies behind the kinked budget line caused by 
the progressive tax system. In this case, however, the assumption of a kinked 
indifference curve may not as restrictive as the case of the progressive tax system. 
Since people may distinguish full-time work and part-time work qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively, the indifference curve may be kinked or even discontinuous at the 
minimum number of hours of full-time work. 
A limitation of this specification is that the linear wage function may not fit well 
the data. This function sometimes predicts negative market wages for individuals with 
poor human capital variables. It is known that the log linear wage function generally 
fits better the data. The log linear wage function is treated in the framework of the type 
2 map. 
In practice, labour supply is generally measured by hours worked per year, but it is not 
easy to define full-time and part-time in terms of annual hours. On the other hand, if full-
time and part-time are defined in terms of weekly hours, the labour supply should also be 
measured by weekly hours, so that the budget constraint (4.33) is satisfied. 
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4. Type 2 Map 
In this section, we discuss the type 2 map given by (4.8). We will give two 
examples of budget constraints that are linearized by the type 2 map, i.e., the case 
where the market wage rate is given by a log linear function in which the hours of 
work is a explanatory variable, and the case where there is a time entry cost which 
varies as labour supply varies. 
4.1. Endogenous Market Wage (Log Linear Wage Function) 
Suppose that the market wage function has a log linear form such that 
log w = log K:+log 0(/i). (4.24) 
Define the effective labour supply as 
y=\lKh) = e{h)h , (4.25) 
Then, the budget constraint is expressed by 
c = Ke{h)h + m=Ky + m, (4.26) 
If the map y/^ in (4.25) is continuous and monotonically increasing, it is a special case 
of y/in (4.8). Proposition 1 can be modified as follows. 
Proposition 3. If the market wage rate is given by (4.23), and if the effective labour 
supply defined by (4.25) is continuous and monotonically increasing in hours of 
work, then the labour supply is consistent with utility maximization behaviour if and 
only if the system consisting of the demand function C(K, m) and the effective labour 
supply function y(K, m) satisfies the Slutsky restriction. 
Proof Utility maximization in terms of c and h can be transformed into utility 
maximization in terms of c and y, such that 
Max C/(c, h) = U{c, y/-^(y)) = (/*(c, y) 
s.t. c = K${h)h + m =Ky + m. (4.27) 
The demand function C(K, m) and the supply function y{K, m) are the outcome of the 
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maximization problem if and only if they satisfy the Slutsky restriction. Since /i is a 
one-to-one map of y, the labour supply function h(K, m) is the outcome of (4.27) if 
and only if y(K, m) is the outcome of (4.27). Q.E.D. 
The labour supply function is expressed by 
y=\iKh)=y{K,m), (4.28) 
or 
h = y/-'^y(K,m). (4.29) 
The functional form of (4.28) is more practical than that of (4.29), because it is 
easy to check the Slutsky restriction for (4.29). An alternative specification of the 
labour supply function, which may be more convenient for empirical work, involves 
using earnings (wh) or the eamings-nonwage ratio (wh/m) as the dependent variable. 
Several types of labour supply functions, including the linear expenditure system and 
the CES labour supply function, have such a functional form. If we select such a 
labour supply function, we can use an actual variable wh or wh/m rather than the 
imputed variable y for the dependent variable, because earnings do not change under 
the map k given by (4.12), i.e., wh = Ky. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the relation between utility maximization in the (c, h) 
space, and utility maximization in the (c, y) space. Line AB is the budget constraint in 
the (c, h) space. It is assumed that the market wage rate is declining as labour supply 
increases. The indifference curve tangent to the budget constraint is given by i, and the 
optimal labour supply and commodity demand are given by h* and c*. The map y/is 
defmed such that the budget constraint in the (c, y) space becomes linear. Then, the 
optimal labour supply and the commodity demand are given by y/'^iy*) and c*. The 
difference from Figure 4.2 is that the regular commodity space is distorted in the 
horizontal direction in Figure 4.4, while it is distorted in the vertical direction in Figure 
4.2. 
The supply function yiK, m) has exactiy the same properties as the utility 
7 2 
c * 
O h* h,y 
Figure 4.4. Type 2 Map 
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consistent labour supply function with a linear budget constraint in the regular 
commodity space. Therefore, the indirect utility function is defined in terms of vand 
w, and the expenditure function is defined in terms of >cand the utility. 
Furthermore, under progressive tax systems, this method can be combined with 
the full information method, so that a labour supply function is estimated taking into 
account progressive taxes and endogenous market wage rates. The budget constraint 
under an endogenous market wage rate and an progressive tax system is denoted as 
c = wh+m - r(wh + m) = xy + m - T(xy + m ) = T]iKy + m). (4 .30) 
Thus, if we transform the maximization problem into the (c, y) space, the budget 
constraint becomes piecewise-linear. Moreover, the tax function r is still valid in the 
(c, j ) space, because the earnings and the non-wage income in the (c, j ) space are the 
same as those on the regular commodity space. The net price of y is calculated in 
exactly the same way as the marginal wage rate, because 
w*h = (\ - r)wh = {l - Tr)Ky= K*y, (4.31) 
where f is the marginal tax rate and w* and are resp)ectively the marginal wage rate 
and the net price of y. 
Finally, let us compare the estimation method developed here and the estimation 
method offered by Rosen (1976). Rosen did not intend to model a utility consistent 
labour supply function, so he used dummy variables for nonwage income. Here, we 
shall show that the labour supply function in Rosen (1976) is not consistent with 
utiUty maximization behaviour even if the dummy variables are replaced by actual 
nonwage income, and then we shall convert that labour supply function to make it 
consistent with a utility maximization problem. 
Rosen estimated the market wage rate in a log form, including hours of work as 
an endogenous explanatory variable, as follows 
log w = 5\x + &ih. (4.32) 
Then, he employed marginal earnings (= dwh/dh) at 15(X) hours of work as the ability 
K-such that 
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K= exp(5ix + 1500^)(1 + 1500^), (4.33) 
so the wage rate is given by 
(4.34) 1 + 150052 
Hence, the utility maximization problem is expressed by 
Max Uic, h) 
s.t. c = Ke{h)h + m. (4.35) 
On the other hand, replacing the income dummy variables in his original labour 
supply function with actual nonwage income gives a linear labour supply function as 
follows, 
h = aK + pm + y. (4.36) 
If a - jS/i > 0, this labour supply function can be regarded as the outcome of the utility 
maximization problem, 
Max U*(x, h) 
s.t. x = Kh+m. (4.39) 
If there exists a one-to-one map which transforms the maximization problem (4.35) 
into (4.37), then the two maximization problems are regarded as equivalent, and hence 
the labour supply function (4.36) is consistent with the utility maximization problem 
(4.35). However, there does not exist such a map. A proof can be constructed as 
follows. 
Proof. Let g be a one-to-one map defined by (x, h) = g{c, h) = (^(c, h), h). Then, the 
budget constraint of (4.37) is expressed by 
^(c, h)=Kh+ m, (4.38) 
In Rosen (1976), he also include the term t 'v where t is the marginal tax rate at 1500 
hours of work, in order to examine whether or not taxes are correctly accepted. For the 
sake of simplicity, we ignore the tax. 
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or 
c = ri(Kh + m, h), (4.39) 
where r\ is the inverse function of ^ with respect to the first argument But the budget 
constraint in (4.35) cannot be expressed in the same form as (4.39) unless 0{h) = 1 
for any h. Q.ED. 
The correct way to specify the labour supply function is given by (4.28). Hence, 
if h in (4.36) is replaced by the effective labour supply 9{h)h, the labour supply 
function is regarded as the outcome of the maximization problem (4.35). 
4.2. The Time Cost of Market Entry 
Finally, we will discuss labour supply with a time entry cost which may vary as 
labour supply varies. Suppose that the time entry cost is a function of total income and 
of hours worked, such that 
t = tic,h), (4.40) 
where t is increasing in h and t{c, 0) = 0, and assume further that the time entry cost is 
perfectiy substitutable for market work. The time cost may be a function of total 
income, because the cost of accommodation may be high near the city. Then the utility 
maximization problem is given by 
Max U*(c, h + r(c, h)) = U*{c, yKc, h)) = U*(c, y) 
s.t.c = wh + m, (4.41) 
where w is the exogenous market wage rate. In this case, the budget constraint is 
already linear in terms of c and h, but the utility function is defined in terms of c and y. 
Hence, if we substitute (4.40) into the utility function, the utility function can be 
defined in terms of c and h, such that U*{c, h + r(c, h)) = U(c, h). In this transform, 
the inverse map of the type 2 map is applied. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the case where the time cost progressively increasing as the 
labour supply increases. The budget constraint in terms of c and h is already linear, so 
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we should transform the utility function from the (c, >) space to the (c, h) space, so 
the indifference curve i is transformed to /'. 
If there is a fixed time cost, then the budget constraint AB will have a horizontal 
part from A before it starts to rise. In this case, the utility function in the (c, h) space is 
discontinuous at zero labour supply. Hence, the participation decision should be 
distinguished from the decision about hours worked, and the two step decision-
making model should be employed to estimate the labour supply function. 
5. Summary 
This chapter discussed the utility consistency of labour supply functions in the 
presence of several types of nonlinear budget constraints. First, we offered a 
fundamental proposition upon which the discussion of this chapter is based. That is, if 
a demand-supply system in a hypothetical commodity space is the outcome of a 
maximization problem subject to a linear constraint, and if the actual commodity space 
is given by a one-to-one map from the hypothetical commodity space, then the 
demand-supply system in the actual commodity space is also the outcome of some 
utility maximization problem. 
Then, we discussed a special type of map called the type 1 map, which 
preserves labour supply and transforms only consumption. Four types of nonlinear 
budget constraints, which are linearized by the type 1 map, were presented as 
examples, i.e., the budget constraint under a progressive tax system, the budget 
constraint under a money entry cost, the budget constraint under intra-family 
bargaining, and the budget constraint under an endogenous market wage rate. 
Thirdly, we discussed another special type of one-to-one map, the type 2 map, 
which leaves consumption unchanged, and transforms only the labour supply. This 
map can be employed to estimate labour supply with an endogenous market wage, or 
with time entry costs. 
Two notable outcomes of this chapter are as follows. First, if a budget constraint 
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is given by c = ri(wh + m, h), where 7] is continuous and monotonically increasing 
with respect to the first argument, the utility consistency of the labour supply function 
h(w, m) is examined in exactly the same way as that of the labour supply function 
with the linear budget constraint c = w/i + m. Furthermore, the indirect utility 
function, the expenditure function, the Slutsky decomposition, Roy's identity, and 
Hotelling's lemma are defmed in the same way as under the linear budget constraint 
In other words, the labour supply function /i(w, m) can be interpreted as an outcome 
of the maximization of U{c, h) subject to c = T]{wh + m, h). Second, under 
endogenous market wage rates, utility consistent labour supply can be defined as a 
function of the nonwage income m and of the ability which is independent of hours 
of work. We offered several ways to specify a utility consistent labour supply function 
with an endogenous market wage rate. 
The discussion in this chapter clarifies the conditions under which the empirical 
work in Chapter 7 and in Chapter 8 is valid. That is, the model in Chapter 7 is valid 
under the current tax system, the current variable money and time entry cost structure, 
and the current family decision making rule, and the model in Chapter 8 is valid under 
the current money and time entry cost structure, so long as the budget line is smooth 
enough for us to assume a continuously differentiable labour supply function. 
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Chapter 5 
Market Entry Costs 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we showed that the budget constraint in the presence of 
money costs and time costs may be linearized respectively by the type 1 map and the 
type 2 map. In this chapter, we discuss how participation and hours of work are 
determined in the presence of money costs and time costs of market entry. We focus 
especially on the change in two types of money entry costs, i.e., the fixed money cost 
and the money cost that is proportional to hours worked. Throughout the chapter it is 
assumed that the commodities and services that are necessary for market entry do not 
affect an individual's utility level, and the time spent for market entry is perfecdy 
substitutable with the labour supply. It is also assumed that there is no substitutability 
between time cost and money cost. 
The main contributions of this chapter are the derivation of numerical 
expressions for the effects on participation probabilities, of lump sum and proportional 
subsidies for market entry, and a demonstration that the derived effects are valid under 
nonlinear budget constraints which are linearized by the type 1 map. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the 
effects of money cost changes on labour supply. It will be shown that an increase in 
the money cost always decreases the participation probability, but the effect on hours 
worked depends on the form of the labour supply function. If leisure is a normal 
good, an increase in a fixed money cost has a positive effect on hours worked, and if 
labour supply is a positive function of the market wage rate, an increase in a 
proportional money cost has a negative effect on hours worked. It will be shown also 
that once we estimate the labour supply function and the reservation wage function. 
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we can measure the marginal effects, of a fixed cost change and of a change in 
proportional cost, on participation and hours worked. This estimation method is 
employed to estimate the efficiency of a subsidy for market entry in Chapter 7. 
In Section 3, we will show that the discussion in Section 2 is valid even under a 
nonlinear budget constraint that is caused by a progressive tax, by variable money and 
time entry costs, or by a certain type of intra-household bargaining, so long as the 
change in entry costs is accepted as an income change. The type 1 map and the type 2 
map discussed in the previous chapter are useful tools widi which the effects of entry 
cost changes under nonlinear budget constraints can be analyzed. Section 4 
summarizes the discussion. 
2. Labour Supply with Fixed Money Entry Costs 
This section discusses labour supply in the presence of a fixed money entry cost. 
We focus especially on the effects of a fixed money cost change and the effects of a 
change in a money cost that is proportional to hours of work. Under a fixed money 
entry cost, an individual's utility maximization problem is expressed by 
Max U{c, h) 
s.t. c <wh + m - J J I , and 
h > 0 , (5.1) 
where the utility function satisfies the classical assumptions, ^ is a fixed entry cost, 
and / is a dummy variable which is equal to one if die individual works, and equal to 
zero otherwise. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates this maximization problem. A'B' gives the budget line in 
the absence of an entry cost, and AB gives the budget line with the entry cost. The 
vertical distance between A'B' and AB measures the money entry cost. The budget 
line with the entry cost is parallel to the budget line in the absence of an entry cost, 
because there is only a fixed money cost If the individual does not participate, she 
80 
O h* 
Figure 5.1. Labour Supply with Fixed Money Cost 
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will be at /4'. The individual has to pay a fixed money entry cost A Vi when she enters 
the labour market. If the indifference curve representing the optimal utility level is 
given by i, she is indifferent for the individual between working at E and staying at 
A', because the indifference curve i passes through the endowment point A'. 
2.1. The Reservation Wage and Reservation Hours 
Now let us discuss the participation decision under a money entry cost, and 
define the terms which are necessary for the discussion that follow. Consider the 
maximization problem (5.1) with a time constraint h > 0 instead of /i > 0. This is the 
maximization of the utility function subject to the infeasibility of the c-axis. If there 
exists a solution, the demand-supply system is given by, 
c = c(w, m - f j ) , and (5.2) 
h = Kw,m-n). (5.3) 
Substituting (5.2) and (5.3) into U gives the indirect utility function, 
V(w,m- / i ) , (5.4) 
where V is increasing in w and m - fi. This is called the latent indirect utility function 
in the remainder of the thesis, and it is equal to actual utility if the individual works. 
If there is no solution, in other words, if the individual likes to work as short a 
time as possible, we assume that V(w, m- ii) = -oo. In this case, the individual prefers 
staying home, so her actual utility level is given by U{m, 0). 
Since the individual is a utility maximizer, she worics if 
V(w, m-^L)> U{m, 0), (5.5) 
and only if 
V(w, m - /i) > U{m, 0). (5.6) 
We define the reservation wage (w )^ and the reservation hour (hr) as follows. 
DEFlNmoN 1. The reservation wage {wr) is the wage rate at which the individual is 
indifferent between participation and nonparticipation. 
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DEFiNmoN 2. The reservation hour (hr) is the number of hours an individual works if 
her offered wage is equal to her reservation wage. 
In the presence of a money entry cost, the reservation wage satisfies the identity 
U(m, 0) = V(w„ m - y), (5.7) 
and the reservation hour is given by 
hr = K w r , m - ^ ) . (5.8) 
The following points should be noted. First, (5.5), (5.6) and (5.7) show that the 
individual works in the market if 
w > w,. (5.9) 
and only if 
w > w , . (5.10) 
This is true even if her hours of work is a negative function of her offered wage. Let 
w and Wr be random variables such that 
logw = co + ui, (5.11) 
log Wr = (Or + U2, (5.12) 
where u\ and u j follow the normal distribution with mean zero and variances (Ti^  and 
02^ respectively. Then, the participation probability is given by 
Pr(/i > 0) = Pr(H' > Wr) = Pr(log tv > log Wr) = <P CO - 0)r\ 
V ^ / 
(5.13) 
where d^ = + o ^ - 2CJi2, and 0is the cumulative standard normal density 
function. 
Second, (5.5) shows that unearned income has a negative effect on the 
participation decision if and only if 
U i ( m , 0 ) > V 2 { w r , m - ^ ) , (5.14) 
where Ui is the partial derivative of U with respect to the first argument, and Vj is the 
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partial derivative of V with respect to the second argument. In other words, unearned 
income has a negative effect on participation if and only if the marginal utility of 
income at zero hours of work is larger than the marginal utility of income at the 
reservation hour. This implies that the effect of nonwage income on participation may 
be positive even if leisure is a normal good. 
2.2. The Effects on Labour Supply of a Change in the Money Entry Cost 
We now discuss the effects, on participation, of a change in the money entry 
cost We discuss changes in two types of money entry costs: a change in a fixed cost 
and the a change in a cost that is proportional to hours of work. First, the effect of a 
change in a proportional cost is relatively simple. If there exists a proportional money 
entry cost ii\ per hour, the budget constraint becomes 
c <wh +m - fil - Hih= (w - + m - ^ I , (5.15) 
and the hours worked function conditional on participation is given by 
h = h { w - n i , m - n ) . (5.16) 
Thus, the increase in proportional cost is exactly the same as a wage rate decHne. 
Hence, from (5.13), the effect, of a change in a proportional cost, on the participation 
probability is given by 
3Pr(;i > 0) _ 1 . 
aw ' 
^0) - COr^ 
V ^ / 
(5.17) 
which is negative. 
The effect of a change in a fixed cost on the participation probability is not so 
simple. This effect is different from the effect of a decline in nonwage income, 
because the decline in nonwage income influences the utility level of nonparticipants as 
well as that of participants. However, it is possible to measure the effect of the fixed 
cost change as follows. As (5.13) shows, the participation probability is a function of 
the expected market wage and the expected reservation wage. The marginal effect of a 
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change in the reservation wage on the participation probability is given by 
dPrjh > 0) _ 1 /CO - CO A dO) aiog Wr 
(J\ a plog W^ dWr 
fo) - coA 
^ / 
(5.18) 
<JWr 
where 0 is the standard normal density function, and dC0r/d\og Wr= I. Hence, if we 
knew the effect of an entry cost change on the reservation wage, we could measure the 
effect of the entry cost change on the participation probability. 
From (5.7), the effect of the fixed cost change on the reservation wage is 
denoted by 
dWr 3V/3// dV/dm 1 
" • dV/dWr " dV/dWr ~ hr- ^ ' 
The implicit function theorem and Roy's identity are used for the above derivation. 
Hence, the effect of a fixed cost change is measured by the inverse of the reservation 
hour. From (5.18) and (5.19), the effect of a fixed cost change on the participation 
probability is given by 
dPrjh > 0) _ J _ J - - , ? 
dH CTWrhr 
^CO - coA (5.20) 
which is also negative. 
The negative effect of an entry cost rise on participation holds not only for these 
two types of entry cost changes, but also for any increase in an entry cost, whether it 
is a time cost or a money cost, because the budget set shrinks as an entry cost rises. In 
Figure 5.1, an increase in the money cost shifts down the budget line AS, and an 
increase in the time cost shifts the budget line towards the right. In both cases, the 
current equilibrium point E is not attainable. 
Finally, as the labour supply function (5.16) shows, the effect of an increase in 
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the fixed entry cost, on hours of work conditional upon participation, is the same as 
the effect of a decline in nonwage income, and the effect of a increase in a proportional 
money cost is the same as the effect of the decrease in the market wage rate.^ Hence, 
an increase in the fixed money cost has a positive effect on hours worked if leisure is a 
normal good, and an increase in the proportional money cost has a negative effect on 
hours worked if the labour supply is a positive function of the market wage rate. 
3. Labour Supply with Nonlinear Budget Constraints 
In this section, we shall show that the discussion in the previous section is still 
valid under a nonlinear budget constraint that is caused by a progressive tax system, 
by variable time and money entry costs, or by a certain type of intra-family bargaining. 
First of all, let us discuss the case of a time entry cost which may vary as labour 
supply varies. As we discussed in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4, utility maximization in the 
presence of a time entry cost can be expressed by 
Max U{c, h + t(h)) = U*{c, h) 
s.t. c <wh + m - nl, 
h > 0 , (5.21) 
where the time cost function r(/i) is assumed to be discontinuous at zero hours of 
work, and U* is assumed to satisfy the classical assumptions if the c-axis (or /z = 0) is 
1 The problem becomes more complicated when we actually measure the effects of these 
costs, on expected labour supply conditional on participation. Consider for instance, a 
linear labour supply function such that 
h= 0^ + pm+y+u. 
The expected labour supply conditional upon participation is given by 
E(h\l=\) = aEiw\I=\) + pfn + r+Eiu\I=\), 
The expectations conditional upon participation generally change as the participation 
probability changes. Hence, the effects of proportional money costs and fixed money 
costs operate not only through the wage and income effects, but also through a change in 
the participation probability. 
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excluded from the budget constraint Although the utility function is also 
discontinuous at zero hours of work, the discussion in Section 2 of this chapter is still 
valid. It is noteworthy that the participation decision given by (5.5) and (5.6) is valid 
even if the direct utility function is discontinuous at zero hours of work. 
The cases involving the progressive tax system, the variable money entry cost, 
and intra-household bargaining can all be treated together as the case of the type 1 
map. The maximization problem with this type of nonlinear budget constraint can be 
expressed as 
Max U{c, h) = h), h) = U*{x, h) 
s.t. ^(c,h)=x<wh+m. (5.22) 
As we discussed in the previous chapter, the indirect utility function can be defined in 
terms of w and m just as it can in the case of a linear budget constraint. Therefore, the 
discussion about the participation decision and about the reservation wage and hour in 
Section 2.1 still holds. 
Similarly, the discussion about the effects of cost changes on the labour supply 
still holds, but we should be careful when we interpret these effects. In the presence of 
a nonlinear budget constraint that is caused by the tax system, by a money entry cost, 
or by intra-household bargaining, a decline in a proportional cost may not be treated as 
a wage rate increase, and a fixed cost decline may not be treated as a nonwage income 
increase. 
For instance, the budget set in (5.22) can be expressed by 
c<Ti{wh+m,h) , (5.23) 
where 7] is the inverse function of ^ with respect to the first argument, and rj embodies 
the tax system, the market entry cost or the family bargaining rule. Suppose that 
money market entry costs decline by one dollar per hour. If this is accepted as a wage 
increase by society, the budget constraint becomes 
c < Tli(w + l)h + m, h). (5.24)1 
Since the virtual wage rate is now given by (w + 1), and nothing else has been 
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changed in the budget constraint, the effect of the entry cost dechne by one dollar on 
labour supply is the same as the effect of a wage increase by one dollar. 
On the other hand, if the cost decline does not change the income upon which the 
tax rate, subsidy, or the bargaining is based, then the budget constraint becomes 
c < ri(wh + m,h) + h, (5.25) 
where the budget for c increases by h since the entry cost declined by one dollar. The 
structure of the budget constraint is different from that of the original budget constraint 
(5.23). Hence, if the cost decline alters the budget constraint like (5.24), then we can 
regard the cost decline as a wage increase, but if the cost decline alters the budget 
constraint like (5.26), we cannot treat the cost decline as a wage increase. This is true 
also for fixed cost changes. 
For instance, if a money cost changed because of a rise in commuting costs, then 
taxable income should be reduced by exactly the same amount in order to treat the cost 
increase as a wage rate decline. In Chapter 7, we measure the effects of a government 
subsidy for market entry on labour supply and earnings. There, we assume that the 
government subsidy is taxable, and is included in the income on which any other 
government subsidy and any family decision is based. 
4. Summary 
We discussed labour supply under market entry costs in this chapter. First, it has 
been shown that the participation probability is a positive function of the market wage, 
and any market cost increase will decrease the participation probability. Then it became 
clear that the effect of an increase in a proponional cost on participation is the same as 
the effect of a wage rate decline, but the effect of a fixed cost increase is not the same 
as that of a nonwage income decline. Numerical expressions for these two effects have 
been offered. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the discussion of linear budget constraints is 
valid even under nonlinear budget constraints that are caused by the tax system, by 
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variable money and time entry costs, or by a certain type of intra-household 
bargaining, so long as the cost changes occur without changing the framework of the 
current budget constraint. The discussion in this chapter offers the theoretical 
background for the empirical work in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6 
Specification of the Labour Supply Functions 
1. Introduction 
The neoclassical theory of labour supply offers several conditions for utility 
consistency, such as the symmetry of cross substitution effects and the negative 
semidefiniteness of the Slutsky matrix. When the theory is applied empirically, 
however, the labour supply function should be specified so that parameters can be 
estimated 
It is possible to distinguish three methods of specifying a labour supply 
function. The first method is to specify the direct utility function, from which a labour 
supply function is derived. The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility 
function and the Stone-Geary utility function (or the linear expenditure system (LES)) 
are examples of this method. An advantage of this method is that the direct utility 
function is simple, and interpretation of the utility function is straightforward. A 
disadvantage is that the labour supply function is not flexible for LES, and tiie labour 
supply function is relatively complicated for CES.^ 
The second method is to specify the indirect utility function or the expenditure 
function, and to derive a labour supply function using Roy's identity. The indirect 
translog function and the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) belong to this type. An 
advantage of tiiis method is that the derived labour supply functions are relatively 
flexible, and a disadvantage of this method is that the associated direct utility function 
^ The CES utility function is given by 
U{c, h) = [Q(n - /z)-M + (1 - aXc -
where the elasticity of substitution is 1/(1 + fi). In order to simplify the estimation 
procedure, and >5 are often selected arbinarily. 
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is often not tractable. 
The third method is to specify directly the labour supply function, and to 
integrate this function to recover the utility function. The linear labour supply function, 
semi-log linear labour supply function, log linear labour supply function, and the 
quadratic labour supply function are specified in this way. An advantage of this 
method is that the interpretation of the parameters is straightforward, and the 
estimation is easy. However, apart from the quadratic labour supply function, this 
type of labour supply function is inflexible, and the associated direct utility function is 
not tractable in the case of the semi-log linear labour supply function and the quadratic 
labour supply function.^ 
It is important to clarify the properties of the functions that are employed in the 
empirical study. As is often pointed out, results may be determined by an arbitrarily 
selected functional form, rather than by estimated parameters.^ In Section 2, we 
summarize Stem's (1986) discussion about the specification criteria. From Section 3 
to Section 8, we discuss the properties of two labour supply functions which are 
adopted for the empirical analysis, and clarify the restrictions which are implicitiy 
imposed in the process of specifying labour supply functions according to Stem's 
criteria. Section 9 summarizes the discussion of this chapter. 
2. Specification Criteria 
The selection of the labour supply function depends on practical convenience 
2 The distinction between these three methods is made just for convenience of understanding. 
It does not have a theoretical importance, because the labour supply function and the 
direct and indirect utility ftinctions have one to one relationship. 
^ For instance, the measurement of the optimal tax is sensitive to the selection of the utility 
function. This sensitivity is discussed by several studies such as Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1976, 1980), Atkinson, Stem, and Gomulka (1980), and Deaton (1981). 
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and on the purpose of the study. Stem (1986) lists eight criteria for the selection of a 
labour supply function, which are as follows: 
1) consistency with utility maximization; 
2) convenience of estimation: 
(i) linearity in coefficients, 
(ii) incorporation of household characteristics, 
(iii) stochastic variation; 
3) ease of calculation of direct and indirect utility functions, the expenditure 
function and the inverse supply function; 
4) ease of use in applied policy problems: largely criteria 2 and 3 above, 
together with transparency of the important parameters; 
5) facility of computation in optimal income tax nxxlel and, in particular, 
additive separability; 
6) behaviour of labour supply at low levels of work: 
(i) the possibility of negative marginal disutility of labour, 
(ii) the possibility that leisure might be inferior, 
7) aggregation; and 
8) flexibility in possible responses of labour supply to changes in the wage. 
In this chapter, we do not need to pay much attention to the fifth criterion since a 
theoretical discussion of optimal tax policy is beyond the purpose of this thesis. The 
seventh criterion is also not of concern to us, because we limit our discussion to cross-
section analysis. We discuss, therefore, only the remaining six points in the rest of 
this chapter. 
In the empirical part of the thesis, we employ two labour supply functions. The 
quadratic labour supply function is adopted to estimate the efficiency of a market entry 
subsidy in Chapter 7, and the linear labour supply function is adopted to simulate a tax 
reform in Chapter 8. The following sections discuss the properties of these two 
functions, with reference to the above criteria. 
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3. Utility Consistency 
As we discussed in Chapter 4, symmetry and negative semidefmiteness of the 
Slutsky matrix are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a utility consistent 
labour supply function. Let us examine whether or not these two conditions are 
satisfied for our two labour supply functions."^ 
Table 6.1 lists the two labour supply functions. The price of the composite 
commodity is set at unity. Because of zero homogeneity in price, wage and income, w 
and m can be regarded in real terms. If we express the price of the composite 
commodity p explicitly, the labour supply functions become 
h i w , p , m ) = a j + p f + r, (6.1) 
and 
w r/n rrfi wm 
h{w, P,m) = a j + K-^ + r (6.2) 
First, we will check the utility consistency of the linear labour supply function (6.1), 
and then we will check that of die quadratic labour supply function (6.2). 
From the budget constraint, the demand for the composite commodity is given 
by 
, w, m w^ o^fn w m 
C(w,p, m) = - / ! + - = + (6-3) 
Applying the Slutsky decomposition to (6.1) and (6.3) gives the compensated cross-
price effects, 
dh'^ dh dh W ft: A\ 
and 
Stem (1986) did not check the symmetry condition, because he treated only functions which 
satisfy the symmetry condition. However, if it is not known whether or not the 
symmetry condition is satisfied, it should be checked. 
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Table 6.1. Labour Supply and Associated Functions 
Labour Supply Function 
Indirect Utility Function 
Expenditure Function 
Inverse Demand Function 
Linear Labour Supply Function 
h{w, m) = aw + Pm + Y 
Direct Utility FuncUon U(c, h) = exp( - 1 + 
where a - ^ , and 6 = ^ 
V{w, m) = exp(j3w) + ^ - ^ + 
, o ^ o. a y miyv, u) = uexp{-pw)" ^ + ^  - ^ 
w(c, h) = ( l / m -dc-i) b - h 
Slutsky Restriction a-ph>0 
Labour Supply Function 
Direct Utility Function 
Indirect Utility Function 
Expenditure Function 
Slutsky Restriction 
Quadratic Labour Supply Function 
h(w, m) = aw + Pm + Tjw'^ + cpm'^ + Kwm + y 
Not Tractable 
Not Tractable 
Not Tractable 
( a + 2r]w + Km) - (fi + 2(pm + Kw)h > 0 
9c- ac (6 .5) 
3w ~ 3w dm 
where hP and c^  are respectively the compensated labour supply function and the 
compensated commodity demand function. Thus the Slutsky matrix is symmetric for 
any a and p. 
Let us now check for negative semidefmiteness. Because of linear dependence 
of substitution effects, a nonnegative compensated labour supply response to the wage 
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is necessary and sufficient for negative semidefmiteness. From the Slutsky 
decomposition, 
a/i'^  a/i 3/z . 1 
P 
(6.6) 
which is nonnegative if a > fih. Thus, negative semidefiniteness depends on the 
parameters a and j3, and on the labour supply h. However, if a is positive and P is 
negative, which is often observed for female labour supply, negative semidefiniteness 
is satisfied for any non-negative labour supply. 
The utility consistency of the quadratic labour supply function (6.2) can be 
checked by a similar process. The compensated cross-price effects are given by 
dp dp dm ^ 
aw 2t]w^ Kwm (fiw 2(pwm Kw'^ 
h. (6.7) 
and 
aw aw dm 
aw Irjw'^ Kwm fPw Icpwm kw'^ + -I- h. (6.8) 
which satisfy the symmetry condition. The compensated labour supply response to the 
wage is given by 
d¥ dh dh 
h = (a + Irjw + Km) - {p + 2(pm + Kw)h. (6.9) 
dw dw dm 
Again, the sign depends on the parameters, and it is nonnegative if (a + Irfw + Km) > 
(p + 2(pm Kw)h. 
4. Convenience of Estimation 
As Table 6.1 shows, both of the labour supply functions are linear in their 
coefficients. Characteristics variables such as the education level, age and family 
background are usually incorporated as additive terms. A stochastic term is also 
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incorporated as an additive term.^ The stochastic term can be interpreted as 
unobserved preferences or a selection error or both. Since these functions are linear in 
parameters, a two step least squares method can be employed to estimate these 
models,^ and even if the maximum likelihood method is employed as in Chapter 8, 
the linearity in parameters ensures a simple second order condition. 
The additive stochastic term implies that labour supply can be negative. This 
property is suitable for the standard tobit participation criterion such as 
h = h*, if the right hand side is positive, 
/i = 0, otherwise, (6.10) 
where h* = h{yv, m) + u, which is called the latent labour supply. In Chapter 8, we 
impose this type of stochastic structure. 
5. Ease of Calculation of the Direct and Indirect Utility Functions, the 
Expenditure Functions and the Inverse Demand Function 
Table 6.1 lists the functions associated with the linear and quadratic labour 
supply functions. In the case of the linear labour supply function, all of these 
functions are tractable. The tractability of the direct utility function makes it suitable for 
simulations of tax reform. For instance, suppose that we want to calculate the utility 
level of an individual who selects a kink point. If the direct utility function is tractable, 
5 Hausman (1980, 1981b) added a stochastic term to the income parameter as well, as we saw 
in Chapter 3. 
6 The ordinary least squares estimator is not generally employed for the following three 
reasons: first, the wage rate is often calculated from the total wage income and the hours 
worked, which causes a correlation between the measurement error in the hours woriced 
and the wage rate; second, some explanatory variables may be endogenous, for example, 
if the nonwage income contains the spouse's wage income, it may be simultaneously 
determined with own labour supply; third, if the participation decision is correlated with 
hours worked, selectivity bias arises. 
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the utility level is calculated straightforwardly by substituting the labour supply and the 
commodity demand at the kink point into the direct utility function. On the other hand, 
if the direct utility function is not tractable, we have to calculate the utility level by 
substituting the virtual wage rate and the virtual nonwage income into the indirect 
utility function. But, since both the virtual wage and virtual income are not directly 
observable, we have to calculate these values by an iterative method. 
Although the quadratic labour supply function does not have tractable dual 
functions, this does not cause any difficulty for the empirical work in Chapter 7. The 
tractability of the dual functions is not required to estimate the effects of market entry 
subsidies on participation and hours. 
6. Transparency of the Important Parameters 
There are some important parameters which are commonly used to interpret an 
individual's behaviour and to compare the estimates of different models and different 
data sets. Here we discuss the following parameters: (i) the uncompensated response 
to the wage; (ii) the response to income; (iii) the compensated response to the wage; 
(iv) the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage; (v) the 
total-income elasticity;"' (vi) the compensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to 
the wage; and (vii) the elasticity of substitution. 
In the case of the linear labour supply function, the first two parameters are easy 
to obtain. The hnear labour supply function captures these effects by a and p 
respectively. One of the merits of linear labour supply functions is that these 
parameters are simple. 
The compensated response to the wage is important when interpreting the 
magnitude of the excess burden caused by a tax system, as was discussed in Chapter 
^ This terminology follows Killingsworth and Heckman (1986). Pencavel (1986) called the 
same concept the "marginal propensity to earn." 
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2. This parameter is relatively easily calculated from the parameters of the labour 
supply functions. The compensated response to the wage is given by a - /3/i for the 
linear labour supply function. 
The above three parameters depend on the units, for price and labour supply, 
that we select For instance, if we measure the wage rate in terms of cents, then the 
labour supply response to the wage rate is a one hundredth of the response to the wage 
rate in terms of dollars. This property is inconvenient when we want an intemational 
comparison or a comparison between different periods. The elasticity overcomes this 
defect, because it measures the percentage response of labour supply to a one per cent 
increase in wage or income. The selection of units does not matter since both changes 
are measured by a ratio. The uncompensated and compensated wage elasticities are 
given by the uncompensated and compensated labour supply responses multiplied by 
w//i, and the total-income elasticity is given by the difference between the 
uncompensated and uncompensated elasticity of hours with respect to wage. The 
relationships between these three elasticities can be expressed by 
hhP W dh W dh 1 1 \ 
where the left hand side is the compensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to 
the wage, and the first and second terms of the right hand side are respectively the 
uncompensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage and the total-
income elasticity. 
Finally, the elasticity of substitution measures how substitutable leisure and the 
commodity are, keeping utility constant Formally it is defined by 
_ d(c'/(T - /zQ) w/p d\ogic'/(T - /iQ) 
d(w/p) c/(T-h)- d\og(w/p) 
aiogc^ aiog(T -
~ d\og(w/p)' d\og{w/p) (6.12) 
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The elasticity of substitution is zero at a point where the indifference curve is kinked, 
and it is infinite at a point where the indifference curve is a straight line. The CES 
utility function is defined such that the elasticity of substitution is constant for any 
combination of labour supply and commodity demand, and the elasticity of 
substitution can be captured by one parameter. In the case of the linear labour supply 
function, however, the elasticity of substitution is less transparent. 
Setting the commodity price to unity, the elasticity of substitution of the linear 
labour supply function is given by 
+ (6.13) 
\ / 
Thus, the relation between parameters in the linear labour supply function and the 
elasticity of substitution is not straightforward. 
Let us now discuss the quadratic labour supply function. It has slighdy 
complicated uncompensated response to the wage and response to income, compared 
to the linear labour supply function. They are given respectively by (a + Irpv + ion) 
and iP + 2(pm + KW). The compensated wage effect is given by (a + Irpv + Km) - (/? 
+ 2(pm + KW)h. The corresponding elasticities are given by multiplying by w//i, for 
the elasticity with respect to the wage, and by mjh, for the elasticity with respect to 
income. 
The elasticity of substitution is, again, not so straightforward. It is given by 
/ I w o = w((a + 2riw + Km) - (p + 2(pm + Kw)h) T - h wh +m \ y 
(6.14) 
Thus, the relation between parameters in the quadratic labour supply function and the 
elasticity of substitution is not straightforward. 
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7. Behaviour of Labour Supply at Low Levels of Work 
Stem stressed the importance of the flexibility of the labour supply function at 
low levels of work, especially in the following contexts: (i) when we analyze the 
behaviour of the working poor, who often have low wages and low levels of work; 
(ii) when we analyze a poverty trap; (iii) where participation is an issue in the 
estimation of labour supply; and (iv) when a fixed entry cost is measured. The third of 
these points is the case of the model employed in Ch^ter 8 which assumes a tobit-
type participation criterion. In addition to the above four cases, flexibility at low levels 
of work is important when we analyze the effect of entry costs on participation. As we 
discussed in Chapter 5, the effect of entry costs on the participation probability is 
measured by the reservation hour, which is generally small for those who work 
longer. Hence, lower levels of labour supply are important, even for those who work 
longer, when we analyze the effects of entry cost changes on the participation 
probability. 
In order to assess flexibility at low levels of work. Stem suggested two criteria: 
it should be possible to have a positive marginal utility of labour (i.e., people are better 
off if they work longer) at low levels of work; and it should be possible for leisure to 
be inferior at low levels of work. 
The first condition is equivalent to the labour supply curve intersecting the 
positive part of the /j-axis. Figure 6.1 illustrates the case where the marginal utility of 
labour is positive at low levels of work. Panel (a) shows that the indifference curve 
has a negative slope at low levels of work, so the individual will select EQ when the 
wage rate is zero. The corresponding labour supply curve is given in panel (b). The 
labour supply curve intersects the positive part of the /i-axis. Although few people, if 
any, have a zero market wage rate, it is important that a labour supply function is 
sufficientiy flexible to allow such a case, when low levels of work is an issue. 
It is instructive to compare the linear labour supply function to other labour 
supply functions at low levels of labour supply. Figure 6.2 illustrates three labour 
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supply curves. Panels (a), (b) and (c) are respectively the linear, semi-log linear, and 
log linear labour supply functions. The functional forms of the semi-log linear and 
log-linear labour supply functions are given respectively by 
h = alogw + pm + y, (6.15) 
and 
l o g /z = a l o g w + / ? l o g m + 7. (6.16) 
In all cases, the effect of the wage is assumed to be positive, and the labour supply 
curve S2 in Figure 6.2 represents a larger constant term than that in Si. 
In the case of the linear labour supply supply function, a supply curve intersects 
the w-axis at 
i3w + r (6.17) a 
which can be positive or negative. If it is negative, the labour supply curve intersects 
the positive part of the /2-axis, which implies that the marginal utility of labour is 
positive at low levels of work. 
On the other hand, in the case of the semi-log linear labour supply function, a 
supply curve intersects the w-axis at 
w = exp(- ^ ^ (6.18) a 
which cannot be negative, so a labour supply curve always intersects the positive part 
of w-axis. Thus, the semi-log linear labour supply function is less flexible than the 
linear labour supply function at low levels of work. 
The log-linear labour supply function is even less flexible than the semi-log 
linear labour supply function, because labour supply approaches zero when the wage 
rate approaches zero. Since the uncompensated wage elasticity is constant, the labour 
supply curve is the straight line through the origin if the wage effect is positive, as 
panel (c) shows. 
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In the case of the quadratic labour supply function, the labour supply curve 
intersects either the positive or the negative part of the w-axis, or intersects it twice. 
The intercept on the w-axis is given by 
w a + ± (a + Km)^ - 4T](pm + (pm'^ + j) ^^ ^ ^ ^ 
Ir] 
Thus, w may be positive or negative, or both. 
Because the income effect is constant for the linear labour supply function, the 
second condition presented by Stem is not satisfied. But, in the case of the quadratic 
labour supply function, it is possible to have a positive income effect at low levels of 
labour supply and a negative income effect at high levels of labour supply. The 
response to income of the quadratic function is given by 3/i/3m = P + 2(pm + kw. If k 
is negative, and if labour supply is a positive function of the wage rate, the income 
effect may be positive at low levels of labour supply and negative at high levels of 
labour supply. 
8. Flexibility of the Response to the Wage 
In the previous section, the flexibility of labour supply at low levels of labour 
supply was discussed. Now, let us discuss another concept of flexibility, that is, the 
flexibility of the response to the wage. The labour supply response to the wage is not 
flexible for the linear labour supply function. The uncompensated response to the 
wage is captured by the single parameter a , and the compensated response to the wage 
is given by a - ph, which depends solely on hours of work when the parameters a 
and p are given, and is monotonically increasing as hours of work increase if the 
income effect is negative. 
On the other hand, the quadratic labour supply function responds flexibly to the 
wage. The uncompensated response to the wage is given by (a + iTpv + Km), which 
may be positive for low levels of the wage rate, and negative for high levels of the 
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wage rate if rj is negative. The compensated response to the wage is given by ( a + 
2r\w + Km) - (fi + 2(pm + KW)h, which depends on the wage rate, on nonwage 
income and on hours of work. Hence, in contrast to the linear labour supply function, 
the compensated response to wage of the quadratic labour supply function is flexible. 
9. Summary 
We have discussed the properties of two labour supply functions: the linear 
labour supply function and the quadratic labour supply function. In Chapter 7, we 
adopt the quadratic labour supply function because it is easy to estimate, its parameters 
are easy to interpret, it is flexible at low levels of labour supply, and its response to the 
wage is also flexible. To estimate the effect of an entry cost change on labour supply, 
we use the reservation hour, which is generally small especially for those who have a 
high participation probability, so it is necessary that the labour supply function is 
flexible at low levels of labour supply. The quadratic labour supply function satisfies 
this condition. Although the quadratic labour supply function has the disadvantage of 
the associated direct and indirect utility functions and the expenditure function not 
being tractable, we do not use these functions for simulation in Chapter 7. 
In Chapter 8, we choose the linear labour supply function because it is easy to 
estimate and its direct utility function is tractable. Since we take into account the 
endogeneity that is caused by the kinked budget line, the estimation method is 
relatively complicated. A simple functional form is, therefore, required. The 
tractability of the direct utility function makes the simulation of tax reform much 
simpler. A crucial disadvantage of the linear labour supply function is the inflexibility 
of the labour supply response to the wage. Hence, in Chapter 8, we test whether or 
not the backward bending phenomenon is observed, by adding the square of the wage 
rate to the linear labour supply function. 
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Chapter 7 
The Efficiency of Subsidies for Market Entry 
1. Introduction 
When people enter the labour market, they have to pay for market entry in the 
form of payments for transportation, uniforms, self-education and child care. These 
may be paid, in part and indirectly, by the government through deductions from 
taxable income of work-related expenses or through subsidies for child care. These 
policies reduce individuals' market entry costs. It is of interest to investigate the effects 
of these policies on labour supply and earnings. If such a policy causes labour supply 
to increase and hence causes earnings to increase, the net cost of the policy to the 
govemment would be lower, because the policy would raise extra tax revenue. 
In spite of the importance of the issue, the impact on labour supply of a change 
in market entry cost has not been estimated. In this chapter, we measure the effects of 
market entry subsidies on labour supply and on income,^ assuming that the labour 
demand function is perfecdy elastic. We treat two simple subsidies for market entry: a 
lump sum subsidy and a subsidy that is proportional to hours worked.^ Although a 
pure lump sum subsidy or a pure proportional subsidy is rare, actual subsidies may be 
approximated by a combination of these two pure types. 
The model we employ is widely used to estimate labour supply. That is, the 
participation decision follows a probit decision making criterion, and the log of die 
1 The measurement of the effect on utility or on equivalent income are relevant when we are 
interested in welfare. But the effect on income is not less important for policy makers 
since tax revenue depends on actual income rather than equivalent income. 
2 A "lump sum subsidy for market entry" means a fixed amount of subsidy conditional on 
participation. This subsidy, therefore, is not paid for nonworicers. 
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market wage is a linear function of the exogenous variables. In addition, the number 
of hours worked is a function of the wage and of the nonwage income, as well as of 
other characteristics variables, and satisfies the Slutsky restriction under a linear 
budget constraint. We have added, however, an extra assumption in order to derive a 
reservation wage equation. Although we do not model explicitly the nonlinearity of the 
budget constraint that is caused by the current tax system, by variable money and time 
entry costs, or by bargaining between husband and wife, the estimation in this chapter 
is valid under those circumstances as we discussed in Chapter 5. 
The organization of the chapter is as follows. The empirical model and 
estimation method is discussed in Section 2, and the data used for the empirical study 
are explained in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the estimation results of our empirical 
model, and in Section 5, we derive the effects of entry costs on labour supply using 
the empirical study of Beggs and Chapman (1988), the model structure of which is 
substantially the same as that in our study. A summary is offered in Section 6. 
2. Empirical Model and Estimation Method 
In this section, we present an empirical model and discuss the estimation 
method. We then explain the method that we use to measure the marginal gain and the 
marginal cost of subsidies. 
2.1. Empirical Model 
Past studies offered two altemative methods which may be adopted for this 
study. One method, which was employed by Hausman (1980), specifies an entry cost 
function and a utility function explicitly, and then derives a participation decision 
equation by maximizing the utility function under the budget set with a fixed entry 
cost. The parameters of the utility function and of the fixed entry cost function are 
estimated directly from the participation equation. 
Another method, which was first employed by Cogan (1980,1981), estimates 
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the participation decision with a predicted wage rate as an explanatory variable, and 
estimates the hours worked equation adjusting for sample selection bias. The 
reservation hour is estimated using the estimates of participation and hours worked. 
An advantage of the latter model is that we do not need to specify the entry cost 
function explicitly, and the model is valid even under fixed time entry costs, as well as 
under fixed money entry costs. 
We basically follow the latter approach. A slight difference in our model is 
discussed later. Our model consists of four simultaneous equations, i.e., a market 
wage equation, a reservation wage equation, a participation decision equation and an 
hours worked equation. The structure of the first three equations is the same as that of 
Gronau (1974), Nelson (1977), and Maddala (1983, p228). The offered wage and 
reservation wage of the /-th individual are assumed to have the functional forms, 
log w,- = 'x\i + uu, and (7.1) 
log Wri = &2'X2i + U2i, (7.2) 
where w,- is the market wage rate; Wri is the reservation wage; xn and X2i are 
exogenous variables which affect the offered wage and the reservation wage 
respectively; and un and uzi are disturbance terms. As we saw in Chapter 5, a wife 
participates if her offered wage exceeds her reservation wage. Hence, her participation 
decision-making criterion can be expressed as 
li* = log Wi - log Wri 
= 6\'Xu + uu - Sl'Xli - U2i 
= S'xi + Ui. 
I i = \ i f / , * > 0 , 
li = 0 otherwise, (7.3) 
where /,• is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the individual participates, 
and equal to zero otherwise. 
The hours worked function is assumed to have a quadratic form, 
hi* = a wi + f5mi + rfwi^ + (pmi^ + KWirrii + y 'z,- + u^i. 
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hi = 0 otherwise, (7.4) 
where /i,* is the latent hours worked which is equal to the actual hours worked if she 
participates; m, is nonwage income; z, is a vector of variables which affect labour 
supply; and M3,- is a disturbance term. This labour supply function is consistent with 
utility maximization if ( a + Irjwi + Kmi) - (fi + 2(pmi + KWi)hi > 0, as we saw in 
Chapter 6. The disturbance terms un, U2i and u^i are assumed to be joindy and 
normally distributed as,^ 
I CTi^  (J\2 C7i3^ 
U2i (7.5) 0 I CJi2 (722 CT23 
I Cri3 (T23 J 
Hence, = uu - U2i is also normally distributed with variance o^ = + - Icyl-
Although the reservation wage is unobserved, the parameters ^ and 02 are estimated 
from the estimation results of (7.1) and (7.2) if an identification condition is satisfied. 
The estimation method is discussed later. 
There are two points which distinguish the above model from Cogan's model. 
First, Cogan assumed that an individual works if the number of latent hours worked is 
larger than the reservation hour. Because he assumed a semi-log linear hours of work 
function and his estimation showed that the wage rate has a positive effect on hours 
worked, his assumption that an individual participates if the latent hours of work 
exceeds the reservation hour is the same as our assumption that an individual works if 
the market wage rate exceeds the reservation wage. In our study, however, Cogan's 
assumption would not be suitable, because our labour supply function is more 
^ The disturbance term of the wage equation is assumed to stem from unobserved ability and 
from the random event of being offered a wage rate which is higher than the reservation 
wage. The disturbance term in the reservation wage equation is assumed to stem from 
unobserved preferences. The disturbance term in the hours worked function is assumed 
to stem from unobserved preferences and from selection error. 
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flexible, and our labour supply curve may be backward-bending. 
Second, Cogan assumed that there exist fixed time and money entry costs, both 
of which are linear functions of exogenous variables. This gives rise to two problems. 
One problem is that Cogan interpreted the model more narrowly than he could have. 
As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, the model is valid even under nonlinear budget 
constraints that caused by variable time and money entry costs so long as the budget 
set is given by c < 7](w/i + m, h). 
Another problem is that his model is over-identified While he specified the 
hours worked function, the time and money entry cost functions and the participation 
decision function independently, the functional form of one of the four equations is 
determined by the other three equations. For instance, specifying the hours function is 
equivalent to specifying the utility function. Hence, if the hours function and the entry 
cost functions are specified, an individual's behaviour is totally captured by these 
functions, and the functional form of the participation equation is determined by the 
remaining equations. 
2.2. The Estimation Method 
For the estimation of the wage and hours equations, the two step method offered 
by Heckman (1976) is employed.'^ A difficulty in estimating the system consisting of 
the above equations is that the market wage rate and the latent hours worked cannot be 
observed for nonworkers. If we estimate the hours worked equation and the wage 
equation using only participants' data, the estimation generally suffers from a 
selectivity bias. 
For instance, the expected value of log w/ conditional upon participation is given 
According to the categories presented by Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), our method 
belongs to number VIII. 
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by5 
£(log W.I / = 1) = 5i'xu + E(uu\ I = 1) 
= + (7.6) 
where 
(yiu = E(uu M,), (7.7) 
1 -
4 = (7.9) 
cr 
0 is the standard normal density function;0 is the cumulative standard normal density 
function; and A, is the inverse of Mill's ratio. This expected value is a monotone 
decreasing function of the probability that an observation is selected into the sample, 
<P{-Ai), and = 0, and l im^.^ , ) .^ , = <». Thus, (7.6) implies that the 
expected value of the disturbance term ui conditional upon participation is positive, if 
the wage equation and the participation equation are positively correlated, and v/ce 
versa. Hence, (7.6) does not satisfy the classical assumptions for a linear regression 
model, and the least squares estimator is biased. 
We now define the error term £\i such that 
£1/= "1/- —A.-, (7.10) 
where 
£(£iil/,• = 1) =0, (7.11) 
5 The validity of this equation depends on the assumption of the distribution of w = ui. W2- If " 
is not normally distributed, the last term in (7.6) should be modified. Mroz (1987) 
estimated a similar labour supply model when the distribution of the error term of the 
participation equation is i) normal, ii) lognormal, and iii) LogiL The comparison of these 
three estimations shows that the estimates of the parameters are not sensitive to the 
assumption of the distribution. Newey, Powell and Walker (1990) applied a 
semiparametric method to the same model of Mroz, and again find that the estimates are 
similar to parametric methods assuming normal errors. 
I l l 
E { e u e i j \ l i = \ ) = 0 f o r / > y , (7.12) 
£(£i.-2 11, = 1) = CJi2((l - p2) + p2(i + - A,-2)), (7.13) 
P = (7.14) GiG 
The wage equation is expressed by 
log H'.- = + ^ X i + £u. (7.15) 
CT 
If we knew Ai and hence A,-, we could enter A,- as a regressor in (7.15) and 
estimate the wage equation by ordinary least squares (OLS). Heckman (1976) 
suggested the use of a consistent estimator of Ai given by the probit estimator of the 
participation equation (7.3). The OLS estimator, when A,- is introduced as a regressor, 
is unbiased but inefficient The inefficiency stems from the heteroscedasticity observed 
in (7.13). Heckman (1976) recommended using the generalized least squares (GLS) 
estimator to estimate the above equation.^ 
Similarly, the reservation wage equation can expressed by 
o? log Wri = 52'X2i + — A , + 621. (7.16) <7 
All of the parameters in the wage equation and in the reservation wage equation are 
estimated if an identification condition is satisfied. Two possible identification 
conditions are: i) one variable in x\ does not overlap X2', and ii) Gn is zero. 
The estimation process is as follows: (i) Estimate the participation equation 
(7.3); (ii) calculate the inverse of Mill's ratio; (iii) estimate the market wage equation 
(7.1) with the inverse of Mill's ratio; (iv) estimate the hours of work equation (7.4) 
with the predicted value of the wage rate and the inverse of Mill's ratio; and (v) 
calculate the reservation wage equation and the variance of the participation equation 
from the estimates of the participation equation and the wage equation. 
^ To estimate the wage equation and the hours equation, the computer package LIMDEP is 
used. LIMDEP does not offer the GLS estimator, but it offers an estimator of a 
covariance matrix which is consistent under self selectioa 
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The last procedure depends on which assumption is imposed to solve the 
identification problem. The estimation procedures under the two possible assumptions 
are as follows."' 
Assumption 1. One variable in xi does not overlap X2. 
In order to avoid over-identification, it is necessary to assume that all but one 
variable in xi overlap X2. For the sake of simplicity, we change the notation of wages 
to log w, = 5\'xi + uii and log Wri = &iXi + un, where some elements of are zero, 
and one element in ^ is zero. The parameters are identified as follows: 
(i) The probit estimator of the participation decision gives a consistent 
estimator of 5Ig= 5*. 
(ii) The OLS estimator of the wage equation including the inverse of Mill's 
ratio gives consistent estimators of and of 0\j0. 
(iii) A consistent estimator of is given by ^  
n\ 
< = 1 
where c is a consistent estimator of 0\J<J, which is the coefficient of the 
inverse of Mill's ratio; D, and /, are respectively consistent estimators 
of Oi, Ai and A,; and e\i is the estimation residual of (7.15). 
( iv) Let the j-\h element of <52 be zero. Then, from the estimates of offered 
wage and participation equations, a consistent estimator of a is given by 
5 = ^ , (7.18) 
The discussion follows Maddala (1983, p229). 
^ This equation is offered by Heckman (1979). For our study, the computer package LIMDEP 
automatically presents a consistent estimate of Ci. 
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where s, dy and dj* are respectively consistent estimators of cr, of they'-th 
coefficient of the wage equation and of the normalized j-th coefficient of 
the participation equation. 
(v) A consistent estimator of S (ii)is given by 
d = d*s, (7.19) 
where d* is a consistent estimator of 5*. 
(vi) A consistent estimator of Si {di) is given by 
d2 = di- d. (7.20) 
(vii) From 5 and c, a consistent estimator of a\u (5i«) is calculated as 
siu = cs. (7.21) 
(viii) Since <7iu = E(uii (un - U2i)) = Eiuu^ - uuU2i) = - c^n, from si and 
siu, a consistent estimator of a n (^12) is given by 
(7.22) 
(ix) Since (T = £((«!,• - M2i)^ ) = + " 2cri2, a consistent estimator of 02^ 
(S2 )^ is given by 
s2^ = s - s i ^ + 2si2. (7.23) 
(x) Finally, since (Jzu = ("i/ - «2/)) = <^ 12 - a consistent estimator of 
<Jzu (S2u) is given by 
S2u = S12 - S2. (7.24) 
Assumption 2. a n = 0 
Under this assumption, in order to avoid over-identification, it is necessary to 
assume that the variables in X2 and x overlap perfectly such that X2 = x, and all of the 
variables in xi are in X2. Hence, the reservation wage equation can be expressed as log 
Wri = Si'Xi + U2i- For the sake of clarity, we denote the wage equation by log w,- = 
Si'Xi + u\i, where some elements in are zero. The first three steps of the estimation 
process are the same as they are for Assumption 1. The subsequent steps are given by: 
(iv) Since <Ti„ = cTi^  - <712, ^lu is given by 
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(iv) Since Giu = - (Jn, siu is given by 
= 5I2 . (7.25) 
(v) From c and siu, s is calculated as 
5 = (7.26) c 
(vi) Using the probit estimator of S'crand s, d is given by 
d = d*s. (7.27) 
(vii) Since a = (Ti^  + 02^ - I a n , is given by 
= ^ - (7.28) 
(viii) Since = cr^ - S2u is given by 
52u = (7.29) 
(ix) Finally, since S= 5\- S2,d2 is given by 
d2 = di- d. (7.30) 
Equation (7.25) shows that if the correlation between the wage equation and the 
participation decision equation (CIM) is zero or negative, the assumption that Gu = 0 is 
violated. 
On the other hand, using the inverse of Mill's ratio, the hours worked equation 
is expressed by 
hi* = a w,- + prrii + rjwP- + (pmi^  + KWimi + y'z,- + —A, + £3/, (7.31) o 
It is noteworthy that there are three different expected values of the hours worked 
which are useful in understanding the following discussion. First, the unconditional 
expectation of the latent hours worked is given by 
E{hi*) = a Wi + prrii + r]wP- + (pmP- + Kwirrii + 7 'z,-, (7.32) 
which is simply the latent labour supply function without a disturbance term. Second, 
the expectation of hours worked conditional on participation is given by 
= a wi + pnti + 7]W,-2 + (pmi^ + KWimi + y 'z,- + - A , - , G 
(7.33) 
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which is different firom the unconditional expectation if the hours worked and the 
participation decision are correlated, i.e. 03^ ^ 0. Third, the unconditional mean for 
both participants and nonparticipants is given by 
£(/i.) = PiE{hi I h = 1) = ^-Ai) E(hi I li = 1), (7.34) 
where P, is the participation probability. It is this last expression which is employed to 
calculate the gains and costs of subsidies. 
2.3. The Marginal Gain, the Marginal Cost and the Efficiency of a Lump Sum 
Subsidy 
Let us now define the marginal gain, the marginal cost and the efficiency of 
subsidies. In this thesis, these are defined in terms of money, not of utility. The 
consumption of leisure is, therefore, not taken into account, when these terms are 
defined. 
The i-th individual's expected wage income is given by 
EiWIi) = P , E i w i h i \ I i = \ ) , (7.35) 
where Wli is the wage income. The expected wage income conditional on participation 
is different from an unconditional expectation if the random terms in the wage income 
equation and the participation equation are correlated. 
In our model, the wage income is not estimated directly. Hence, we have to 
decompose the wage income into the wage rate and hours of work in order to measure 
the expected wage income, hi and w, are respectively denoted by 
Wi= c\p(co'i + Eli), (7.36) 
hi = h'i + £3/. (7.37) 
where 6)',- = £(log w,-1 /,• = 1), and h'i = E(hi I /,• = 1). The first order Taylor 
expansion of (7.35) around co'i and h'i gives 
PiEiwihi I li = 1) = Pi cxp((o'i)h'i. (7.38) 
where 
Pi = (7.39) 
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co'i = 8'xi + ^Xi, (7.40) cr 
h'i = a E(wi \ h = 1)+ prrii + T] E(wp- !/, = !) + (pmp- + KEiwinn I // = 1) 
G 
« a exp(a)',)+ + ricxp(co'i)^ + (pmp- + Kexp(a)',)mj 
+ + — A i . (7.41) cr 
Again, the first order approximation is applied to derive (7.41). We redefine h'i as the 
final expression of (7.41), and define the approximated expected wage income by 
Wri = Piexp(co'i)h'i. (7.42) 
Now, let us consider the effect of a lump sum subsidy on earnings. Taking 
derivatives with respect to Si gives 
^ = (7.43, 
Three partial derivatives in the right hand side of (7.43) are generally nonzero. First, 
the subsidy has a positive effect on participation, because it reduces the market entry 
cost. 
Second, the participation probability affects the expected wage rate conditional 
on participation. If the wage equation and the participation equation are positively 
correlated, i.e., (J\u > 0, as has been widely observed in empirical studies, an increase 
in the participation probability decreases the expected wage rate, because the inverse 
of Mill's ratio is a decreasing function of the participation probability. Intuitively 
speaking, the increase in the participation probability implies that individuals who 
have relatively low wage rates enter the market, and so they depress the mean wage 
rate. 
Finally, the lump sum subsidy affects the labour supply conditional upon 
participation, through changes in the expected wage rate, nonwage income, and the 
participation probability. If the hours worked function is increasing in the wage rate. 
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the decline of the wage rate shortens the hours worked; if the hours worked function 
is decreasing in nonwage income, the increase in lump sum subsidy shortens the 
hours worked; and if the hours worked function is positively related to the 
participation equation, the increase in the participation probability shortens the 
expected hours worked conditional upon participation. Many empirical studies show 
that the hours worked function for wives is increasing in the wage rate, is decreasing 
in nonwage income, and is positively correlated to the participation equation. Hence, 
an increase in the lump sum subsidy will have a negative effect on expected hours 
worked conditional upon participation. 
Let us now derive the three partial derivative terms. The participation probability 
is expressed as 
/>, = = ^ £ ( l o g w,) ww)^ ^ 
where EQog w,) and E(\og Wri) are respectively the unconditional expectation of the 
market wage and of the reservation wage. As we saw in Chapter 5, the effect of the 
lump sum subsidy on the reservation wage is given by 
dWri 1 (7.45) dSi hri ' 
where si is the lump sum subsidy for workers. Hence, the effect on the participation 
probability is given by 
dPj _ d0{-Ai) d{-Ai) dE(\og Wri) alog Wri dWri 
3^1 BE (log Wri) 31og Wri BWri 
(J Wri nri 
(7.46) 
(JWrihri 
Note that 3£'(log Wrdl^ Xog Wri = 1, because the change in the reservation wage stems 
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from a lump sum subsidy, not from a change in the random term U2i. 
Next, the effect of the lump sum subsidy on the expected log of the wage rate 
conditional upon participation is given by 
dco'i (JiudXi a (piAi) = 
C7 (P(.Ai) 
( l^u 1 
CT GWrihri 
Olu 1 
- AMAi) ^ 
(- AiXi + A.-2) (7.47) 
O GWrihri 
Finally, the effect on expected hours worked conditional upon participation is 
given by 
= ( a + 2r]exp(a)',) + Kim) + + + Ktxp{co'i)) 
Giu 1 (- AiXi + A,-2). (7.48) 
Cr GWrihri 
Substituting (7.46), (7.47) and (7.48) into (7.43) gives the marginal gain of the 
subsidy. In practice, the wage rate, the reservation wage, hours worked and 
reservation hour are replaced by the expectation of these variables, and then the 
parameters and variables are are replaced by consistent estimates. 
On the other hand, the expected lump sum subsidy for the i-th individual, which 
is the expected cost to the government, is given by the lump sum subsidy multiplied 
by her participation probability such that 
COSTu = SiPi. (7.49) 
The marginal cost is given by 
dCOSTu ^ 
dsi - ^ ' ^ ^ ^ d s i ' (7.50) 
Thus, the marginal cost depends on the current subsidy, and if currendy there is no 
subsidy, the marginal cost is equal to the participation probability. 
The efficiency of the subsidy is measured by the ratio between the marginal gain 
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and the marginal cost. If the ratio is negative, the subsidy causes losses to the total 
income of society. If the ratio is large, the government may offset the cost of the 
subsidy by the extra revenue from income tax. For instance, if the tax is proportional 
to a person's income, the tax rate at which an average person pays an amount of tax 
that is exactly equal to the subsidy she receives is given by 1/(1 + r), where r is the 
marginal gain / marginal cost ratio. 
However, if the tax rate is progressive, one cannot know how large r should be 
to offset the government's expenditure. The expected effect of the subsidy is an 
average of the effect on a small portion of people who enter the market and the effect 
on a large portion of people who reduce hours worked and wage income because of 
the income effect of the subsidy. Since the former people generally face a lower 
marginal tax rate than the latter people, it is possible that the government loses tax 
revenue even if the average person's income is increased. 
2.4. The Marginal Gain, the Marginal Cost and the Efficiency of a Proportional 
Subsidy 
The marginal gain from a proportional subsidy is given by 
= . , e x p ( . - , - ) f . (7.51) 
The signs of the three partial derivatives in the right hand side of (7.51) are predicted 
as follows. First, the effect of the proportional subsidy on the participation probability 
is the same as the effect of an exogenous increase in the wage rate. As we saw in 
Chapter 5, the wage rate has a positive effect on the participation probability, so 
dPi/dS2 is positive. 
Second, the proportional subsidy has a negative effect on the expected wage rate 
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conditional on participation if the wage equation is positively correlated with the 
participation equation. Therefore, 3exp(co',)/a52 will be negative.^ 
Third, the effect on the expected hours worked conditional on participation 
depends on the uncompensated wage effect and the correlation between the hours 
worked equation and the participation decision equation. If labour supply is a positive 
function of the wage rate, the increase in hourly income has a positive effect on hours, 
and if the hours function and the participation function are positively correlated, the 
increase in the participation probability has a negative effect on expected hours worked 
conditional upon participation. 
The three partial derivatives that we are discussing are derived as follows. The 
effect of the proportional subsidy on the participation probability is given by 
dPj _ d0{-Ai) di-Aj) aEdog wj) 31og iv,-
di-Ai) ^i) vv, dwi 
= (7.52) 
(Tw, 
Note that 9£(log w,)/81og w,- = 1, because the change in the net wage rate stems from a 
proportional subsidy, not from a change in the random term This is the same as 
the effect of a wage rate rise. The effect on the expected log of the wage rate 
conditional upon participation is given by 
dco'i dXi a (piAi) 
f-Ai(l>(Ai) , 1 = - CTlu CTW, + 0(-Ad 0i-Ai)\ 
9 However, hourly income (subsidy plus wage) may increase because of the subsidy. 
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= - < T i u — ( - 4 A / + A.-2) (7.53) 
<TW, 
The effect on expected hours worked conditional upon participation is given by 
= ( a + Iriexpico'i) + Krm) exp(a)',) (1 + 
- 0 3 « — + (7.54) 
GWi 
Substituting (7.52), (7.53) and (7.54) into (7.51) gives the marginal gain of the 
subsidy. 
On the other hand, the expected cost of the proportional subsidy for the /-th 
individual is given by the proportional subsidy multiplied by the unconditional mean 
hours of the participants and nonparticipants such that 
COSTii = S2Pih'i. (7.55) 
Hence, the marginal cost is given by 
^ ^ = (7.56) 
Thus, again, the marginal cost depends on the current subsidy, and if currently there 
is no subsidy, the marginal cost is equal to the unconditional mean of hours worked, 
Pih'i. The efficiency of a subsidy is measured by the marginal gain / marginal cost 
ratio. 
Finally, it should be noted that the above measurement method depends on the 
assumption concerning the distribution of the disturbance term in the participation 
decision equation. If the distribution is not normal, the effect of the subsidies on the 
participation probabihty will be different from the effect shown in the derived 
equations. Although most empirical studies of labour supply assumed a normal or a 
logistic distribution of the disturbance term in the participation equation, few studies 
have examined empirically the plausibility of this assumption.^® 
A notable exception is Heckman and WiUis (1977). They used panel data, and estimated the 
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3. Data 
The Australian Income Distribution Survey, 1985-1986 is used for the empirical 
work. This data set consists of individual observations of 11,298 married people and 
6,416 single people. Out of 11,298 married people, both the husband's data and the 
wife's data are available for 11,032 people or 5,516 couples. The data set contains: 
personal characteristics variables such as sex, age, marital status and country or area 
of birth; education variables such as the age of leaving primary or secondaiy school, 
highest education level and current education status; labour supply variables such as 
hours worked per week and weeks worked per year; annual and weekly wage income; 
annual and weekly income from ten different government benefits separately; annual 
and weekly income from six different sources of business income separately; nine 
other sources of income such as superannuation, insurance and director's fees; total 
amount of tax paid; and child variables such as the number of dependent children aged 
0-4 years, 5-9 years, 10-14 years, and 15-20 years. 
Although the data set is quite rich, there are at least two defects that should be 
noted when we employ it to study labour supply. First, past job experience is not 
available, although many studies show that job experience is an important factor 
which explains the current wage rate and labour supply. Second, weekly labour 
supply is available only for ten categories, i.e., 0, 1-9 hours, 10-19 hours, 20-24 
hours, 25-29 hours, 30-34 hours, 35-40 hours, 40-44 hours, 45-49 hours, and 50 
hours and over. To calculate hours worked, the mid point of each category is selected 
for the first eight categories, and 52 hours is selected for the last category. Compared 
to data sets reporting exact hours, a measurement error is larger in this data set, so the 
estimated equation standard error will become large. 
distribution of the participation probability. They found that the distribution of the 
participation probability is u shaped. If their findings reflect a common phenomenon, the 
normality assumption would be restrictive. 
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The sample selection criteria are explained in Table 7.1. The following points 
should be noted. First, wives between 20 years old and 45 years old, and husbands 
between 20 years old and 50 years old are selected. Teenagers are excluded since their 
preferences may be quite different from others. Aged couples are excluded because we 
want to eliminate the effect of retirement. Second, people for whom the log of the 
wage rate is less than one or more than 3.5 are excluded. The corresponding wage 
rates are respectively $2,72 and $33.12. Table 7.1 shows that only one per cent of 
males and 1.3 per cent of females belong to this category. Indeed this category may be 
caused by measurement errors unless its members worked under extreme conditions. 
Third, those who have income from their own business or from director's fees are 
excluded, because the distinction between business income and wage income is not 
Table 7.1. Excluded Observations 
Male 
(1) 
Female 
(2) 
20 Years Old or Less 21 (0.4) 78 (1.4) 
45 Years Old or more (female) NA 2220 (40.2) 
50 Years Old (x more (male) 2069 (37.5) NA 
Marital Status Changed in 1985-86 155 (2.8) 155 (2.8) 
Away from Australia 13 Weeks cm* mwe 78 (1.4) 81 (1.5) 
Full-Time Student 48 (0.9) 48 (0.9) 
No Work but Having Wage Income (female) NA 12 (0.2) 
No Work (male) 2163 (39.2) NA 
WcH-ked but No Wage Income 10 (0.2) 0 (0.) 
Having Director's Fee 49 (0.9) 17 (0.3) 
Log of Wage Rate Less than 1 33 (0.6) 36 (0.7) 
Log of Wage Rate More than 3.5 23 (0.4) 35 (0.6) 
Having Income from Own Business 1333 (24.2) 923 (16.7) 
Wage/Salary from Own Ltd 290 (5.3) 179 (3.2) 
Income from Own Non-Ltd 818 (14.8) 568 (10.3) 
Loss from Own Non-Ltd 240 (4.4) 177 (3.2) 
Income form Dividends, Own Ltd 101 (1.8) 75 (1.4) 
Original Sample Size 
Selected Sample Size 
5516 
1813 
(100.0) 
(32.9) 
Note.— The proportions to total sample size are in parentheses. 
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clear for them. Their wage may contain a part of their profit, or their profit may 
contain a part of their wage. 24.2 per cent of males and 16.7 per cent of females are 
excluded for this reason. 
As a result, 1,813 couples, for each of which both the husband and the wife fit 
our criteria, are selected. Table 7.2 gives the definition of variables, and Table 7.3 
gives means and standard deviations of the selected sample. 
4. Results 
4.1. Participation 
Table 7.4 gives the probit estimates of the participation decision. The 
interpretation of the coefficients is as follows. The number of years of primary and 
secondary education has a positive effect and is significant at the five per cent level. 
The dummies for diplomas and bachelor degrees also have positive effects on 
participation and are significant at the one per cent level. These effects result partly 
ft-om the associated high wage rate. If education increases general human capital, it 
increases also the wage rate. As we saw in Chapter 5, the participation decision is 
always a positive function of the market wage rate. Hence it is not clear whether or not 
education itself would have a positive effect on participation if its effect on the wage 
rate were excluded. As we will discuss later, measurements of the pure effect of 
education on the participation decision are sensitive to assumptions. 
Age has a negative effect on participation. The dummy for the 30s is significant 
at the ten per cent level, and the dummy for the 40s is significant at the five per cent 
level. To interpret the effect of age is not simple. The model is static, so it is assumed 
that people decide their labour supply and commodity consumption only considering 
the current period. In this context, age simply changes the tastes for work such that 
the disutility of work is larger for aged people. 
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Table 7.2. Definiuon of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Wtfe's Characteristics 
Labour Market Status 
W Wage Rate 
H Hours Worked a Year 
I Dummy for Participation 
Education 
ED Years of Primary and Secondary Education 
DIP Dummy for Diploma 
BACH Dummy for Diploma 
Age 
Dummy for 30-39 Years Old 
AAO Dummy for 40-45 Years Old 
Country of Birth 
ASIA Dummy for Bom in Asia 
UK Dummy for Bom in UK 
EUROPE Dummy for Bom in Other Europe 
OTHER Dummy for Bom in Other Overseas 
Income 
NWI Wife's Nonwage Income 
Husband s Characteristics * 
NWI„ Husband's Nonwage Income 
Husband's Wage Rate 
Children 
C(M-1 Dummy for Having One Child 0-4 Years Old 
COA-2 Dummy for Having Two Children 0-4 Years Old 
CO-4-3 Dummy for Having Three or mcw^ Children 0-4 Years Old 
C5-9-1 Dummy for Having One Child 5-9 Years Old 
C5-9-2 Dummy for Having Two Children 5-9 Years Old 
C5-9-3 Dummy for Having Three or more Children 5-9 Years Old 
ClO-14-1 Dummy for Having One ChUd 10-14 Years Old 
ClO-14-2 Dummy for Having Two Children 10-14 Years Old 
ClO-14-3 Dummy for Having Three or more Children 10-14 Years Old 
* Subscript m is for a husband's characteristics. 
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Table 7.3. Sample Means 
All Wives 
(1) 
Woricers 
(2) 
Non-Workers 
(3) 
NA 9.463 (3.955) NA 
H 822.5 (877.5) 1316 (7763.0) NA 
I 0.6249 (0.4843) 1. (0.) 0. (0.) 
Education 
ED 9.830 (1.260) 9.918 (1.262) 9.684 (1.243) 
DIP 0.2372 (0.4255) 0.2657 (0.4419) 0.1897 (0.3924) 
BACH 0.06784 (0.2516) 0.09356 (0.2913) 0.02500 (0.1562) 
Age 
A30 0.4843 (0.4999) 0.4537 (0.4981) 0.5353 (0.4991) 
A40 0.1671 (0.3732) 0.1854 (0.3888) 0.1368 (0.3439) 
Country of Birth 
ASIA 0.03365 (0.1804) 0.03089 (0.1731) 0.03824 (0.1919) 
UK 0.1015 (0.3021) 0.1024 (0.3033) 0.1000 (0.3002) 
EUROPE 0.07777 (0.2679) 0.07414 (0.2621) 0.08382 (0.2773) 
OTHER 0.04027 (0.1967) 0.04148 (0.1995) 0.03824 (0.1919) 
Inconie 
NWI 1057 (2178) 924.6 (2438) 1277 (1.634) 
Husband 
NWI„ 613.1 (2008) 570.9 (2174) 683.5 (1696) 
w^ 11.17 (3.474) 11.22 (3.400) 11.08 (3.594) 
Children 
C(M-1 0.2675 (0.4428) 0.2251 (0.4178) 0.3382 (0.4735) 
C(M-2 0.1214 (0.3266) 0.06178 (0.2409) 0.2206 (0.4150) 
CO-4-3 0.008274 (0.0906) 0.002648(0.0514) 0.01765 (0.1318) 
C5-9-1 0.2554 (0.4362) 0.2074 (0.4056) 0.3353 (0.4724) 
C5-9-2 0.09597 (0.2946) 0.07502 (0.2635) 0.1309 (0.3376) 
C5-9-3 0.01434 (0.1189) 0.007944 (0.0888) 0.02500 (0.1562) 
ClO-14-1 0.2223 (0.4159) 0.1968 (0.3978) 0.2647 (0.4415) 
ClO-14-2 0.09984 (0.2999) 0.09974 (0.2998) 0.1000 (0.3002) 
CIO-14-3 0.009377 (0.0964) 0.01147 (0.1066) 0.005882 (0.0765) 
Sample Size 1813 1133 680 
Note.— Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 7.4. Probit Estimates of Participation 
Coefficient Standard Errui 
Constant 0.4992 0.3006 
Education 
ED 0.06471* 0.02899 
DIP 0.3954** 0.08322 
BACH 0.9561** 0.1700 
Age 
A30 -0.1701 0.08697 
AAQ -0.2885* 0.1130 
Country of Birth 
ASIA -0.1211 0.1772 
UK -0.1069 0.1077 
EUROPE -0.01807 0.1225 
OTHER -0.01917 0.1669 
Income 
W / / 1 0 0 0 -0.01760 0.01412 
Husband's Status 
AW/JIOOO -0.009802 0.01453 
-0.003404 0.009579 
Children 
C(M-1 -0.8051** 0.08377 
C(M-2 -1.532** 0.1121 
CO-4-3 -2.031** 0.4151 
C5-9-1 -0.3925** 0.07961 
C5-9-2 -0.6193** 0.1133 
C5-9-3 -0.8717** 0.2779 
ClO-14-1 -0.3342** 0.08755 
ClO-14-2 -0.3422** 0.1167 
ClO-14-3 0.2099 0.3445 
Pseudo-R-Square 0.16065 
Test for Normality (Ruud (1984)) {x\l)) 23.543** 
Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
* Significant at the 1 per cent level 
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However, it is likely that people actually decide their labour supply in a life cycle 
context. We should consider another facet of the labour supply decision in order to 
understand dynamic labour supply behaviour. Job experience raises the wage rate 
since people accumulate human capital during work. Hence, the current labour supply 
is determined considering not only the current income but also considering its effect 
on the future wage rate. The gain from investing in human capital diminishes as 
people get older, because when the remainder of the working life gets shorter, the 
incentive to invest in human capital gets smaller. This implies that if the effect of the 
wage rate could be controlled for, age would have a negative effect on labour supply 
since the gain from experience becomes smaller. In the probit model, the market wage 
rate is not included, so the effect of age on labour supply is a mixture of the following 
effects: changes of the tastes for work, changes of the wage rate and changes of the 
expected gain from job experience. 
The next seven variables, namely, four dummy variables for wives bom in 
overseas countries, own nonwage income, spouse's nonwage income and spouse's 
wage rate, all have negative effects but none of them is significantly different from 
zero. 
The dummies for children have negative and significant effects except for the 
dummy for three or more children aged from ten to fourteen years old. If we evaluate 
at sample means, a first child aged four years or less decreases its mother's 
participation probability by 25.1 per cent, and a second child aged four years or less 
decreases it by 28.3 per cent (see column one of Table 7.9). These impacts are similar 
to those found by Beggs and Chapman (1988), who found that one additional child 
less than five years of age decreases its mother's participation probability by 28.6 per 
cent. 
The interpretation of the coefficients on the child dummies is as follows. In a 
static context, the number of children is exogenously given, and people are assumed 
to decide their labour supply based on the given numbers of children. In a dynamic 
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context, and in an actual economy, the number of children is not an exogenous 
variable. Child bearing is determined simultaneously with life-cycle labour supply. If 
those who have strong preferences for work are likely to have less children, our 
model would suffer from endogeneity bias. 
Finally, the failure of the normality test (Ruud (1984), and Newey (1985))^^ at 
the one per cent level shows that the normality assumption does not hold. The effect 
of this departure on the following study is hard to assess, because the true distribution 
is not known. It is beyond the purpose of this study to estimate the distribution of the 
participation probability as Heckman and Willis (1977) did using panel data, so we 
leave this task to future research. 
4.2. The Market Wage Rate 
Table 7.5 gives the two step estimates of the log of the market wage rate. In 
order to see whether or not the market wage depends on the labour supply, the 
number of hours worked is imposed as a regressor. Since this variable is endogenous, 
an instrumental variable is used. The instruments used are all the variables appearing 
in the probit equation and the inverse of Mill's ratio. 
There are three different specifications. The first and the second equation contain 
the inverse of Mill's ratio as regressors. Since this two step estimation method relies 
on the assumption of the normality of disturbance term u\, we examined the 
applicability of this assumption, ^ ^ j^e test employed here is presented by Pagan and 
11 This is a RESET-like test. Regress /,• = p'xi +yi (Jb'xi) +yiib'xi) + U3, where b is a probit 
estimate of P, and test HQ: YI = Y2 = 0. 
When the inverse of Mill's ratio is added to the original equation, the disturbance term £i is 
not nonnally distributed. The test applied here tests the nomiality of ui, not the normality 
ofci. 
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Table 7.5. Two Step Estimates of the Log of the Market Wage Rate 
(1)* (2)* (3)" 
Constant 1.781** 1.742** 1.850** 
(0.1577) (0.1034) (0.09719) 
Education 
ED 0.03298** 0.03239** 0.03362** 
(0.009967) (0.009801) (0.009599) 
DIP 0.09940** 0.1021** 0.09367** 
(0.02795) (0.02669) (0.02562) 
BACH 0.3154** 0.3173** 0.3091** 
(0.04275) (0.04240) (0.04023) 
Age 
0.01341 0.01407 0.01362 
(0.02491) (0.02483) (0.02505) 
>440 0.01673 0.01830 0.01422 
(0.03184) (0.03149) (0.03169) 
Country of Birth 
ASIA -0.1539* -0.1592* -0.1446* 
(0.06476) (0.06271) (0.05707) 
UK 0.03936 0.03572 0.04530 
(0.03732) (0.03562) (0.03733) 
EUROPE 0.04785 0.04120 0.05824 
(0.04623) (0.04155) (0.03821) 
OTHER -0.002561 -0.005317 0.002191 
(0.05473) (0.05409) (0.05111) 
Labour Supply 
///lOOO (Instrumental Variable) -0.02254 . . . -0.05794 
(0.06869) (0.03002) 
Inverse of Mill's Ratio 0.05542 0.08490* 
(0.09818) (0.03971) 
Equation Standard Error 0.3609 0.3636 0.3607 
R-Square Adjusted 0.0765 0.0773 0.0771 
Normality of Ui (Pagan-Vella) {x\Z)) 2.317 2.175 
Heteroscedastisity I ixH})) . . . . . . 0.625 
Heteroscedastisity n . . . 0.570 
Heteroscedastisity HI 6:^10)) • • • . . . 80.33** 
Note.— Standard errors are in parentheses. 
• LIMDEP is used for the estimation. It presents standard errors ottered by Heckman (1979). 
Heteroscedastisity consistent standard errors (White (1980)) are listed. 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
** Significant at the 1 per cent level 
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Vella (1988).i3 The method is to add the variables D ^ h J = 1, 2, 3, where D, and U 
are respectively consistent estimators of A and A,, to the two step estimator and to test 
whether they are jointly zero. The result shows that the test does not reject the null 
hypothesis at the ten per cent level in both equations. 
The third equation does not contain the inverse of Mill's ratio. It is the two stage 
least squares estimator according to which the number of hours worked that is 
estimated at the first stage is added to the second stage least squares estimator. Since 
the 2SLS does not rely on the normality assumption, we tested only for 
heteroscedasticity. Three different tests were applied. The first method is to regress 
the square of the estimation residual against the predicted value and to test if the 
coefficient is zero, the second is to regress the square of the estimation residual against 
the square of the predicted value and to test if the coefficient is zero, and the third is to 
regress the square of the estimation residual against all the explanatory variable and to 
test if the coefficients are jointly zero. Only the third test rejected the null hypothesis, 
but its ;^2-value is large enough to suspect the existence of heteroscedasticity. While 
heteroscedasticity does not cause a bias if it is not caused by misspecification, the 
estimator is not efficient. To calculate the standard errors of the third equation, the 
heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix offered by White (1980) was used. 
All the equations contain education variables, age variables and country of birth 
dummies. The education variables capture the level of general human capital 
investment. If we evaluate at participants' sample means, one additional year of 
primary and secondary education increases the wage rate by $0.31, and the wage rates 
of diploma holders and bachelor degree holders are respectively $0.92 and $3.18 
higher than the wage rates of those who have completed secondary education but do 
not have a higher degree. Compared to the results of Beggs and Chapman (1988), 
which showed that one additional year of schooling (including tertiary education) 
The author is indebted to Adrian Pagan for this suggestion. 
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increases the wage rate by $0.80, the effect of secondary education is much smaller, 
but the effect of university education per year is slightly larger in our estimation. 
The dummies for country of birth are proxies for the factors which influence 
working ability, and which are commonly owned by the people who were bom in the 
same area, such as language and preferences for education and for market work. 
Wives bom in Asian countries have a lower wage rate than Australian bom wives, and 
the difference is statistically significant If we evaluate at the participants' sample 
means, an Asian bom wife's wage rate is $1.24 lower than that of an Australian bom 
wife. On the other hand, European migrants, including UK migrants, have a higher 
wage rate on average than Australian bom wives, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. According to the estimation of Beggs and Chapman (1988), a migrant 
from a non-English speaking country has a $0.56 lower wage rate than the other 
wives cet par. Their estimate for these migrants is smaller than that for Asian migrants 
and larger than that for European migrants in our estimation. 
The interpretation of the age dummies is rather controversial. These capture the 
wage profile through the life cycle. However, according to human capital theory, the 
wage rate should be a function of job experience, rather than age.^ '^  An individual's 
wage profile will depend on whether she was working at a certain period of her life. 
Unfortunately, the data set used for this study does not contain an experience variable. 
Therefore, we regard the wage equation as a reduced form, and experience is captured 
by all the exogenous variables. 
Except for the bottom two variables, the estimated coefficients are quite similar 
in all three equations. All the education variables have significant positive effects on 
the wage rate, but the effects of the age dummies are insignificant. Wives bom in 
^^  If job experience is used as an explanatory variable, we should be careful about the 
exogeneity of this variable. If the preferences for work and unobserved ability are 
correlated, job experience should be treated as an endogenous variable. 
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Asian countries have significantly lower wage rates than Australian bom wives after 
adjusting for education and age. 
The first equation contains the number of hours worked as an endogenous 
explanatory variable. The predicted value of hours worked and the inverse of Mill's 
ratio are highly correlated, because the inverse of Mill's ratio is a monotone decreasing 
function of the participation probability, but the participation probability is highly 
correlated with the number of hours worked. The insignificant coefficients on the 
hours and on the inverse of Mill's ratio are caused by the high correlation between the 
two variables. 
The second and the third equation imposed zero restrictions respectively for 
hours worked and for the inverse of Mill's ratio. The second equation assumed that 
the wage rate does not depend on hours. In this equation, the inverse of Mill's ratio 
turned out to be significant at the five per cent level. The third equation assumed that 
the error term of the wage equation is not correlated with the error term of the 
participation equation. Hours worked became significant at the ten per cent level. 
Thus, there are two alternative interpretations: the market wage rate does not depend 
on hours of work and there is a selectivity bias; or the market wage rate depend on 
hours of work and there is no selectivity bias. In the reminder of the chapter, 
following most of studies, we assume that the wage rate does not depend on hours of 
work, and we select the second equation. ^ ^ 
4.3. Hours Worked per Year 
Table 7.6 offers the two step estimates of hours worked per year. The wage rate 
estimated by the second equation in Table 7.5 is used to estimate hours. We estimated 
For a practical reason also, we assume the independence of the market wage rate. If the 
market wage rate depends on hours of work, the calculation of the effect, of subsidies for 
market entry, on hours of work becomes too complicated. 
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two alternative specifications, the quadratic function and the linear function. When 
normality was tested by the Pagan-Vella normality test, only the quadratic functional 
form passed the test. 
Table 7.6. Two Step Estimates of Hours Worked per Year 
Quadratic Function Linear Function 
(1) (2) 
Constant 390.7 (1257) 244.5 (339.3) 
Wage and Income 
W 174.2 (258.0) 194.1** (35.12) 
NWI / 1000 -214.2* (102.1) -17.35* (8.132) 
0.5058 (13.26) . . 
(AW//1000)2 1.275** (0.3078) . . . . . . 
w(,Nwi/\(m) 15.60 (11.34) . . . 
Age 
A30 -136.0* (52.93) -141.2** (53.19) 
A40 -280.5** (67.39) -295.9** (67.60) 
Husband's Status 
NWIJIOOO -6.887 (8.951) -8.786 (8.901) 
-13.23* (5.797) -13.46* (5.828) 
Children 
CO-4-1 -769.0** (106.7) -774.4** (106.6) 
C(M-2 -1320.** (219.6) -1323.** (220.4) 
CO-4-3 -1709.** (456.5) -1715.** (457.7) 
C5-9-1 -280.3** (70.11) -298.8** (70.41) 
C5-9-2 -621.4** (107.5) -659.9** (107.0) 
C5-9-3 -853.7** (242.2) -906.2** (243.4) 
ClO-14-1 -184.5** (69.75) -201.0** (69.87) 
ClO-14-2 -330.3** (79.90) -364.9** (79.72) 
ClO-14-3 157.4 (182.2) 95.10 (182.9) 
Inverse of Mill's Ratio 215.1 (228.2) 195.3 (229.4) 
Equation Standard Error 649.6 651.3 
R-Square Adjusted 0.3003 0.2917 
Test for the Quadratic Terms 
JoinUy Zero (^(3)) 17.19** . . . 
Normality of U3 (Pagan-Vella) (x^O)) 7.476 31.64** 
Note.— Standard errOTS are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
** Significant at the 1 per cent level 
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It should be noted that nonwage income does not contain husband's or other 
family member's income, and husband's nonwage income and wage rate are imposed 
as two independent variables. As we saw in Chapter 4, this assumes that the family 
decision making method may not be a classical method, but the labour supply function 
is still consistent with the wife's utility maximization. 
In the quadratic function, the coefficient on the square of the wage rate is nearly 
zero. This implies that the labour supply curve is almost linear, and there is no 
backward bending. The small r-statistics in both the wage and the square of the wage 
stem from the collinearity between the two variables. In the linear specification, the 
coefficient on the wage turns out to be significant. On the other hand, the square of the 
nonwage income has the opposite sign to the nonwage income, and both of the 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. The income effect is given by j3 + 
2(pnii + KWi, so if we evaluate the income effect at wage rate $10, the income effect is 
negative until the nonwage income exceeds $90,000. Since the average nonwage 
income is about $1,000, the income effect is negative for most wives. 
Age has a negative and significant effect on hours. As discussed before, this can 
be interpreted as the result of changes in tastes and of the diminishing incentive for 
extra job experience because of the declining expected return. The husband's nonwage 
income and the wage rate have negative effects, and the latter is significant at the five 
per cent level. All except one of the children dummies have negative effects. The 
inverse of Mill's ratio is not significant, which implies that there is no significant 
selection bias. However, we did not delete this variable because the f-ratio is nearly 
one. 
For the linear function, the estimated coefficients on age, husband's status and 
children are almost the same as in the case of the quadratic function. The linear 
function is given by imposing the zero restriction on three coefficients in the quadratic 
function. The null hypothesis that the three coefficients are jointly zero is rejected at 
the one per cent level. The wage effect of 194.1 and the income effect of -0.01735 
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imply that the Slutsky restriction is satisfied for individuals who desire more than 
-11200 hours of labour supply. In other words, the Slutsky restriction is satisfied for 
almost all individuals in the sample. 
Table 7.7 lists the effects of wage and income on hours, based on the estimates 
of the quadratic function. These effects are called, from left to right, the 
uncompensated response to the wage, the compensated response to the wage, the 
response to income, the uncompensated elasticity of hours with respect to the wage, 
the compensated elasticity of hours with respect to the wage, and the total-income 
elasticity. These terms are explained in Chapter 5. 
The first column shows that the uncompensated response to the wage is almost 
the same as that for the linear function. This is not surprising since the wage effect is 
almost linear. The third column, however, shows that the response to income is about 
four times as large as the estimate from the linear function. (Note that the income 
variables in the regression model are divided by 1000). This means that the linear 
specification largely underestimates the income effect, perhaps because a few wives 
who have a very large nonwage income affect the estimates of the income response. 
Table 7.7. Wage and Income Effects 
dh 
dw 
(1) 
dh' 
dw 
(2) 
dh 
dm 
(3) 
dh w 
dw h 
(4) 
dh" w 
h 
(5) 
dh 
dm 
(6) 
No Child 199.1 323.6 -0.0819 1.088 1.769 -0.6806 
One Child Age 199.1 260.6 -0.0819 2.202 2.883 -0.6806 
Two Children Age (M 199.1 215.5 -0.0819 8.249 8.929 -0.6806 
One ChUd Age 5-9 199.1 300.6 -0.0819 1.334 2.015 -0.6806 
Two Children Age 5-9 199.1 272.7 -0.0819 1.840 2.521 -0.6806 
Average Wife 199.1 274.8 -0.0819 1.790 2.470 -0.6806 
Average Working Wife 198.2 282.7 -0.0642 1.425 2.032 -0.6075 
Note.— Evaluated at the sample means. 
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The fourth column shows that the compensated elasticities differ substantially 
between the demographic groups. This is because of the large differences in hours 
worked. The quadratic labour supply function assumes that the uncompensated 
response to the wage is constant when wage and nonwage income are given. Hence, 
the elasticity becomes large for people working short hours, and vice versa. In other 
words, the high elasticity for wives working short hours and the small elasticity for 
wives working long hours is determined by the specification of the hours worked 
function, rather than by the estimation. For this reason, the elasticity for a wife who 
has two children less than five years old is large compared to that for the other 
demographic groups. 
The uncompensated elasticity for an average working wife is 1.43. This value is 
about the medium value of past studies, of female labour supply using US data, that 
were listed in Killings worth and Heckman (1986). Seven out of seventeen of the 
listed suidies estimated elasticities higher than 1.43. In the case of studies using UK 
data, the uncompensated elasticity is smaller than it is in US studies on average. Two 
out of fifteen listed studies estimated elasticities higher than 1.43. On the other hand, 
as we review in Appendix A of this chapter, studies using Australian data report 
relatively small uncompensated elasticities (see Table A.7.1). Out of five studies listed 
in Appendix A, only Ross (1986) reported an uncompensated elasticity larger than 
unity. 
The compensated elasticity of hours with respect to the wage is 2.03. Again, 
about a third of past US studies listed in the survey of Killingsworth and Heckman 
estimated larger elasticities than this, but no studies in the UK estimated larger 
elasticities than this. All of the five Australian studies listed in Appendix A reported 
lower compensated elasticities than that of our estimation. 
The total-income elasticity is -0.61. This is large (in absolute terms) compared to 
the studies listed in the survey of Killingsworth and Heckman and to past Australian 
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studies listed in Appendix A. No study presented a larger value than this. However, 
most of studies defined die nonwage income as wife's nonwage income plus 
husband's total income, so we cannot compare our result with the results of the past 
studies straightforwardly. More discussion about the comparison between our 
estimation and other Australian studies is in Appendix A of this chapter. 
4.4. The Reservation Wage 
Table 7.8 lists the estimates of the reservation wage equation. As we discussed 
before, there are two possible restrictions that can be used to solve the identification 
problem. One assumption is that one variable in the wage equation does not overlap 
the equation in the reservation wage equation. The first column of the table assumed 
that the years of primary and secondary education do not affect the reservation wage 
rate. Another assumption is that the error term of the market wage equation and the 
error term of the reservation wage equation are not correlated with each other. The 
estimation in the second column is based on this assumption. 
The standard errors of the reservation wage equation and the participation 
equation, and the correlation between the market wage equation and the reservation 
wage equation are calculated by the procedure discussed in Section 2. The coefficient 
standard errors cannot be calculated, because the correlations between the coefficients 
in the participation equation and the coefficients in the market wage equation are not 
available. If the participation equation and the market wage equation were 
simultaneously estimated by the maximum likelihood method, it would be possible to 
calculate the standard errors of the coefficients of the reservation wage equation. 
A positive coefficient implies that the variable has a negative effect on 
participation and vice versa. When we compare the two equations, we find that the 
second assumption gives a standard error of the reservation wage equation that is 
about four times larger. Hence, the coefficients of the variables which are not in the 
market wage equation, such as the wife's nonwage income, the husband's status 
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variables, and the children dummies, are about three times larger (in absolute terms) in 
the second equation. In both cases tertiary education has a negative effect, but the 
effect is much larger in the second case. 
Table 7.8. Estimates of the Log of the Reservation Wage 
Assumption 1 
(1) 
Assumption 2 
(2) 
Constant 1.4922 0.9646 
Education 
ED 0. -0.06838 
DIP -0.09579 -0.5136 
BACH -0.1613 -1.1716 
Age 
/i30 0.09924 0.2790 
/\40 0.1627 0.4676 
Country of Birth 
ASIA -0.09855 0.02944 
UK 0.08922 0.2022 
EUROPE 0.05025 0.06934 
OTHER 0.004278 0.02453 
Income 
NWI/IOOO 0.008812 0.02741 
Husband's Status 
NWI„ /lOOO 0.004907 0.01526 
0.001704 0.005301 
Children 
C(M-1 0.4030 1.2539 
C(M-2 0.7668 2.3855 
CO-4-3 1.0168 3.1632 
C5-9-1 0.1965 0.6113 
C5-9-2 0.3100 0.9645 
C5-9-3 0.4363 1.3575 
ClO-14-1 0.1673 0.5204 
ClO-14-2 0.1713 0.5329 
ClO-14-3 -0.1051 -0.3269 
Standard Error of Reservation Wage 
Equation (02) 0.3636 1.5143 
Standard Error of Participation 
Decision Equation (c^ 0.5006 1.5573 
Correlation between Market Wage 
and Reservation Wage Equations (CT12) 0.08972 0. 
Note.— Coefficient standard errors are not available. 
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The coefficients of the education variables depend on the assumption imposed to 
solve the identification problem. The coefficients of the dummies for diploma and 
bachelor are respectively about five and seven times larger for the second equation. 
Although all the coefficients for the education variables are nonpositive, some of them 
could be positive if we assumed that the diploma or the bachelor does not affect the 
reservation wage. 
Since there is no theoretical method by which to select one of the two 
assumptions listed in Table 7.8, we shall examine whether or not the estimates based 
on the two assumptions predict reasonable values. Table 7.9 gives the predictions of 
seven variables. Columns six and seven offer the predicted values of the reservation 
wage and the reservation hour, based on the first assumption, and the figures in 
columns eight and nine are based on the second assumption. The deviations of the 
reservation wage and the reservation hour are larger under the second assumption, and 
some variables are extreme. For instance, the reservation wage of a wife who has no 
child is $1.77, which implies that an average wife having no child prefers working to 
staying home if the wage rate is more than $1.77. On the other hand, the reservation 
hour of an average wife having two children less than five years old is 1,907 hours a 
year, which implies that an average wife having two children less than five years old 
does not want to work less than 1,907 hours a year for any market wage. Thus, the 
predictions based on the second assumption are not plausible, so we adopt only the 
first assumption for our estimation of efficiency.^^ 
Before we discuss the estimation of the marginal gain and cost, let us look at the 
other predicted variables. The first column contains the participation probability. This 
prediction is based on the probit estimates of the participation decision equation. The 
number of children has a negative effect on the participation probability, but even a 
^^  The estimation results based on the second assumption are listed in Appendix B of this 
chapter. 
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Table 7.9. Predicted Values 
Participation Hours Hours Market Market 
Probability Worked* Woriced'' Wage = WagC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
No Child .8607 1520 1612 8.86 9.04 
One Child Age 0-4 .6097 751 977 8.86 9.33 
Two Children Age 0-4 .3270 201 601 8.86 9.70 
One Child Age 5-9 .7552 1239 1389 8.86 9.16 
Two Children Age 5-9 .6788 899 1088 8.86 9.25 
Average Wife .6506 924 1128 8.86 9.28 
Note.— Evaluated at the sample means. 
* Latent hours of work. 
'' Hours of work conditional upon participation. 
Unconditional expectation of market wage, which is approximated by the second order Taylor series 
expansion such as 
E(wi) = exp(£Oog H'i))(l + ^ ) • 
Expectation of market wage conditional upon participation, which is approximated by the second 
OTder Taylor series expansion such as 
I /, = 1) = exp(£(log w, I /. = 1))( 1 + ) . 
where = . 
Table 7.9. Continued 
Assumption 1 Assumption 2 
Reservation 
Wage® 
(6) 
Reservation 
Hour 
(7) 
Reservation 
Wage® 
(8) 
Reservation 
Hour 
(9) 
No Child 5.55 834 1.77 195 
One Child Age 0-4 8.30 537 6.19 174 
Two Children Age 0-4 11.95 618 19.19 1907 
One Child Age 5-9 6.75 759 3.25 165 
Two Children Age 5-9 7.57 535 4.63 48 
Average Wife 7.87 634 5.23 183 
® Unconditional expectation of reservation wage, which is approximated by the second order Taylor 
series expansion such as 
£ (w^ = exp(£(logH'^)( l + ) . 
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wife having two children less than five years old still has a 33 per cent participation 
probability. 
The second column contains the predicted latent hours worked, and the third 
column contains the predicted hours worked conditional upon participation. The 
predicted hours conditional upon participation is larger than the latent hours since the 
participation decision is positively correlated with the hours decision. The mean hours 
of participants and nonparticipants are given by the first column multiplied by the third 
column. 
Finally, the fourth and the fifth columns contain the unconditional expectation of 
the market wage, and the market wage conditional upon participation. The 
unconditional expectation is the same for all groups since the number of children is 
assumed not to affect the market wage rate. However, the expected market wage 
conditional upon participation is larger for wives with small participation probabilities. 
Since the wage rate and the participation decision are positively correlated with each 
other, the small participation probability implies that only wives having high wage 
rates participate in the market. Hence, if other conditions are equal, woiidng wives 
that have small children are expected to have a higher wage rate than working wives 
that have no child. 
4.5. The Marginal Gain, the Marginal Cost and the Efficiency of the Subsidies 
Table 7.10 lists the estimation result for tiie marginal gains and marginal costs of 
the subsidies and their ratios. In the case of a lump sum subsidy, the marginal gain / 
marginal cost ratio for an average wife is 1.10. This implies that if the government 
subsidized all working wives by one dollar in a lump sum, their income would 
increase by $2.10 on average, because of the subsidy and the labour supply increase. 
It should be noted that the ratio is the mean of the ratios of two different groups of 
wives. The ratio will be negative for wives who were already working without a 
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Table 7.10. Marginal Gain and Marginal Cost 
(No Initial Subsidy) 
Lump Sum Subsidy Proportional Subsidy 
Gain Cost Ratio Gain Cost Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Child 0.4587 0.8607 0.5329 1959. 1388. 1.412 
One Child Age 0-4 0.7071 0.6097 1.156 1583. 595.9 2.656 
Two Children Age 0-4 0.1560 0.3270 0.4770 877.1 196.4 4.466 
One Child Age 5-9 0.6772 0.7552 0.8967 1930. 1049. 1.840 
Two Children Age 5-9 0.7687 0.6788 1.133 1714 738.6 2.321 
Average Wife 0.7174 0.6506 1.103 1730 734.2 2.357 
Note.— Evaluated at the sample means. 
subsidy, because they reduce hours worked in response to the income effect of the 
subsidy. On the other hand, the ratio will be quite large for wives who were not 
working before the introduction of the subsidy and started to work in response to the 
subsidy. In other words, the labour supply of these wives increases inspite of a 
negative income elasticity, because the lump sum subsidy has a positive effect on 
wives' participation. Income increases by the subsidy plus the reservation wage 
multiplied by the reservation hour. The positive income gain on Table 10 implies that 
the income gain of the latter type of wife exceeds the income loss of the former type of 
wife. 
The table shows that the ratio is largest for a wife having two children aged five 
to nine years old, and smallest for a wife having two children less than five years old. 
The difference in marginal gain among the different demographic groups stems mainly 
from the fu^t term in (7.43). The small marginal gain for a wife having two small 
children is interpreted as follows. First of all, as (7.45) shows, the effect of the lump 
sum subsidy on the reservation wage decline is equal to the inverse of the reservation 
hour. Since her reservation hour is large, the reservation wage decline is small. 
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Second, the effect of the reservation wage decline on the latent variable /*, is equal to 
the inverse of the reservation wage, as (7.46) shows. Since her reservation wage is 
large, the decrease in the reservation wage causes a relatively small increase in the 
latent variable /*,. Finally, as (7.46) shows, the effect of the latent variable on the 
participation probability is proportional to the density function which is the largest 
when the participation probability is fifty per cent. Since her participation probability 
is small, the increase in the latent variable causes a relatively small increase in the 
participation probability. 
The last three columns contain the marginal gain and the marginal cost, of a 
proportional subsidy, and their ratios. For all demographic groups, the marginal gain / 
marginal cost ratios are much larger than the corresponding ratios for the lump sum 
subsidy. The marginal gain / marginal cost ratio is largest for a wife with two children 
less than five years old, and it is smallest for a wife with no children. 
Next, let us decompose the marginal gain / marginal cost ratio into three 
elements. As (7.43) and (7.51) show, the marginal gain is decomposed into three 
terms. If we divide each term of (7.43) and (7.51) by a marginal cost, the marginal 
gain / marginal cost ratio can be decomposed such that 
dCOSTu ~ dCOSTu dCOSTu dCOSTu 
ds\ dsi 3Ji 
and 
dWI'i dPi , ,,,, „ 3exp(aj',),, , 
dCOSTii ~ dCOSTji dC0ST2i dC0ST2i ' 
dS2 dS2 dS2 
In the remainder of the chapter, these three terms on the right hand sides are 
respectively called the participation effect, the wage effect and the hours effect. 
Table 7.11 lists the decomposed effects of the two subsidies. In both cases, the 
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wage effect is negligible. The difference between the marginal gain / marginal cost 
ratios of the two subsidies stems mainly from the hours effect, because the effect on 
hours is negative for a lump sum subsidy and positive for a proportional subsidy. 
The marginal cost depends on the current level of the subsidies. Although there 
is no pure lump sum subsidy or proportional subsidy under the current social security 
system, it is worth examining how the marginal cost, and hence the marginal gain / 
marginal cost ratio, change if we assume that there already exists a lump sum or 
proportional subsidy. Table 7.12 gives the marginal gain and cost and their ratios. The 
first three columns assumes that all working wives are subsidized $1,000 in a lump 
sum. The marginal gain is the same as before, and the marginal cost is increased for 
all groups. As a result, the marginal gain / marginal cost ratios declined by about 
twenty to thirty per cent. The last three columns assume that all working wives are 
already subsidized by one dollar per hour. Again, the marginal cost increased for all 
groups, and hence the marginal gain / marginal cost ratio decreased for all groups. 
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Table 7.11. Decomposed Effects of Subsidies on Earnings 
(No Initial Subsidy) 
Lump Sum Subsidy Proportional Subsidy 
Participation Hours Wage Participation Hours Wage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Child 1.750 -1.194 -0.0235 0.526 0.893 -0.0071 
One Child Age 0-4 2.778 -1.594 -0.0244 1.327 1.341 -0.0117 
Two Children Age 0-4 1.877 -1.389 -0.0114 2.421 2.060 -0.0148 
One Child Age 5-9 2.226 -1.305 -0.0243 0.861 0.988 -0.0094 
Two Children Age 5-9 2.716 -1.557 -0.0263 1.102 1.229 -0.0107 
Average Wife 2.577 -1.450 -0.0240 1.193 1.175 -0.0111 
Note.— Evaluated at the sample means. 
Table 7.12. Marginal Gain and Marginal Cost 
(With Initial Subsidy) 
Lump Sum Subsidy' Proportional Subsidy ^ 
Gain Cost Ratio Gain Cost Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Child 0.4587 0.9707 0.4725 1959. 1619. 1.210 
One Child Age 0-4 0.7071 0.8073 0.8758 1583. 777.3 2.036 
Two Children Age 0-4 0.1560 0.4390 0.3553 877.1 292.9 2.995 
One ChUd Age 5-9 0.6772 0.8959 0.7559 1930. 1274. 1.514 
Two Children Age 5-9 0.7687 0.8737 0.8798 1714. 936.7 1.830 
Average Wife 0.7174 0.8209 0.8739 1730. 834.7 2.073 
Note.— Evaluated at the sample means. 
• It is assumed that $1,000 is currently paid as a lump sum subsidy. 
'' It is assumed that $1 per hour is currently paid as a proportional subsidy. 
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5. The Marginal Gain, the Marginal Cost and the Efficiency of 
Subsidies Derived from the Result of Beggs and Chapman (1988) 
As we mentioned before, our estimation of the effects of subsidies on wage 
income is based on a widely adopted labour supply model. That is, the model consists 
of a probit participation decision equation, a log linear market wage equation, and a 
utility consistent hours worked function. We added only one additional assumption in 
order to identify a log linear reservation wage equation. Hence, it is possible to 
estimate the effects using other empirical studies which adopt the same model 
structure. In this section, we derive the marginal gain and the marginal cost of two 
types of subsidies from the estimation results of Beggs and Chapman (1988). 
Their study is summarized in Table A.7.1 in Appendix A of this chapter. The 
model structure is ahnost the same as ours. A slight difference in their model is that 
their labour supply function is the semi-quadratic function, for which only the square 
of the wage is added to the linear labour supply function. 
However, there is an important difference in their estimation method. They used 
an observed market wage rate rather than a predicted wage rate as a regressor in the 
hours of work equation. Past empirical studies show that this method estimates a 
relatively small effect of the wage on hours of work, compared to a method that use a 
predicted market wage as a regressor. The uncompensated elasticity of hours with 
respect to the wage is 0.0374 in their estimation, which is much smaller than our 
estimate, 1.425. Furthermore, their result shows that the effect of income on hours of 
work is positive, but is not statistically significant Thus, compared to that of our 
estimation, hours of work is much less elastic with respect to both wage and income. 
We impose an additional assumption that years of education do not influence the 
reservation wage, which is similar to Assumption 1 in our estimation. Table 7.13 lists 
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Table 7.13. Estimates of the Log of the Reservation Wage — Beggs and Giapman (1988) 
Assumption 1 
Years of labour market work experience -0.05728 
Years of labour market work experience squared 0.001005 
Years of education 0. 
Dummy variable equal to one if has any child 
less than 15 years, zero otherwise 0.2718 
Number of children aged 0-4 years 0.3667 
Number of children aged 5-14 years -0.1076 
Dummy variable equal to one if less than age 
25 years, zero otherwise -0.8626 
Dummy variable equal to one if age 25-34 years. 
zero otherwise -0.3528 
Average weekly unearned income 0.0002219 
Husband's average weekly after tax income -0.0004438 
Dummy variable equal to one if married or de facto. 
zero otherwise 0.09449 
Dummy variable equal to one if migrant from 
non-English speaking country, zero otherwise -0.09039 
Years of tenure with current employer 0.007800 
Constant 2.6800 
Standard Error of Participation 
Decision Equation (cr) 0.5547 
Note.— Coefficient standard errors are not available. 
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Table 7.14. Predicted Values — Beggs and Chapman (1988) 
Reservation Reservation 
Wage* Hour 
(1) (2) 
No Child 6.28 1234 
One Child Age 0-4 11.88 1150 
Two Children Age 0-4 17.15 1058 
One Child Age 5-14 7.40 1045 
Two Children Age 5-14 6.64 885 
' Expectation of reservation wage is approximated by the first order Taylor series expansion such as 
= exp(£:(log w^). 
the derived log of the reservation wage equation based on this assumption. The 
estimated standard error of the participation equation is close to that of our estimation. 
The standard error of the reservation wage equation is not available since the standard 
error of the wage equation is not reported. 
Table 7.14 lists the reservation wage and reservation hour of five derriographic 
groups. The predicted reservation wage is approximated by the first order Taylor 
series expansion, which gives smaller values than the second order approximation. 
Compared to our estimation based on Assumption 1, the reservation wage and the 
reservation hour are larger for all groups (see columns six and seven of Table 7.9). 
Table 7.15 gives the derived marginal gain, marginal cost and their ratio, for 
five groups. Compared to our results in Table 7.10, the ratio is larger for all groups in 
the case of a lump sum subsidy, and is smaller for all groups in the case of a 
proportional subsidy. The difference from our results stems mainly from the 
difference in the marginal gain. In the case of a lump sum subsidy, the marginal gain 
is larger than that in our results for all but one group, and in the case of the 
proportional subsidy, the marginal gain is smaller than that in our results for all 
groups. Since the effect of income on hours is positive in the estimation of Beggs and 
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Table 7.15. Marginal Gain and Marginal Cost — Beggs and Chapman (1988) 
(No Initial Subsidy) 
Lump Sum Subsidy FYoportional Subsidy 
Gain Cost Ratio Gain Cost Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Child 0.9079 0.7002 1.297 1196. 1012. 1.182 
One Child Age 0-4 0.5809 0.2657 2.186 1113. 429.8 2.589 
Two Children Age 0-4 0.2516 0.0991 2.540 600.1 169.0 3.550 
One Child Age 5-14 0.9038 0.5906 1.530 1197. 775.3 1.544 
Two Children Age 5-14 0.8693 0.6639 1.309 994.5 713.0 1.395 
Note.— Evaluated at the sample means except marriage dummy which is set to one. 
Table 7.16. Decomposed Effects of Subsidies on Earnings — Beggs and Chapman (1988) 
(No Initial Subsidy) 
Lump Sum Subsidy Proportional Subsidy 
Participation Hours Wage Participation Hours Wage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Child 1429 -0.1319 0. 0.8949 0.2869 0. 
One Child Age 0-4 2.254 -0.06798 0. 2.225 0.3637 0. 
Two Children Age 0-4 2.552 -0.01218 0. 3.172 0.3783 0. 
One Child Age 5-14 1.723 -0.1930 0. 1.186 0.3573 0. 
Two Children Age 5-14 1.623 -0.3135 0. 0.9906 0.4041 0. 
Note.— Evaluated at the sample means except marriage dummy which is set to one. 
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Chapman, the lump sum subsidy is more efficient than that of our estimation. On the 
other hand, since the effect of the wage on hours is much smaller, the proportional 
subsidy is less efficient in their estimation. 
This explanation is illustrated more clearly in Table 7.16. This table decomposes 
the marginal gain / marginal cost ratio into three effects. The wage effect is zero for 
both subsidies, because subsidies affect wages through the participation probability, 
but there is no selectivity bias in the market wage equation according to the estimation 
of Beggs and Chapman. However, this does not cause a substantial difference from 
our estimation since the wage effect is also negligible in our estimation. A clear 
contrast is in the hours effect. For both a lump sum subsidy and a proportional 
subsidy, the hours effect is much smaller (in absolute terms) in the estimation of 
Beggs and Chapman. This is consistent with their less elastic labour supply function. 
6. Summary 
This chapter estimated the effects, on wives' labour supply and income, of two 
types of subsidies for market entry: a lump sum subsidy and a proportional subsidy. 
The model employed for this study is widely adopted to estimate labour supply, 
namely, participation is determined by a linear sample selection criterion equation with 
a normally distributed stochastic term, the wage equation is log linear, and the labour 
supply function is specified such that it is consistent with utiUty maximization. A 
contribution of this study is to develop, in the context of that model, a method for 
estimating the efficiency of a subsidy for a market entry. 
The results show that a one dollar lump sum subsidy for all working wives 
increases an average wife's income by $1.10 on top of the subsidy. On the other 
hand, if the subsidy is proportional to hours of work, a one dollar subsidy increases 
an average wife's income by $2.36 on top of the subsidy. The model assumed 
normality for the distribution of the disturbance term in the participation equation, but 
this assumption does not appear to hold according to the normality test The direction 
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of the bias caused by the violation of normality is hard to predict, because the true 
distribution is not known. 
153 
Appendix A to Chapter 7 
Table A.7.1 summarizes two empirical studies in this thesis and five other 
empirical studies on female labour supply that use Australian cross-section data. 
Notable points are as follows. First, except for Ross (1986), past studies report 
smaller uncompensated and compensated elasticities with respect to the wage 
compared to our results and to most of the results listed in Killingsworth and 
Heckman (1986), The small elasticity of Apps, Jones and Savage (1988), of Beggs 
and Chapman (1988), and of Miller and Volker (1987) would be caused partly by the 
selection of the wage variable. These studies select the observed wage rate rather than 
the predicted wage rate. Since the wage rate is generally obtained by the wage income 
divided by hours worked, a measurement error in hours of work is negatively 
correlated with the observed wage rate, which causes a downward bias in the effect of 
the wage. 
On the other hand, although Ross (1986) did not include the wage rate as a 
regressor, the wage elasticity in his study is calculated from the reduced form labour 
supply function and the wage function. This estimation method is substantially the 
same as the two stage least squares method, according to which the predicted wage 
rate is included in the hours of work function. Ross reported a relatively high wage 
elasticity which is close to our result.^^ 
Second, the total income elasticity in the result of Qiapter 7 is quite large 
compared to that in other Australian studies and in the US and UK studies listed in 
Killingsworth and Heckman (1986). A difference of the study in Chapter 7 from most 
of the other studies is that the former employed wife's nonwage income as an income 
variable, but most of the other studies include husband's nonwage income or wage 
A limitation of using the predicted wage rate is an a r b i u ^ assumption imposed in order to 
solve the identification problem. We have to assume that at least one variable affects the 
wage rate but does not affect labour supply. 
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income in the income variable. The large total income elasticity is partly caused by the 
distinction between wife's income and husband's income. Another source of the large 
total income elasticity may be an endogeneity bias. Because nonwage income contains 
government benefits which are likely to be paid to people having disadvantages in 
working, unobserved working ability may be correlated with govemment benefits. 
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Table A.7.1. Comparison of Studies of Female Labour Supply with Australian Data 
Apps (1988) 
(1) Australian Income and Housing Survey, 1981-82 
(2) Married couple; male age 25-54, working over 624 hours a year, no business 
income; female age 20-54, no business income 
(3) 3356 (1377') 
(4) h: Annual hours of work (weekly hours of work'' times annual weeks of work) 
w. Hourly wage (predicted) 
m: Wife's annual nonwage income and husband's annual total income 
(5) AIDS (single equation system) 
(6) Estimate reduced fcwm equation for labour force participation by probit; use probit 
coefficients to compute the inverse of Mill's ratio; include the inverse of Mill's ratio 
in estimation of wage equation; use estimates of wage equation to compute a 
{xedicted wage for working individual; include predicted wage and the inverse of 
Mill's ratio in ML estimation of structural labour supply equation 
(7) Maximum likelihood 
(8) Linearized budget constraint 
(9) Error term in preferences 
(10) UE = 0.0130, CE = 0.0408, TIE = -0.0278 
Note: * Wives working over 624 hours only 
^ Hours worked per week are reported for seven categories: 0,1-14, 15-19, 20-24, 
25-29, 30-35, 35 and over, mid points of intemiediate categories are taken, and 37 
hours is taken for the last category. 
Apps, Jones and Savage (1988) 
(1) Australian Income and Housing Survey, 1981-82 
(2) Married couple; husband age 25-54, working over 624 hours a year, no business 
income; wife age 20-54, no business income 
(3) 3356(1270') 
(4) h: Annual hours of work (weekly hours of work*' times annual weeks of work) 
w: Hourly wage (observed) 
m: Wife's and husband's annual nonwage income 
(5) AIDS (simultaneous equation system) 
(6) Estimate reduced form equation for labour force participation by probit; use probit 
coefficients to compute the inverse of Mill's ratio; include the inverse of Mill's 
ratio in ML estimation of structural labour supply equation 
(7) Maximum likelihood 
(8) Case 1: Pre-tax budget constraint 
Case 2: Linearized budget constraint 
(9) Error term in preferences 
(10) Case 1: UE = 0.2375, CE = 0.3231, TIE = -0.0856 
Case 2: UE = 0.1576, CE = 0.1691, TIE = -0.0115 
Note: ' Wives and husbands working over 800 hours only 
'' Hours worked per week are reported for seven categories: 0,1-14,15-19,20-24, 
25-29, 30-35, 35 and over; mid points of intemiediate categories are taken, and 37 
hours is taken for the last category. 
Note.— (1) Data set; (2) sample selection criteria; (3) selected sample size (figure in parenthesis is 
sample size used for the estimation of hours of work); (4) measurement of hours of work, wage rate, 
and nonwage income; (5) specification of labour supply function; (6) estimation procedure; (7) 
estimation technique; (8) treatment of taxes; (9) error structure; (10) UE = uncompensated elasticity of 
hours with respect to wage, CE = compensated elasticity of hours with respect to wage, TIE = total-
income elasticity 
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Table A.7.1. Continued 
Beggs and Chapman (1988) 
(1) Family Fortune Survey, 1986 
(2) Female age 20-64 
(3) 2358(1159) 
(4) h: Average weekly hours 
w. Hourly wage (observed) 
m: Weekly household nonwage income' 
(5) Semi-quadratic labour supply function'' (single equation system) 
(6) Estimate reduced form equation for labour force participation by probit; use jyobit 
coefficients to compute the inverse of Mill's ratio; include the inverse of Mill's ratio 
in estimation of 0 1 ^ estimation of structural labour supply equation 
(7) Ordinary least squares 
(8) Pre-tax budget constraint 
(9) Not specified 
(10) UE = 0.0374, CE = 0.0312, TIE = 0.0062 
Note: ' Husband's weekly after tax earned income is also added as a regressor. 
'' Square of wage rate is added on the linear labour supply function. 
Miller and Volker (1987) 
(1) Australian Longitudinal Survey, 1985 
(2) Female age 19-25 
(3) 2185 (1645) 
(4) h: Weekly hours of work in all jobs 
w: Hourly wage in main job (observed) 
m: N.A.' 
(5) Log linear labour supply function (single equation system) 
(6) Estimate reduced form equation for labour force participation by probit; use probit 
coefficients to compute the inverse of Mill's ratio; include the inverse of Mill's ratio 
in estimation of OLS estimation of structural labour supply equation 
(7) Ordinary least squares 
(8) Pre-tax budget constraint 
(9) Not specified 
(10) UE = -0.226, CE = N.A., TIE = N.A. 
Note: • No income variable is included. 
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Table A.7.1. Continued 
Ross (1986) 
(1) Sydney Survey of the Work Patterns of Married Women, 1980 
(2) Working age married woman 
(3) 508 (284) 
(4) k. Weekly hours of wcffk 
H^  Hourly wage* 
m: Household's annual nonwage income 
(5) Reduced form equation (single equation system) 
(6) Estimate reduced form equation for labour force participation by p-obit; use probit 
coefficients to compute the inverse of Mill's ratio; include the inverse of Mill's ratio 
in estimation of OLS estimation of wage equation and reduced form hours of work 
equation; identify structural labour supply equation using reduced form estimates and 
estimates of wage equation 
(7) Ordinary least squares 
(8) Pre-tax budget constraint 
(9) Not specified 
(10) UE = 1.296, CE = 1.474, TIE = -0.1778 
Note: • Wage rate is not included in the reduced form labour supply function. 
Chapter 7 of this thesis 
(1) Australian Income Distribution Survey, 1985-86 
(2) Married couple; husband age 21-50, woiicing, no business income; wife age 21-44, 
no business income 
(3) 1813(1133) 
(4) h: Annual hours of work (weekly hours of work* times annual weeks of work) 
w. Hourly wage (predicted) 
m: Wife's nonwage income'' 
(5) Quadratic labour supply function (single equation system) 
(6) Estimate reduced form equation for labour force participation by probit; use probit 
coefficients to compute the inverse of Mill's ratio; include the inverse of Mill's ratio 
in estimation of wage equation; use estimates of wage equation to compute a 
predicted wage for working individual; itKlude predicted wage and the inverse of 
Mill's ratio in OLS estimation of structural labour supply equation 
(7) Ordinary least squares 
(8) Pre-tax budget constraint 
(9) Not specified 
(10) UE = 1.425, CE = 2.032, TIE = -0.6075 
Note: * Hours worked per week are reported for ten categories: 0, 1-14,15-19,20-24, 25-
29, 30-35, 35-39,40-44, 45-49, 50 and over; mid points of intermediate categories 
are taken, and 52 hours is taken for the last category. 
Husband's nonwage income is also added as a regressor. 
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Table A.7.1. Continued 
Chapter 8 of this thesis 
(1) Australian Income Distribution Survey, 1985-86 
(2) Married couple; husband age 21-64, no business income; wife age 21-59, 
no business income 
(3) 2172' 
(4) h: Annual hours of work (weekly hours of work** times annual weeks of work) 
H: Hourly wage (predicted) 
m: Wife's nonwage income and husband's total income 
(5) Linear labour supply function (single equation system) 
(6) Estimate reduced form equation for labour force participation and wage equation by 
ML simultaneously; use estimates of wage equation to compute a predicted wage 
for each individual; include predicted wage in the full information estimation of 
labour supply equation. 
(7) Full information method 
(8) Complete budget constraint 
(9) Error of selection of hours of work 
(10) UE = 1.000, CE = 1.232, TIE = -0.232 
Note: ' Both participants and nonparticipants are used for estimation of hours of work. 
Number of participants is 1347. 
Hours worked per week are reported for ten categories: 0, 1-14,15-19, 20-24, 25-
29, 30-35, 35-39,40-44, 45-49, 50 and over, mid points of intermediate categories 
are taken, and 52 hours is taken for the last category. 
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Appendix B to Chapter 7 
Tables A.7.2 and A.7.3 list the estimated marginal gain / marginal cost ratios 
which are based upon the second assumption that can be imposed to solve the 
identification problem, namely, (Tn = 0. Although the estimates based on this 
assumption predict unrealistic reservation wages, it is worth discussing this estimation 
result in order to examine sensitivity to the assumptions. The assumption imposed to 
solve the identification problem affects three variables which are used to estimate the 
ratio, that is, the reservation wage, the reservation hour, and the standard error of the 
participation equation (o). 
The first columns of both tables show that the estimated marginal gain from the 
lump sum subsidy is sensitive to the assumption. This is not surprising since the 
effect of the lump sum subsidy on wage income depends on the reservation wage, the 
reservation hour and the standard error of participation equation. 
On the other hand, the effect of the proportional subsidy is less sensitive to the 
assumption. The last columns of Tables A.7.1 and A.7.2 give about 20 per cent 
smaller values compared to Tables 7.10 and 7.11. Since, in the case of a proportional 
subsidy, the reservation wage and the reservation hour do not influence the marginal 
gain, the difference stems from the standard error of the participation equation. 
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Table A.7.2. Marginal Gain and Marginal Cost 
(Assumption 2, No Initial Subsidy) 
Lump Sum Subsidy Proportional Subsidy 
Gain Cost Ratio Gain Cost Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Child 3.893 0.8607 4.523 1618. 1388. 1.166 
One ChUd Age 0 ^ 1.077 0.6097 1.766 1232. 595.9 2.068 
Two Children Age 0-4 -0.1829 0.3270 -0.5593 686.7 196.4 3.496 
One Child Age 5-9 3.122 0.7552 4.134 1500. 1049. 1.430 
Two Children Age 5-9 5.838 0.6788 8.601 1349. 738.6 1.827 
Average Wife 1.494 0.6506 2.296 1324. 734.2 1.804 
Note.— Evaluated at the sample means. 
Table A.7.3. Marginal Gain and Marginal Cost 
(Assumption 2, With Initial Subsidy) 
Lump Sum Subsidy Proportional Subsidy 
Gain Cost Ratio Gain Cost Ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No Child 3.893 1.335 2.916 1618. 1579. 1.025 
One Child Age 0-4 1.077 0.8734 1.233 1232. 736.8 1.673 
Two Children Age 0-4 -0.1829 0.3343 -0.5471 686.7 271.8 2.527 
One Child Age 5-9 3.122 1.187 2.630 1500. 1224 1.226 
Two Children Age 5-9 5.838 1.686 3.463 1349. 894.1 1.509 
Average Wife 1.494 0.9364 1.595 1324. 766.5 1.728 
Note.— Evaluated at the sample means. 
• It is assumed that $1,000 is currently paid as a lump sum subsidy. 
** It is assumed that $1 per hour is currently paid as a proportional subsidy. 
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Chapter 8 
The Effects of Tax Reforms on a Wife's Labour Supply and 
Welfare: A Comparison between an Individual-Income-Based 
Tax System and a Joint-Income-Based Tax System 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in applying estimates of 
labour supply functions to the assessment of tax systems. Neoclassical models of 
labour supply assume that individuals or households select hours worked so that their 
utility functions are maximized. Functions dual to the labour supply function, such as 
the direct and indirect utility functions and the expenditure function, are extensively 
utilized to measure individual's welfare and the efficiency of taxes. Apps (1987, 
1988), Apps, Jones and Savage (1988), and Apps and Savage (1987) analysed 
Australian tax reforms with utility-maximizing labour supply models.^ 
In this chapter, we estimates married women's labour supply taking into account 
the progressivity of the tax system and the simultaneous nauire of decisions about 
participation and hours. The estimates are used to simulate tax reforms. We focus 
especially on two issues conceming income taxes. One is whether the tax is levied on 
individual income or on the joint income of a couple. In Australia, the tax rate is 
determined by individual income, and is independent of whether or not an individual is 
married.2 Some other OECD countries, including the United States and the United 
1 See also Glaister, McGlone and Ulph (1981) and BlundeU, Meghir, Symons, and Walker 
(1988) for simulations of tax reforms in the United Kingdom, and Hausman (1981b, 
1981c) for the United States. 
2 Precisely speaking, taxes and u-ansfer payments are partly based on a couple's joint income 
and joint assets. Some government benefits are determined by income and asset tests, 
162 
Kingdom (until March 1990), employ so called income splitting systems such that a 
husband and wife face the same marginal tax rate. 
Another issue is the trade off between equity and efficiency. In most countries, 
taxes are progressive in the sense that the average tax rate increases as income 
increases. Such a tax system causes efficiency losses in terms of both labour supply 
loss and the deadweight loss.^ Studies using US data stated that the trade-off between 
efficiency and equity is relatively large. For instance, Hausman (1981b, 1981c) found 
that a single rate tax system with a relatively low threshold increases labour supply and 
reduces excess burdens of both husband and wife. On the other hand. Browning and 
Johnson (1984) found that the disposable money income of upper income quintiles is 
depressed by 9.51 dollars for each dollar increase in the disposable money income of 
lower income quintiles. 
The research in this chapter examines whether or not Hausman's findings are 
observed under an individual-income-based tax system. His findings may depend on 
whether the tax rate is based on individual income or based on a couple's joint income. 
Under a joint-income-based tax system, a husband and wife face the same marginal 
tax rate, and introducing a single rate tax system with a low threshold reduces both an 
average wife's and average husband's marginal tax rate. However, such a reform may 
have quite a different effect on wives' labour supply and excess burden under an 
individual-income-based tax system. Introducing a single rate tax system reduces the 
marginal tax rates of high income earners, but it may increase the marginal tax rates of 
low income earners. Since an average wife's income is lower than an average 
which are based on a couple's income and assets. Furthemiore, there is a tax rebate for a 
dependent spouse. 
3 Optimal income tax theory, which was developed by Mirrlees (1971), offers a theoretical 
framework for selecting a tax system which maximizes a social welfare function, taking 
into account work effort losses caused by a tax system. 
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husband's income, this reform is likely to lower an average husband's marginal tax 
rate, but it is not certain whether or not this reform lowers an average wife's marginal 
tax rate. The magnitude and the direction of the marginal tax rate change depend on the 
threshold and on the tax rate. 
Our attention in this chapter is limited to married women since there is no doubt 
that the introduction of a single rate tax system reduces an average husband's excess 
burden even under an individual-income-based tax system. To estimate female labour 
supply, it is not too restrictive to assume that a husband's income is exogenously 
given and fixed. We impose this assumption and simulate wives' behaviour under 
alternative tax systems. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The estimation method and 
simulation method are explained in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the explanation 
of data, and the estimation results are discussed in Section 4. The final section 
summarizes the discussion of this chapter. 
2. Estimation and Simulation Method 
2.1. Model 
A wife's utility function is assumed to be a function of own labour supply and 
total consumption of the husband and wife. She maximizes the utility function subject 
to a budget constraint such that 
Max Uj{c, h f ) 
S.t. C < Wfhf Wmhfn + rrim - X{w>fhf + m/) - X{Wmhm + rrim), 
(8.1) 
where Uf\s the utility function which satisfies the classical assumptions, c is the 
composite commodity consumed by the couple, h f , w/and mfaic respectively the 
wife's labour supply, market wage rate, and nonwage income, hm, Wm and mm are 
respectively the husband's labour supply, wage rate and nonwage income, and l i s the 
tax function. 
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Two alternative interpretations are possible in this model. Suppose that a 
husband has a utility function, (/^(c, hm). Then, the husband and wife try to 
maximize their own utility functions either cooperatively or noncooperatively subject 
to the budget constraint given by (8.1). One interpretation of the wife's utility 
maximization problem given by (8.1) is that the husband's labour supply is 
institutionally given, and the husband cannot select his labour supply. Therefore, the 
wife maximizes her own utility regarding the husband's total income as a part of 
nonwage income. 
An alternative interpretation is that the husband is the Stackelberg leader and the 
wife is the Stackelberg follower. In this case, the husband tries to maximize his utility 
taking into account the wife's reaction. Hence, his labour supply function is given by 
hm = hm(wm, mm, w/, mf). Once he decides the labour supply, the wife tries to 
maximize her utility regarding the husband's labour supply as exogenously given. 
Therefore, again, the wife's utility maximization problem is given by (8.1). 
In this chapter, we employ the former interpretation, because under the latter 
interpretation, the husband's response to tax reform would be too complicated. 
Therefore, the husband's labour supply is assumed to be fixed, even if tax system 
changes. 
Next, let us discuss the relationship between this static model and a dynamic 
labour supply model. Most of the dynamic labour supply models assume that a utility 
function is additively separable such as, 
n 
= X (1 + py'uict, ht), (8.2) 
r=0 
where m is a utility function at each period which is strictly concave, Ct and ht are 
respectively consumption and labour supply at r, p is a discount rate. The individual 
maximizes (8.2) subject to the budget constraint. 
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n n 
X + '-y'PtCt = X + ry'wtht + mo, (8.3) 
t=0 f=0 
Where r is the interest rate, pt is the price of c at t, and mo is nonwage income at the 
beginning of the economic life. The future income and expenditure should be 
discounted by the interest rate. 
This maximization problem can be solved by two steps, since the utility function 
is separable. The first step is to allocate the income to each period such that the 
marginal utility of money is equal for all periods. Then, the second step is to solve 
each period's utility maximization. 
Max u*{ct, ht) = {\+ pY'uict, h[), 
s.t.pt*C( = wt*ht + mt*, (8.4) 
where = (1 + r)-'/?,, Wi* = (1 + rrit* is the allocated income which may be 
negative if the individual saves at period r. This maximization problem is solved as, 
ht = h{wt* ,pt* ,mt*) . (8.5) 
which is quite similar to the static labour supply function. However, an important 
difference between the above model and the static model is that mi* is an endogenous 
variable in the dynamic model. Furthermore, mi* is not the nonwage income at period 
t, but the dissaving at period t. Therefore, m,* is not observed unless we have data on 
expenditure, as well as on income. 
2.2. Estimation Method 
It is assumed that the labour supply is linear in the wage and in nonwage 
income. The properties of this function are explained in Chapter 6. Since the 
estimation results are utilized to simulate labour supply and to measure the deadweight 
loss under an alternative tax system, the nonlinearity of the budget line should be taken 
into account when we estimate the labour supply function. Therefore, we employ the 
full information method explained in Chapter 3. 
In order to estimate the labour supply function by the full information method, 
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the slope and intercept of the piecewise-linear budget line corresponding to each tax 
brackets, and the hours of work at each kink point should be calculated for all 
observations. In other words, it is necessary to create the whole budget line for each 
wife. The necessary information is as follows: wife's wage income, wife's hours 
worked; wife's nonwage income, husband's total income, and wife's and husband's 
taxable income. 
Three points should be noted. First, the market wage rate is calculated by 
dividing the wage income by the hours of work. When we estimate the labour supply, 
however, the predicted market wage rate is used, partly because the market wage rate 
is not observed for nonparticipants and partly because the measurement error of the 
wage rate is negatively correlated with hours worked.'^ 
Second, total income is not generally equal to taxable income. The gap between 
the two incomes would stem from the deductions from taxable income, payments of 
provisional tax, tax evasion, and measurement errors. It is assumed that the gap is 
independent of hours of work, and moreover it is assumed that the gap does not 
change under an alternative tax system.^ 
Third, it is assumed that there is no fixed entry cost so that the error stnicUire is 
of the standard tobit type. This assumption, however, does not prohibit the existence 
The way in which we estimateed the wage rate is the same as that in Chapter 7. That is, first 
of all, the participation equation is estimated by probit, and then the wage equation is 
estimated including the inverse of Mill's ratio as an explanatory variable. The 
participation equation does not include the wage rate, and the equation is interpreted as a 
reduced form of the labour supply function. Although we do not assume the fixed market 
entry cost in the remainder of the chapter, the probit estimation is valid even under the 
existence of the fixed cost. Hence the estimation method of the wage rate is not totally 
consistent with the model. 
5 Because of this assumption, the predicted taxable income may be negative for some wives 
under an altemative tax system. 
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of variable entry costs which are embodied in the labour supply function, as was 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.3. The Simulation Method 
The purpose of the simulation is to see whether or not introducing a single rate 
tax system that is based on individual income would improve efficiency in terms of the 
wife's labour supply and the deadweight loss. We introduce two single rate tax 
systems, a single rate tax system without a threshold (the proportional tax system), 
and a single rate tax system with a threshold of $4,595, which is the same as the first 
threshold under the current tax system (see Table 8.1). The tax rates of these systems 
are determined such that the predicted total tax revenue is equal to the predicted total 
tax revenue under the current tax system. The simulation procedure is as follows. 
i) Using the estimated labour supply function, the labour supply and the 
equivalent incomes of all wives in the absence of any tax are calculated 
under the assumption that there is no selection error. Equivalent incomes 
evaluated at the sample mean of the wage rate are then calculated for all 
wives. 
ii) All wives are ranked according to their equivalent income under the no-tax 
situation. The sample is divided into deciles according to this ranking, and 
this ranking is used simulate other tax systems. 
Table 8.1. 1985-1986 Income Year Tax Schedule 
Not less than 0 4595 12500 19500 28000 35000 
Not more than 4595 12500 19500 28000 35000 and over 
Marginal tax rate 0 .25 .30 .46 .48 .60 
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iii) The wife's labour supply, the husband's and wife's tax, and the 
deadweight loss under the current tax system is simulated assuming that 
there is no selection error. 
iv) A proportional tax system is created such that the predicted total tax 
revenue under the hypothetical tax system is the same as the predicted total 
tax revenue under the current tax system.^- The labour supply, tax and 
the deadweight loss under the proportional tax system are compared to 
those under the current tax system. 
v) A single rate tax system with a threshold is created such that the threshold 
is set to $4,595, and the tax rate is determined such that the predicted total 
revenue is equal to the current tax system. Again, the labour supply, tax 
and the deadweight loss are compared to those under the current tax 
system. 
Thus, we will compare the current tax system to two different individual-income-
based single rate tax systems. 
The above simulation will show the effects of introducing single rate tax systems 
that are based on individual income. In order to compare these effects to the effects of 
introducing a single rate tax system that is based on the joint income, we will create a 
^ Under the proportional tax system, the tax rate is constant regardless of the income level, 
so long as taxable income is positive. If simulated taxable income is negative, which 
sometimes happens at low levels labour supply, it is assumed that no tax is levied on the 
income. 
As we will see later, the predicted tax revenue under the current tax system underestimates 
the actual tax revenue, because we ignore the selection error. In order to see a possible 
bias from this underestimation, we also simulated the labour supply and tax revenue 
under an altemative assumption that people will make a selection error under an 
alternative tax system that is exactly the same as the error under the current tax system. 
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hypothetical joint-income-based tax system which has the same marginal tax rates as 
the current tax system, and introduce two joint-income-based single rate tax systems. 
The procedure is as follows: 
i) A hypothetical joint-income-based tax system is created such that the 
marginal tax rates of all the tax brackets are the same as those of the current 
tax schedule, and the thresholds of each existing tax bracket are multiplied 
by the same number. This multiplier is determined such that the predicted 
total tax revenue under the joint-income-based tax system is equal to the 
predicted tax revenue under the current tax system. 
ii) A joint-income-based proportional tax system is created in the same way as 
the individual-income-based proportional tax system, ^ and the labour 
supply, the taxes and the deadweight losses are compared to the joint-
income based tax system with the current marginal tax rates. 
iii) A joint-income-based single rate tax system with a threshold is created in 
the same way as the individual-income-based single rate tax system. The 
threshold is set at the same income level as the first threshold of the joint-
income-based tax system with the current tax rates. The labour supply, the 
taxes and the deadweight losses are compared to the joint-income based tax 
system with the current marginal tax rates. 
Thus, we will simulate seven tax systems all together. Three of these are individual-
income-based tax systems, another three are joint-income-based tax systems, and the 
other is the no-tax situation. Table 8.2. lists the table numbers for the seven 
simulations. In the remainder of the chapter, the individual-income-based proportional 
8 The joint-income-based proportional tax system is almost the same as the individual-
income-based proportional tax system. A slight difference stems from the assumption 
that a gap between total income and the taxable income is held fixed under altemative tax 
systems. Under this assumption, there are some wives whose simulated taxable incomes 
are negative. 
Table 8.2. List of Simulation Tables 
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Individual-Income-Based Joint-Income-Based 
Current Tax System Table 8.11 NA 
Current Tax Rates with 
Different Thresholds NA Table 8.15 
Proportional Tax System Table 8.12 Table 8.16 
Single Rate Tax System Table 8.13 Table 8.17 
No Tax Table 8.10 
tax system is called the "proportional tax system (I)"; the individual-income-based 
single rate tax system with a threshold is called the "single rate tax system (I)"; the 
joint-income-based tax system with the current marginal tax rates is called the "current 
tax rate system (J)"; the joint-income-based proportional tax system is called the 
"proportional tax system (J)"; and the joint-income-based single rate tax system with a 
threshold is called the "single rate tax system (J)". 
3. Data 
The Australian Income Distribution Survey, 1985-1986 is used. The 
characteristics of this data were explained in the previous chapter. The sample 
selection criteria, which are summarized in Table 8.3, are different from those of the 
previous chapter. 
A few points should be noted. First, those who have received government 
benefits or pensions other than family allowances are excluded, though this may cause 
a sample selection bias. In the current social security system, some benefits are 
determined based on a couple's weekly family income and assets, and the maximum 
amount payable is different for each benefit and pension. Hence, it is hard to collect 
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Table 8.3. Excluded Observations 
Male Female 
20 Years Old or less 21 (0.4) 78 (1.4) 60 Years Old or more (female) NA 939 (17.0) 
65 Years Old w more (male) 768 (13.9) NA 
Marital Status Changed in 1985-86 155 (2.8) 155 (2.8) 
Away from Australia 13 Weeks or more 78 (1.4) 81 (1.5) Full-Time Student 48 (0.9) 48 (0.9) 
Paid Tax more than Income 60 (1.1) 47 (0.9) Received Government Pension or Benefit 
Other than Family Allowance 1386 (25.1) 1277 (23.2) 
$20000 cw more Difference between 
Total Income and Taxable Income 289 (5.2) 97 (1.8) 
No Work but Having Wage Income (female) NA 12 (0.2) 
Having Director's Fee (female) NA 17 (0.3) 
-Having Income from Own Business 1333 (24.2) 923 (16.7) 
Wage/Salary from Own Ltd 290 (5.3) 179 (3.2) 
Income from Own Non-Ltd 818 (14.8) 568 (10.3) 
Loss from Own Non-Ltd 240 (4.4) 177 (3.2) 
Income form Dividends, Own Ltd 101 (1.8) 75 (1.4) 
Original Sample Size 
Selected Sample Size 
5516 
2172 
(100.0) 
(39.4) 
the information necessary to estimate the budget line that confronts these people.^ 
Second, if the difference between the taxable income, which is estimated from 
the tax actually paid and the income reported, is larger than $20,000, those people are 
excluded as exceptional observations. Those people may have paid a large amount of 
provisional tax, or they may have evaded tax, or their answers to the questionnaire 
may be in error. 
As a result, 2,172 couples are selected. The definition of variables are given in 
Table 8.4, and the mean variables and standard deviations are listed in Table 8.5. 
9 Including government benefit recipients may, however, create another source of bias. Most 
benefits are paid for those who are not only poor but also are supposed to have 
disadvantages for working in the market. Hence, the virtual incomes and the virtual wage 
rates would be correlated with the unobserved working ability if government benefit 
reipients were included in the sample. 
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Table 8.4. Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
W 
W* 
H 
ED 
DIP 
BACH 
AGE 
ASIA 
UK 
EUROPE 
OTHER 
Wife's Characteristics 
Wage Rate 
Virtual Wage Rate 
Hours Waked a Year 
Years of Primary and Secondary Education 
Dummy for Diploma 
Dummy for Bachelcff 
Age 
Dummy for Bom in Asia 
Dummy for Bom in UK 
Dummy for Bom in Other Europe 
Dummy for Bom in Other Overseas 
NWI 
NWI^ 
Income 
Wife's Nonwage Income Plus Husband's Income 
Virtual Nonwage Income 
CO-4 
C5-9 
ClO-14 
Children 
Number of Children Age 0-4 Years Old 
Number of Children Age 5-9 Years Old 
Number of ChUdren Age 10-14 Years Old 
Variables 
Table 8.5. Sample Means 
Total Workers Non-Workers 
H 834.6 (880.1) 1345.7 (749.0) NA 
W NA 8.0546 (1.313) NA 
NWI 25726 (9381) 25477 (9411) 26132 (9324) 
ED 9.5861 (1.387) 9.7298 (1.326) 9.3515 (1.452) 
DIP .21593 (.4116) .24944 (.4329) .16121 (.3680) 
BACH .063536 (.2440) .086860 (.2817) .025455 (.1576) 
AGE 37.768 (9.822) 36.688 (9.253) 39.532 (10.46) 
ASIA .032228 (.1767) .031180 (.1739) .033939 (.1812) 
UK .11832 (.3231) .12918 (.3355) .10061 (.3010) 
EUROPE .098066 (.2975) .090572 (.2871) .11030 (.3135) 
OTHER .032228 (.1767) .036377 (.1873) .025455 (.1576) 
CO-4 .37523 (.6654) .27023 (.5476) .54667 (.7932) 
C5-9 .35221 (.6529) .30438 (.6078) .43030 (.7141) 
C 10-14 .37201 (.6662) .37639 (.6777) .36485 (.6473) 
Sample 2172 1347 825 
Note.— Standard Deviations are in Parentheses. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Estimation Results 
Table 8.6 gives maximum likelihocxl estimates of the participation and the 
market wage. These two equations are estimated simultaneously so that we could 
avoid the selectivity bias in the estimation of market wage. The regressors are almost 
the same as the previous chapter. Although the sample selection criteria are different 
fix)m the previous chapter, there is no notable difference from the estimation result in 
the previous chapter. 
Table 8.7 gives maximum likelihood estimates of the labour supply. The first 
two columns are the hnear labour supply function, and the last two columns are the 
semi-quadratic labour supply function where the square term of the wage rate is 
imposed. The first and the third columns are estimated by tobit where the market wage 
and nonwage income are used as regressors, and the nonlinearity of the budget line is 
ignored. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the labour supply function ignoring the 
progressive tax is not consistent with the utility maximizing behaviour if the tax rate is 
determined based upon the individual income. On the other hand, the second and the 
fourth columns are estimated by the full information method discussed in Chapter 3. 
Notable points are as follows. First, compared the tobit estimates to the full 
information estimates, the coefficients of characteristics variables such as education, 
age and the numbers of children are larger (in absolute term) for the full information 
method. This is true for both Unear labour supply function and the semi-quadratic 
labour supply function. This result is reasonable since the interpretation of these 
coefficients are different between the two estimation method. For instance, the 
coefficient of the number of children estimated by the tobit measures the effect of an 
extra child on the hours worked when the market wage rate and the nonwage income 
are given. On the other hand, in the case of the full information method, the same 
coefficient measures the effect of an extra child on the hours worked when the virtual 
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Table 8.6. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Wife's Participation and Market Wage 
Explanatory Variables Participation 
(1) 
Market Wage 
(2) 
Constant -0.070514 (0.6121) 1.2718 (4.701) 
ED 0.073606** (0.02488) 0.052318** (0.01205) 
DIP 0.40581** (0.07835) 0.14849** (0.03170) 
BACH 0.9552** (0.1568) 0.35297** (0.05834) 
AGE 0.062457* (0.02854) 0.013473 (0.01192) 
AGE^ -0.0013702** (0.0003517) -0.00018305 (0.0001513) 
ASIA -0.22837 (0.1574) -0.17870 (0.09333) 
UK 0.14396 (0.09194) -0.0021547 (0.M092) 
EUROPE 0.027149 (0.09976) 0.0012143 (0.06186) 
OTHER 0.19560 (0.1693) -0.022673 (0.07935) 
CO-4 -0.80405** (0.05504) 
C5-9 -0.32291** (0.04425) 
C 10-14 -0.15483** (0.04519) 
W / / 1 0 0 0 -0.0090839** (0.003084) 
Equation Standard Error 1. 0.45320 
Correlation Coefficient 0.39539** (0.06637) 
Log of Likelihood -2032.4 
Note.— Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
** Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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Table 8.7. Maximum Likelihood Estimate of Wife's Labour Supply 
ExplanatOTy Variable Tobit Full Information Tobit Full Information 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 1472.8*** 2659.7** -571.66 3365.8** 
(415.2) (220.1) (1137.) (725.9) 
W* (IVforTobit) 184.78** 167.07** 697.69** -59.817 
(49.32) (38.43) (267.8) (212.6) 
( ^ 2 for Tobit) -32.000 18.344 
(16.52) (15.56) 
NWI* (NWI for Tobit) -0.013536** -0.028806** -0.013810* * -0.028161** 
(0.002755) (0.005273) (0.002757) (0.005393) 
DIP 173.84 345.16** 184.29 338.73** (97.54) (71.07) (97.76) (72.07) 
BACH 288.21 786.72** 612.09* 704.38** 
(214.9) (120.5) (271.7) (127.8) 
AGE -41.349** -56.623** -40.748** -57.055** 
(3.171) (3.581) (3.184) (3.597) 
CO-4 -961.52** -1167.1** -956.98** -1186.6** 
(48.75) (67.58) (48.72) (69.59) 
C5-9 -396.00** -473.14** -396.64** -491.46** 
(41.27) (51.24) (41.23) (52.64) 
C 10-14 -151.74** -154.65** -154.85** -156.40** 
(38.22) (43.60) (38.23) (43.83) 
Standard Error of Equation 1078.1 1062.3 1077.3 1060.2 
Log of Likelihood -11940.8 -11934.5 11938.9 -11933.1 
Note.— Standard Errors are in Parentheses. 
* Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
** Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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wage and the virtual nonwage income are given. The virtual wage rate and the virtual 
income, however, change as the hours of work change. If the budget set is convex, an 
extra child reduces the virtual nonwage income and increases the virtual wage rate 
which partly offset the effect of the child, so the total effect of the child will be smaller 
than the coefficient of the children dummy. 
Second, the square terms in the semi-quadratic labour supply functions are not 
significantly different from zero at the conventional level in either equation. Especially 
in the case of the full information method, the null hypothesis that the square term is 
zero is not rejected at the ten per cent level. This implies that the linear labour supply 
function is not a strong assumption. Following simulations are based on the estimation 
result in the second column. 
Now, compare the marginal tax rates actually selected and simulated. Table 8.9 
summarizes the distribution of the marginal tax rates. The first column gives the 
husband's marginal tax rates. It shows that only less than 10 per cent of husbands face 
25 per cent or lower marginal tax rate, and about 70 per cent of husband face 46 per 
cent or higher marginal tax rates. 
The second column gives the marginal tax rates wives actually face. The contrast 
between the first and the second columns is clear. Nearly fifty per cent of wives face 
zero marginal tax rate, and only about 11 per cent of wives face 46 per cent or higher 
marginal tax rates. 
The third column shows the predicted distribution of the wife's marginal tax 
rates. For the prediction, we assumed that there is no selection error in labour supply. 
Under this assumption, about 20 per cent of wives select kink points. A drawback to 
this simulation method is that the total tax revenue is underestimated. As the bottom 
figure in the column three shows, the average tax paid by wives is $688 which is less 
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Table 8.8. Wage and Income Effects 
dh Bh' dh dh w dh' w dh 
dw dm dw h dw h dm 
167.07 205.83 -0.028806 1.0000 1.2320 -0.2320 
Note.— Evaluated at the participants' means. 
Table 8.9. Marginal Tax Rates Actually Selected and Simulated (I) 
Actual Wife's Predicted Tax 
Marginal 
Tax Rate Husband Wife Without Error With Error 
0 0.0612 0.4991 0.3881 0.4862 
0 - .25 • 0. 0. 0.1883 0. 
.25 0.0345 0.1980 o.im 0.2242 
.25 - .30 • 0. 0 . 0.0170 0. 
.30 0.2118 0.1902 0.0847 0.2132 
.30 - .46 • 0. 0 . 0.0124 0. 
.46 0.4176 0.0953 0.0203 0.0654 
.46 - .48 • 0. 0 . 0. 0 . 
.48 0.1630 0.0129 0.0018 0.0106 
.48 - .60 • 0. 0. 0. 0 . 
.60 0.1119 0.0046 0. 0.0005 
Total 1. 1. 1. 1. 
Tax Paid 6471.7 1458.6 688.4 1603.2 
• Kinked points. 
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than a half of the actual average tax.^^ 
This drawback is overcome if we add on the errors to the predicted labour 
supply. Following Blundell, Meghir, Symons, and Walker (1988) we add on the 
selection errors to the predicted labour supply. The errors for the participants are 
simply obtained by the estimation errors, and the errors for the nonparticipants are 
generated by drawing from the truncated tail of the estimated truncated distribution so 
that the nonparticipants stay out of labour market under the current tax system after 
adding the error term.ii This method assures that the predicted labour supply under 
the current tax system is exacdy the same as the actual labour supply. 
The last column shows the prediction using this method. The figures are slighdy 
different from the second column since wage rate used for the estimation and the 
simulation is not equal to the actual wage rate.^^ It is clear that the latter simulation 
method offers a much better prediction of the marginal tax rate selection and the 
government's tax revenue. However, this method also has a defect. That is, since the 
selection errors are added to the optimal labour supply, the predicted point is not the 
optimal. This causes a difficulty in estimating the deadweight loss since the 
However, this drawback is not crucial for the following simulation. Since more than 80 
per cent of tax is paid by husband, the underestimation of wife's tax does not affect total 
tax revenue a lot. 
There are a few differences between our model and and the model of Blundell et al.(1988). 
First, our model assumed the estimation error represents the selection error, and there is 
no unobserved preferences. On the other hand Blundell et al. assumed that there is no 
selection error and the estimation error represents the random preference. Secondly, the 
dependent variable in their model is the wage income rather than hours of woric. 
If the dependent variable of the labour supply function were wage income, as Blundell et 
al. specified, adding the errors according to the above procedure would assure the perfect 
prediction under the current tax system. 
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deadweight loss is measured assuming that the optimal point is s e l e c t e d . ^ ^ 
In the reminder of the paper, we mainly discuss the simulation results based on 
the former method, and the simulation results based on the latter method is listed in 
Appendix A for this chapter. 
4.2. No Tax Situation 
Table 8.10 gives the simulation results assuming that there is no tax. The 
meaning of the abbreviations are as follows: 
EI: the equivalent income evaluated at 24 x 365 hours and at the sample 
means of wage rate; 
NMI: the net money income, which is equal to the couple's total income 
minus couple's total tax; 
H : hours worked, which is the mean of the participants and the 
nonparticipants; 
HI: husband's total income; 
WI: wife's total income; 
HT: tax paid by a husband; 
WT: tax paid by a wife; 
7T : total tax paid by a couple; 
DL : wife's deadweight loss. 
The inequality of the equivalent income is measured by the Gini coefficient and 
the Atkinson i nd i ce s .These are calculated as follows. Let yi be the i-\h individual's 
income which is ordered such that < < . • . < Then, the Gini coefficient is 
given by 
If there is no selection error and the disturbance term represents the random preference as 
Blundell et al. assumed, then this difficulty would not occur. 
14 See Atkinson (1970). 
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Table 8.10. No Tax 
Decile EI NMI H HI WI HT WT TT DL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1 80556 19406 858.4 II991 7415.0 0 0 0 0 
2 86195 23459 698.4 17480 5979.5 0 0 0 0 
3 88374 25656 750.1 19228 6428.3 0 0 0 0 
4 90256 27700 784.2 20687 7012.8 0 0 0 0 
5 92038 29031 707.8 22184 6847.7 0 0 0 0 
6 94199 31012 655.6 24079 6303.0 0 0 0 0 
7 96473 33012 638.6 26336 6675.9 0 0 0 0 
8 99401 35609 596.0 28974 6634.6 0 0 0 0 
9 103733 40624 655.7 32652 7971.9 0 0 0 0 
10 113869 49941 549.9 42521 7419.3 0 0 0 0 
Mean 94523 31558 689.4 24688 6869.6 0 0 0 0 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .05385 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .004872 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .009580 
i=l 
n where fJ. = n'^ Xy,-. The Atkinson index is given by 
i=l 
(8.6) 
A = 1 - I /=i M 
= 1 - exp 
v ^ / 
n 
I log 
l/(l-£) 
'Zi-
V i=l 
if 1, 
i f £ = 1, 
(8.7) 
(8.8) 
where e is the degree of inequality-aversion. 
The wives are ranked by the equivalent income under the no tax situation, and 
this ranking is hold in the remainder of the paper. The net money income is equal to 
the total income since there is no tax. Notable points are as follows. First, the 
equivalent income is clearly positively correlated with the net money income and 
husband's income. This does not imply that the EI ranking is exactly the same as the 
net income ranking and husband's income ranking. The similarity of these rankings 
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stems from the fact that the husband's income is a large part of total nonwage income. 
It is not surprising that the nonwage income has a positive effect on utility and on net 
money income. 
Second, the hours of work is roughly negatively correlated with the equivalent 
income, but the order of the hours of work is sometimes reversed. For instance, the 
wives in the second decile work shorter than the wives in the third decile, and the 
wives in the ninth decile work longer than the wives in eighth decile. The negative 
correlation is explained by the negative effect of nonwage income, but the negative 
correlation is partly offset by the wage effect since wage rate is positively correlated 
with the welfare level. 
Third, the wife's income is large for the first decile and the ninth and tenth 
deciles. The large income for wives in the low-E/ group is caused by a large wage 
income, and the large income for wives in the high-f / groups is caused by a large 
nonwage income. 
Fourth, the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson indices are quite small compared to 
other studies of income d i s t r i b u t i o n . ^ ^ There are two reasons the indices are so small. 
One is that the sample do not contain single people, those who have business income, 
or those who received government benefits. Hence, the income distribution within the 
sample is much more even than the whole economy. Second, the indices measure the 
inequality of the equivalent income, not the inequality of the money income. ^ ^ Since 
the equivalent income is evaluated at 24 x 365 hours and at the sample mean of market 
wage rate, a large part of the equivalent income is the value of the time asset. Hence, it 
is meaningless to compare the indices in this paper to those in other papers, but this 
Atkinson (1970) listed six different inequality indices including the Gini coefficient and the 
Atkinson indices applied for twelve countries. 
The Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index based on the net money income is not 
available sincc the predicted after tax income is negative for some couples. 
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does not deny the usefulness of the indices for comparing the equity of tax systems 
offered in the paper. 
4.3. Current Tax System 
Table 8.11. gives the simulation of the current tax system, and Table 8.11.1 
gives the difference of Table 8.11 from Table 8.10, or the effect of introducing the 
current tax system into the no-tax situation. The notable points are as follows. 
First, the equivalent income and the net money income declined in all groups, 
and the decline is larger for the h igh- f / groups, because the high-EI groups paid more 
tax. As a result, all the inequality indices declined. 
Second, the wife 's labour supply and income declined except for the highest-f / 
group. Introducing the current tax system has two opposite effects on wife 's labour 
supply. On the one hand, the income tax depresses the virtual wage and raises the 
virtual income as far as the gross nonwage income is constant, and this has a negative 
effect on the wife 's labour supply. On the other hand, the income tax reduces the 
husband's after tax income, this has a negative effect on the virtual income, and hence 
it has a positive effect on the labour supply. The third column in Table 8.11.1 shows 
that the former effect dominates the latter especially for low-E/ groups, and the latter 
effect dominates the former effect for the highest-f / group. 
Third, the deadweight loss is clearly positively correlated with the wife 's 
income. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the second order approximation of the 
deadweight loss is proportional to the square of the marginal tax rate. Hence, wives 
having high income faces to high marginal tax rate, and they have large deadweight 
losses. 
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Table 8.11. Current Tax System 
Decile EI NMI H WI HT WT TT DL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 77597 15329 703.0 6145.0 2121.1 685.9 2807.0 254.6 
2 82292 18974 613.0 5286.6 3320.6 472.1 3792.7 179.4 
3 84139 20753 645.7 5571.7 3531.4 515.3 4046.6 209.5 
4 85269 21969 668.0 6034.8 4099.6 653.5 4753.1 263.8 
5 86336 22787 633.5 6158.8 4967.3 588.5 5555.8 224.8 
6 87602 23947 597.5 5760.5 6044.2 478.8 6523.0 220.7 
7 88608 24858 604.9 6270.9 7047.9 701.2 7749.1 267.0 
8 90531 26386 564.5 6217.3 8062.3 742.9 8805.2 282.8 
9 92655 28980 622.5 7350.1 10009.3 1012.9 11022.2 475.8 
10 97602 33595 598.5 7558.3 15455.7 1029.4 16485.2 491.3 
Mean 87270 23765 625.1 6236.5 6471.7 688.4 7160.1 287.2 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .03462 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .002376 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .004759 
Table 8.11.1. The Difference of "Current Tax System" from "No Tax' 
Decile AEI ANMI AH AWI AHT AWT ATT ADL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 -2960 -4077 -155.4 -1270.0 2121.1 685.9 2807.0 254.6 
2 -3903 -4486 -85.4 -692.9 3320.6 472.1 3792.7 179.4 
3 -4235 -4903 -104.4 -856.6 3531.4 515.3 4046.6 209.5 
4 -4987 -5731 -116.2 -978.0 4099.6 653.5 4753.1 263.8 
5 -5702 -6245 -74.3 -688.8 4967.3 588.5 5555.8 224.8 
6 -6597 -7066 -58.0 -542.5 6044.2 478.8 6523.0 220.7 
7 -7865 -8154 -33.7 -405.0 7047.9 701.2 7749.1 267.0 
8 -8870 -9223 -31.4 -417.3 8062.3 742.9 8805.2 282.8 
9 -11078 -11644 -33.2 -621.8 10009.3 1012.9 11022.2 475.8 
10 -16267 -16346 48.7 139.0 15455.7 1029.4 16485.2 491.3 
Mean -7252 -7793 -64.3 -633.0 6471.7 688.4 7160.1 287.2 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient -.01923 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) -.002496 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) -.004821 
Note.— Figures are the difference from Table 8.10. 
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Table 8.12. Proportional Tax System (I) 
Decile AFI ANMI AH AWI AHT AWT ATT ADL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 -1610 -1570 -9.7 5.6 803.2 772.6 1575.8 1.5 
2 -1466 -1659 -40.7 -266.1 716.5 676.3 1392.8 54.2 
3 -1483 -1663 -34.6 -232.7 692.3 737.9 1430.1 51.2 
4 -1272 -1329 -15.8 -67.3 488.4 772.9 1261.3 7.8 
5 -851 -1088 -41.6 -272.6 129.2 686.1 815.3 37.0 
6 -502 -758 -46.2 -314.6 -292.0 735.4 443.4 44.4 
7 68 -305 -59.4 -392.6 -731.4 643.9 -87.5 8.5 
8 512 162 -56.6 -371.1 -1224.6 691.5 -533.1 1.4 
9 1645 1338 -50.3 -225.2 -2193.5 630.3 -1563.2 -136.1 
10 4706 4042 -96.3 -663.6 -5266.9 561.2 -4705.7 -156.8 
Mean -22 -280 -45.2 -280.2 -690.7 690.7 0. -8.8 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .01092 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .001398 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .002692 
Note.— Tax rate is 24.43%. Figures are the difference from Table 8.11. 
4.4. Proportional Tax System (I) 
Table 8.12 summarizes the effect of introducing the proportional tax system (I). 
The figures are the difference from the current tax system. The tax rate is set to 24.43 
per cent which assures the tax neutral reform. 
First of all, let us compare the marginal tax rates selected under the current tax 
system and the post-reform marginal tax rate. Post-reform tax rate 24.43 per cent is 
lower than the lowest marginal tax rate of the current tax schedule. According to 
column one in Table 8.9, only six per cent of husbands face zero marginal tax rate 
under the current tax system, so under the proportional tax system, about 94 per cent 
of husbands face lower marginal tax rate than the current tax system. 
On the other hand, according to column three in Table 8.9, 39 per cent of wives 
are predicted to select zero marginal tax rate under the current tax system, and 42 per 
cent of wives are predicted to select 25 per cent or higher marginal tax rates. Since 
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most wives face 24.43 per cent marginal tax rate under the proportional tax system, 
the former group of wives face higher marginal tax rate, and the latter group of wives 
face lower marginal tax rate under the proportional tax system. 
Second, the proportional tax shifts the tax burden from the people having high 
income to people having low income. The seventh column in Table 8.12 shows that 
the tax increased for the six \ow-EI groups and decreased for the four high-El groups. 
As a result, the equivalent income increased for the high-EI groups and decreased for 
the l ow- f / groups, and the inequality indices increased. 
Third, under the individual-income-based tax system, we should consider the 
tax burden shift between a husband and wife, as well as the shift among households. 
As the fifth and the sixth columns show, the mean tax of husbands decreased and the 
mean tax of wives increased. Especially, the wife's tax increased for all groups. Thus 
the tax burden shifted from husbands to wives. 
Fourth, the wife's labour supply decreased for all groups, but the causes of the 
labour supply decline may be quite different between the high-f / groups and the low-
EI groups. As the last column shows, the wife's deadweight loss increased for the 
eight lower-f / groups in spite of the labour supply decline. ^ ^ The deadweight loss 
increase implies that the marginal tax rate increased on average for these groups. 
Hence, the labour supply decline for the low-f / groups are mainly caused by the 
increase of marginal tax rate, and hence the decrease of virtual wage. 
On the other hand, the effect of the virtual wage change will be positive for the 
Exception is those who have zero or negative taxable income. 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, the second order approximation of the deadweight loss is 
proportional to the compensated response to wage. In the case of the linear labour supply 
function, the compensated response to wage decreases as the labour supply decreases if 
the uncompensated response to wage is constant, and if the response to income is 
negative. 
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two highest-f/ groups. As the last column shows, the deadweight loss declined 
sharply for the two highest-E/ groups, so the marginal tax rates are likely to decreased 
for these two groups. Hence, the labour supply decline should stem from a strong 
negative income effect which dominates the positive virtual wage effect. As column 
five shows, the husband's tax declines largely for the h igh-f / groups, which causes a 
strong negative effect on the wife's labour supply. 
The labour supply decline and the deadweight loss rise for the eight deciles are 
quite different results from Hausman's simulation. The difference will stem from 
whether the tax rate is determined based upon the individual income or the couple's 
joint income. This conjecture is supported by another simulation where there exists a 
threshold to the single tax rate. 
4.5. Single Rate Tax System (I) 
Table 8.13 offers the effects of introducing the single rate tax system, where the 
threshold is set to $ 4595 which is the same as the threshold to the lowest tax bracket 
under the current tax system. The tax rate is set to 33.33 per cent which assures the 
revenue neutral tax reform. 
First, let us compare the marginal tax rates selected under the current tax system 
and under the single rate tax system. Since husbands' pre-tax income is fixed, those 
who currently face zero marginal tax rate will again face zero marginal tax rate under 
the single rate tax system, and those who face 25 per cent or higher marginal tax rate 
will face 33.33 per cent marginal tax rate. Hence, about six per cent of husbands face 
the same marginal tax rate, and 25 per cent of husbands face the higher tax rate, and 
the rest of husbands face lower tax rate compared to the current tax system. 
On the other hand, the wife's marginal tax rate change is not so simple since she 
changes the labour supply. If the labour supply is fixed at the predicted labour supply 
under the current tax system, then 57 per cent of wives do not change the marginal tax 
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Table 8.13. Single Rate Tax System (I) 
Decile AEI ANMI AH AWI AHT AWT ATT ADL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 -674 -735 -19.4 -138.0 466.9 129.5 596.5 71.7 
2 -822 -874 -17.8 -138.3 656.4 79.8 736.2 80.2 
3 -876 -935 -18.4 -141.4 700.1 93.6 793.6 85.4 
4 -817 -905 -23.0 -173.8 629.0 102.5 731.5 89.4 
5 -639 -160 -25.3 -208.6 455.2 96.7 551.9 93.2 
6 ^ 2 4 -569 -29.3 -235.8 273.0 60.4 333.3 92.1 
7 -211 -286 -16.4 -117.0 39.3 129.8 169.2 45.7 
8 78 -95 -29.9 -246.6 -263.9 111.9 -152.0 72.7 
9 743 637 -16.6 -88.3 -876.2 151.0 -725.2 -31.5 
10 2949 2464 -66.0 -553.8 -3084.7 613 -3017.4 -15.7 
Mean -68 -204 -26.2 -204.3 -102.2 102.3 0.0 58.3 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .00596 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .000781 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .001495 
Note.— Tax rate is 33.33%. Figures are the difference from Table 8.11. 
rate they face (which is the sum of the first two rows in column three of Table 8.9), 39 
per cent of wives face higher marginal tax rate (which is the sum of the third, fourth 
and fifth rows in the third column of Table 8.9), and only two per cent of wives face 
lower marginal tax rate than the current tax system (which is the sum of the seventh 
and ninth columns in column three of Table 8.9). Thus, the single rate tax system 
increases wives' marginal tax rate on average. 
According to Table 8.13, the pattem of the change of variables is quite similar to 
the case of the proportional tax system, but the magnitudes are smaller in general. A 
notable exception is the change of the deadweight loss. The deadweight loss increased 
much larger for the eight \ow-EI groups, and declined much smaller for the rest of the 
wives. As a result, the deadweight loss increased on average. 
Again, the result shows that Hausman's findings are not supported under the 
individual-income-based tax system. Introducing the single rate tax system has a quite 
different effect on wives' labour supply and deadweight losses under the individual-
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income-based tax system and the joint-income-based tax system. 
4.6. Current Tax Rate System (J) 
The difference of our results from Hausman's findings may stem from the 
difference of the data. In order to compare the effect under the individual-income-
based tax system to the effect under the joint-income-based tax system, we create a 
hypothetical joint-income-based tax system which has a similar progressivity to the 
current tax system, and compare the joint-income-based single rate tax systems to this 
hypothetical tax system. As we explained before, we create the hypothetical joint-
income-based tax system based on the current tax schedule such that the marginal tax 
rates are the same as the current tax schedule and the thresholds to each tax bracket are 
multiplied by the same number. The multiplier is determined such that the predicted 
total tax revenue under the hypothetical tax system is equal to the predicted total tax 
revenue under the current tax system. In the case of the simulation without a selection 
error, the multiplier is 1.274 which raises average tax revenue $7160.1 per couple 
(which is equal to the sum of the first and the third columns of Table 8.9), and in the 
case of the simulation with a selection error, the multiplier is 1.354 which raises 
average tax revenue $7747.8 per couple (which is equal to the sum of the first and the 
fourth columns of Table 8.9). 
Table 8.14 compares the marginal tax rate rates which the husbands and wives 
actually face under the current tax system and the marginal tax rates which couples 
face under the two hypothetical tax systems. The first two columns offer the actual 
distribution of the marginal tax rates, which are the same as the first two columns in 
Table 8.9. 
The third column is predicted assuming that there is no selection error in the 
labour supply, so some couples select kink points. The fourth column is predicted 
assuming that the selection error under the current tax system is hold under the 
189 
Table 8.14. Marginal Tax Rate Actually Selected and Simulated (II) 
Actual Couple's Predicted Tax 
Tax Rate Husband Wife Without Error With Error 
0 0.0612 0.4991 0.0198 0.0235 
0 - .25 " 0. 0. 0.0069 0. 
.25 0.0345 0.1980 0.0686 0.0870 
.25 - .30 ^ 0. 0. 0.0037 0. 
.30 0.2118 0.1902 0.2689 0.2091 
.30 - .46 ' 0. 0. 0.0456 0. 
.46 0.4176 0.0953 0.3789 0.3900 
.46 - .48 " 0. 0. 0.0041 0. 
.48 0.1630 0.0129 0.1349 0.1372 
.48 - .60 » 0. 0. 0.0087 0. 
.60 0.0119 0.0046 0.0599 0.0723 
Total 1. 1. 1. 1. 
Tax Paid 6471.7 1458.6 7160.1 7747.8 
® Kinked points. 
alternative tax system. In both cases, the distribution of the marginal tax rates couples 
face is similar to the distribution of the marginal tax rates husbands actually face under 
the current tax system (figures in the first column). This is not surprising. Since 
currently more than 80 per cent of total tax is paid by husbands, couple's marginal tax 
rate is mainly determined by the husband's income. This implies that most wives face 
higher marginal tax rates under the joint-income-based tax system. 
Table 8.15 summarizes wives' labour supply and welfare under the joint-
income-based tax system. There is no distinction between the tax paid by the husband 
and the tax paid by the wife since the tax is determined based on the joint income of 
the couple. These figures are predicted without selection error, and the prediction with 
a selection error is listed in Appendix A for this chapter. 
Table 8.15.1 gives the difference of the joint-income-based tax system from the 
current tax system (Table 8.11). Notable points are as follows. First of all, the fifth 
column shows that the tax burden shifted from high-E/ groups to low- f / groups. If 
the total income of a couple is given, the tax paid by the couple under the individual-
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Table 8.15. Current Tax Rate System (J) 
Decile EI NMI H WI TT DL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 77052 14248 597.8 5410.0 3152.7 438.8 
2 81682 17478 448.3 4085.2 4087.4 485.1 
3 83435 19123 All.l 4288.9 4393.4 560.9 
4 84528 20273 487.6 4649.5 5063.6 697.1 
5 85882 21154 420.8 4504.3 5534.0 701.1 
6 87157 22192 356.4 3882.8 6399.8 791.4 
7 88130 23004 356.7 4309.8 7642.1 863.6 
8 89979 24443 316.4 4197.4 8729.0 926.5 
9 92129 26888 350.1 5027.1 10791.1 1284.9 
10 97318 31479 280.6 4709.2 15751.7 1576.1 
Mean 86737 22035 409.1 4506.7 7160.1 833.1 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .03538 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .002735 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .005467 
Note.— Thresholds to each tax brackets are multiplied by 1.274. 
Table 8.15.1. Difference of "Current Tax Rate (J)" from "Current Tax System" 
Decile AF.I ANMI AH AWI ATT ADL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 -545 -1081 -105.2 -735.0 345.7 184.2 
2 -610 -1496 -164.7 -1201.3 294.7 305.7 
3 -704 -1630 -168.4 -1282.9 346.8 351.4 
4 -741 -1696 -180.5 -1385.2 310.5 433.3 
5 -454 -1633 -212.7 -1654.6 -21.8 416A 
6 ^ 4 5 -1755 -241.1 -1877.7 -123.2 570.7 
7 -478 -1854 -248.1 -1961.1 -107.0 596.6 
8 -552 -1944 -248.1 -2019.8 -76.2 643.7 
9 -526 -2092 -272.4 -2323.1 -231.1 809.1 
10 -283 -2116 -317.9 -2849.2 -733.5 1084.8 
Mean -534 -1730 -216.0 -1729.8 0.0 546.0 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .00075 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .000359 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .000708 
Note.— The figures are the difference form Table 8.11. 
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income-based tax system will be minimized when the couple's income is evenly 
distributed between the husband and wife, but under the joint-income-based tax 
system, the distribution of income between the husband and wife does not affect the 
tax paid by the couple. Since the difference between the husband's income and the 
wife 's income is smaller for couples in lower- f / groups, they pay relatively little tax 
under the individual-income-based tax system, and they have to pay more tax under 
the joint-income-based tax system. 
Secondly, in spite of the decline of the tax, the equivalent income and the net 
money income declined for high-EI groups as well as \ow-EI groups. The decline of 
the net money income is caused by the large decline of wife's wage income. The forth 
column shows the change of the wife 's pre-tax income. Since the nonwage-income is 
fixed, the income change stems from the change of wage income. The figures show 
that there is a large decUne in wage income for wives in high-E/ groups, and that is 
corresponding to the large decline in labour supply as the third column shows. 
Thirdly, the large decline in labour supply is caused by the high marginal tax rate 
for wives in h igh - f / groups. Since their spouses have large income, their marginal tax 
rates under the joint-income-based tax system are quite high. This discourages their 
work efforts. 
4.7. Proportional Tax System (J) 
Next, let us discuss the effects of introducing two different single rate tax 
system, i.e., the proportional tax system (J) and a single rate tax system (J). Wives' 
behaviour under these two tax systems are compared to the behaviour under the joint-
income-based tax system with the current tax rates (Table 8.15). This comparison is 
similar to Hausman's comparison between the current US tax system and the 
hypothetical single rate tax systems, in the sense that both pre-reform tax system and 
post-reform tax system are joint-income-based. 
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Table 8.16. Proportional Tax System (J) 
Decile AEI ANMI AH AWI ATT ADL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 -1045 -538 86.1 672.9 1211.4 -176.0 
2 -857 -229 114.7 870.7 1099.7 -244.6 
3 -773 -69 128.5 1004.2 1072.7 -294.8 
4 -516 326 156.4 1254.9 928.4 -418.0 
5 -387 465 157.8 1283.1 818.0 -427.3 
6 -38 917 181.7 1457.0 540.3 -514.0 
7 511 1451 180.5 1500.3 49.6 -579.5 
8 1028 2010 184.2 1586.0 -424.4 -634.6 
9 2158 3351 212.7 2030.6 -1320.7 -938.2 
10 4966 6075 214.0 2124.6 -3950.9 -1235.5 
Mean 508 1379 161.7 1379.1 0.0 -546.8 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .01007 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .001034 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .001975 
Note.— Tax rate is 24.44%. The figures are the difference form Table 8.15. 
The tax rate of the proportional tax system (J) is set to 24.43 per cent. Compared 
to the distribution of the tax rates under the current tax rate system (J), which is given 
in column three of Table 8.14, more than 97 per cent of couples face lower marginal 
tax rate under the proportional tax system (J) (the sum of the third raw onward). From 
this, we can anticipate a large decline of deadweight losses for most wives. 
Table 8.16 summarizes the wives' labour supply and welfare under the joint-
income-based proportional tax system. The figures are the difference from Table 8.15. 
First of all, as we anticipated, the deadweight loss declined for all groups, and the 
labour supply increased for all groups. The magnitude is large for the wives in high-f/ 
groups since they initially had a high marginal tax rates. This result support the 
Hausman's findings. 
Secondly, the fifth column shows that the tax burden shifts from high-EI groups 
to low-f / groups. The increase of the tax for low-f/ groups is partly because of the 
labour supply increase, and partly because of the increase of the average tax rate. 
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Although the marginal tax rate decreased for most of the couples, the average tax rate 
increased for l ow- f / groups. 
Thirdly, because of the shift of the tax burden, the equivalent income and the net 
money income declined for \ow-EI group, and increased for high-EI groups. As a 
result, the inequality indices increased. 
4.8. Single Rate Tax System (J) 
Finally, we discuss the wives' behaviour under the single rate tax system (J). 
The threshold is set to $5854, which the same as the first threshold under the current 
tax rate system (J) ($5854 = $4595 x 1.274). The tax rate is set to 31.16 per cent, 
which assures the revenue neutral tax reform. 
First, let us compare the distribution of marginal tax rates people face under the 
current tax rate system (J) and under the single rate tax system (J). For the sake of 
simplicity, assume that wives' labour supply under the single rate tax system (J) is the 
same as that under the current tax rate system (J). Then, couples who face 25 per cent 
or higher marginal tax rate under the pre-reform tax system will face 31.16 per cent 
marginal tax rate under the post-reform tax system. According to the third column of 
Table 8.14, three per cent of couples who initially face less than 25 per cent marginal 
tax rate (the first and the second rows) are not affected by the reform; 33 per cent of 
couples who currentiy face 25 to 30 per cent marginal tax rates (from the third to the 
fifth rows) will face higher marginal tax rate after the reform, but the increase is only a 
litde for wives currently face 30 per cent marginal tax rate; and 59 per cent of couples 
who face 46 per cent or higher marginal tax rates before the reform (the seventh row 
onward) will face lower marginal tax rate after the reform. Thus, introducing the 
single rate tax system will lower the marginal tax rate for the majority of couples if the 
labour supply is constant, this will reduce the deadweight losses for the wives and 
encourage their work efforts. 
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Table 8.17. Single Rate Tax System (J) 
Decile AEl ANMI AH AWI ATT ADL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 ^28 -319 18.8 154.4 472.9 -47.2 
2 -458 -230 42.7 332.4 562.8 -108.1 
3 ^56 -177 54.0 426.5 603.5 -145.6 
4 -350 109 88.9 723.0 614.4 -267.0 
5 -319 149 91.7 746.3 596.9 -274.8 
6 -133 444 116.0 929.1 485.6 -358.2 
7 219 808 120.0 999.2 191.2 -420.9 
8 574 1199 124.3 1072.4 -126.1 -466.6 
9 1384 2190 152.9 1475.7 -714.8 -735.9 
10 3547 4347 167.6 1676.5 -2670.9 -1033.0 
Mean 360 854 97.8 854.2 0.0 -386.2 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .00642 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .000633 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .001196 
Note.— Tax rate is 31.16%. The figures are the difference form Table 8.15. 
Table 8.17 summarizes the wives' behaviour under the single rate tax system 
(J). The results are similar to the results of the proportional tax system (J), but the 
magnitudes are smaller for all variables. That is, the equivalent income and the net 
money income declined for low-E/ groups and rose for high-EI groups; wives' labour 
supply and income increased for all groups; the tax burden shifted from high-f / 
groups to low-f / groups; the deadweight loss declined for all groups; and the 
inequality indices increased. These results are, again, consistent with the Hausman's 
findings. 
5. Summary 
In this chapter, we examined whether or not Hausman's findings that 
introducing a single rate tax system improves efficiency in terms of labour supply and 
deadweight loss is valid for wives under an individual-income-based tax system. The 
procedure of the examination was as follows: First, we estimate a utility consistent 
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labour supply function taking into account of the nonlinearity of the budget line; 
second, the wives' behaviour under three alternative individual-income-based tax 
systems was simulated, i.e., the current tax system, the proportional tax system (I), 
and the single rate tax system (I), and the behaviour under the latter two tax systems 
were compared to the behaviour under the current tax system; third, a hypothetical 
joint-income-based tax system was created such that the progressivity of the tax rate is 
similar to the current system which is called the current tax rate system (J); and finally 
the behaviour under two alternative joint-income-based tax systems, the proportional 
tax system (J) and the single rate tax system (J), was compared to the behaviour under 
the current tax system (J). 
The results were quite impressive. The Hausman's findings were observed 
under the joint-income-based tax system, but were not observed under the individual-
income-based tax system. That is, under an individual-income-based tax system, 
wives' labour supply will decrease and the deadweight loss will not decline a lot, or it 
may even increase by introducing a single rate tax system. 
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Appendix A for Chapter 8 
Tables A.8.1 to A.8.7 list the simulation results assuming that the current 
selection errors are hold under alternative tax systems. The main results which we 
derived form the simulation with no selection errors are supported here. First, 
compared to the current tax system, the labour supply declines when the proportional 
tax system (I) or the single rate tax system (I) is introduced. Second, compared to the 
current tax rate system (J), the labour supply increases when the proportional tax 
system (J) or the single rate tax system (J) is introduced. 
Table A . g . l . N o T a x 
Decile EI NMI H HI WI HT WT TT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1 78565 20324 988.5 11991 8333.2 0 0 0 
2 84661 25539 984.0 17480 8059.4 0 0 0 
3 86643 27362 965.5 19228 8133.7 0 0 0 
4 88898 29559 1028.6 20687 8872.1 0 0 0 
5 90400 30544 913.6 22184 8360.7 0 0 0 
6 92819 31843 llAl 24079 7134.3 0 0 0 
7 95133 34239 806.6 26336 7902.8 0 0 0 
8 97997 37303 817.7 28974 8328.3 0 0 0 
9 102478 42124 UlA 32652 9472.4 0 0 0 
10 112595 51806 1M2 42521 9284.1 0 0 0 
Mean 93027 33077 891.0 24688 8389.0 0 0 0 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .05587 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .005560 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .01101 
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Table A.8.2. Current Tax System 
Decile EI NMI H WI HT WT TT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 75307 16046 869.7 7343.1 2121.1 1167.1 3288.3 
2 80316 20486 903.8 7414.2 3320.6 1087.3 4407.9 
3 82018 21916 881.2 7435.3 3531.4 1216.1 4747.5 
4 83616 23261 919.4 7953.3 4099.6 1279.5 5379.1 
5 84318 23978 863.1 7874.5 4967.3 1113.1 6080.4 
6 85853 24448 724.4 6611.?> 6044.2 894.4 6938.5 
7 86852 25577 768.4 7485.3 7047.9 1196.1 8244.0 
8 88667 27319 775.9 7856.4 8062.3 1449.3 9511.6 
9 90934 29899 813.4 8872.1 10009.3 1615.3 11624.7 
10 95730 34713 826.7 9385.9 15455.7 1738.6 17194.3 
Mean 85368 24771 834.6 7830.9 6471.7 1276.1 7747.8 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .03617 
Atkinson Index (£ = 1) .003104 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .006272 
Table A.8.2.1. The Difference of "Current Tax System" from "No Tax' 
Decile EI NMI H WI HT WT TT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 -3258 -4278 -118.7 -990.1 2121.1 1167.1 3288.3 
2 -4294 -5053 -80.2 -645.2 3320.6 1087.3 4407.9 
3 -4625 -5446 -84.3 -698.4 3531.4 1216.1 4747.5 
4 -5283 -6298 -109.2 -918.9 4099.6 1279.5 5379.1 
5 -6083 -6567 -50.5 -486.2 4967.3 1113.1 6080.4 
6 -6966 -7396 -49.8 -457.1 6044.2 894.3 6938.5 
7 -8281 -8661 -38.1 -417.5 7047.9 1196.1 8244.0 
8 -9331 -9984 -41.8 -471.9 8062.3 1449.3 9511.6 
9 -11544 -12225 -34.0 -600.2 10009.3 1615.3 11624.7 
10 -16865 -17092 42.5 101.9 15455.7 1738.6 17194.3 
Mean -7659 -8306 -56.4 -558.1 6471.7 1276.1 7747.8 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient -.01970 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) -.002456 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) -.004736 
Note.— The figures are the difference form Table A.8.1. 
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Table A.8.3. Proportional Tax System (I) 
Decile AEI ANMI AH AW I AHT AWT ATT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 -1388 -1324 7.9 121.9 931.2 514.2 1445.4 
2 -1277 -1464 -12.6 -68.1 893.2 503.2 1396.4 
3 -1235 -1345 -10.5 -66.7 877.1 401.0 1278.2 
4 -1227 -1198 lA 94.4 689.2 603.5 1292.7 
5 -666 -885 -24.3 -157.0 352.3 375.5 121.S 
6 -384 -551 -17.9 -113.5 -40.2 All.?, 437.6 
7 179 -32 -15.4 -70.4 -454.9 416.1 -38.7 
8 604 414 -20.1 -104.3 -925.3 407.2 -518.1 
9 1681 1401 -26.4 -58.3 -1851.3 392.0 -1459.3 
10 4736 4113 -64.6 -421.1 ^ 8 2 0 . 9 286.8 -4534.0 
Mean 105 -84 -17.7 -84.5 -437.6 437.6 0.0 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .01068 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .001313 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .002518 
Note.— Tax rate is 25.50%. The figures are the difference form Table A.8.2. 
Table A.8.4. Single Rate Tax System (I) 
Decile AEI ANMI AH AWI AHT AWT ATT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 -668 -705 -8.8 -55.7 429.4 219.8 649.3 
2 -849 -952 -15.4 -118.0 598.7 234.9 833.7 
3 -856 -935 -11.1 -83.1 638.8 213.7 852.4 
4 -769 -922 -19.1 -141.0 560.5 220.8 781.3 
5 -570 -713 -17.6 -143.3 376.6 193.6 570.2 
6 -374 -514 -19.5 -157.2 181.4 174.9 356.4 
7 -130 -250 -12.9 -86.5 -63.4 227.0 163.6 
8 229 26 -22.6 -183.0 -376.9 167.5 -209.4 
9 897 787 -10.3 -28.2 -1008.6 193.6 -815.0 
10 3200 nil -A1.6 -386.5 -3264.0 100.3 -3163.6 
Mean 13 -138 -18.5 -138.3 -194.5 194.6 0.0 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .00656 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .000875 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .001680 
Note.— Tax rate is 32.85%. The figures are the difference form Table A.8.2. 
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Table A.8.5. Current Tax Rate System (J) 
Decile EI NMI H WI TT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 75218 15305 801.9 6848.6 3534.8 
2 80156 19228 787.0 6554.5 4805.9 
3 81849 20600 760.3 6499.0 5126.5 
4 83240 21873 796.3 6998.7 5813.3 
5 84430 22559 691.1 6528.6 6153.3 
6 86136 23402 569.8 5451.0 6757.7 
7 87191 24337 591.4 6073.6 8073.1 
8 88983 25951 593.6 6365.1 9388.3 
9 91302 28252 586.6 6959.2 11358.7 
10 96569 33007 545.6 6895.3 16409.8 
Mean 85515 23458 672.3 6517.7 7747.8 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .03811 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .003505 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .007050 
NOTE. - Thresholds to each tax brackets are multiplied by 1.354. 
Table A.8.5.1. Difference of "Current Tax Rate (J)" from "Current Tax System" 
Decile AEI ANMI AH AWI ATT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 -89 -741 -67.9 -494.5 246.6 
2 -161 -1258 -116.8 -859.7 398.0 
3 -169 -1315 -120.9 -936.4 379.0 
4 -375 -1389 -123.1 -954.5 434.3 
5 112 -1419 -172.0 -1345.9 72.9 
6 283 -1046 -154.6 -1226.3 -180.8 
7 339 -1241 -177.0 -1411.6 -170.8 
8 317 -1368 -182.3 -1491.3 -123.3 
9 368 -1647 -226.8 -1912.9 -266.0 
10 839 -1706 -281.1 -2490.7 -784.5 
Mean 147 -1313 -162.3 -1313.2 0.0 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .00194 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .000401 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .000779 
Note.— The figures are the difference form Table A.8.2. 
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Table A.8.6. Proportional Tax System (J) 
Decile AEI ANMI AH AWI ATT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 -1198 -768 56.4 454.6 1223.1 
2 -1044 -411 84.5 647.9 1058.5 
3 -1010 -213 93.5 736.7 949.3 
4 -750 105 114.1 928.4 823.1 
5 -695 170 113.5 933.7 763.4 
6 -521 335 113.1 925.4 590.7 
7 -58 996 136.7 1148.0 152.0 
8 417 1689 146.5 1260.3 -428.3 
9 1480 2969 179.9 1704.2 -1264.6 
10 4090 5736 193.0 1892.2 -3843.6 
Mean 74 1064 123.2 1063.8 0.0 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .00891 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .000925 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .001763 
Note.— Tax rate is 25.01%. The figures are the difference form Table A.8.5. 
Table A.8.7. Single Rate Tax System (J) 
Decile AEI ANMI AH AWI ATT 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 -422 ^ 3 3 6.4 57.4 490.0 
2 ^ 7 6 -349 24.0 190.9 540.0 
3 -482 -227 33.8 265.8 492.8 
4 -429 -43 55.4 462.0 505.1 
5 -436 -45 57.8 479.3 524.4 
6 -422 40 63.9 524.8 485.0 
7 -170 452 86.3 727.5 275.5 
8 129 940 96.7 832.9 -107.0 
9 854 1867 127.1 1215.0 -652.1 
10 2792 4011 149.3 1472.2 -2539.0 
Mean 95 623 70.1 623.5 -0.1 
Inequality of Equivalent Income 
Gini Coefficient .00503 
Atkinson Index (e = 1) .000486 
Atkinson Index (e = 2) .000909 
Note.— Tax rate is 31.82%. The figures are the difference form Table A.8.5. 
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Chapter 9 
Summary and Conclusions 
The thesis discussed and measured the effects of taxes and transfer payments on 
wives' labour supply, income and welfare. We intend to contribute to labour supply 
studies on three counts. 
First, we showed that under certain types of nonlinear budget constraints, the 
utility consistency of a labour supply function can be examined by checking the 
Slutsky restriction, and dual functions, such as the expenditure function and the 
indirect utility function, and identities, such as Roy's identity and Hotelling's lemma, 
are still valid. We offered some examples of such types of nonlinear budget 
constraints, such as those under progressive taxes, variable entry costs, and intra-
family bargaining. Those budget constraints may be denoted as c = ri(wh + m, h), 
where rj is continuous and monotonically increasing in the first argument. It should be 
noted, however, that the estimated labour supply function is not valid if the tax 
system, the entry cost functions, or the family decision making rule have changed; in 
other words, the estimated parameters are not valid if the functional form of rj has 
changed. 
Furthermore, we developed a method for estimating utility consistent labour 
supply under endogenous market wages. Rosen (1976) estimated a labour supply 
function assuming that the market wage rate depends on hours of work. We developed 
his method so that the estimated labour supply function is consistent with utility 
maximization. We offered two ways to specify a labour supply function 
corresponding to linear and log linear wage equations. The developed method may be 
combined with the full information method under a progressive tax system. 
Secondly, we measured the effects of two types of subsidies for market entry, a 
202 
lump sum subsidy and a proportional subsidy, on wives' labour supply and income. 
The model consists of four equations, a probit-type participation equation, a log linear 
market wage equation, a log linear reservation wage equation, and a utility consistent 
labour supply function. The disturbance terms of these equation are assumed to be 
jointly normally distributed. We derived a numerical expression for the marginal gain 
and the marginal cost of subsidies. 
The estimation results show that if one dollar is subsidized for all working wives 
in a lump sum, an average wife will increase her wage income by $1.10, and if all 
working wives are subsidized in proportion to hours of work, a one dollar subsidy 
will increase an average wife's wage income by $2.36. The estimation depends on the 
assumption that the participation decision equation has a normally distributed 
disturbance term. According to a normality test, however, this assumption does not 
appear to hold. The direction of the bias caused by the nonnormal disturbance term is 
not known since the true distribution is not known. 
Thirdly, we compared the effects of introducing a single rate tax system under a 
individual-income-based tax system and a joint-income-based tax system. Hausman 
(1981b, 1981c) found that introducing a single rate tax system would increase labour 
supply and decrease the excess burden of both husband and wife. His findings, 
however, may depend on whether the tax system is based on individual income or a 
couple's joint income. Under the current tax system in Australia, a majority of the 
wives face marginal tax rates that are lower than their husbands. Hence, it is not 
certain whether or not introducing a single rate tax system lowers an average wife's 
marginal tax rate, although there is no doubt that a single rate tax system lowers an 
average husband's marginal tax rate. 
The simulation results show that if both pre-reform tax system and post-reform 
tax system are based on individual income, introducing a single rate tax system will 
decrease labour supply and increase deadweight loss for a majority of the wives. On 
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the other hand, if both pre-reform tax system and post-reform tax system are based on 
a couple's joint income, we get a result that is similar to that of Hausman. Our study 
shows that similar tax reforms may have quite different effects on wives' work efforts 
and welfare under the two different tax systems. 
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